

AidWatch 2022

**Is the EU a
payer, player...
or just full of hot air?**

CONCORD

European Confederation of NGOs working on
sustainable development and international cooperation

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CONCORD is the European Confederation of NGOs working on sustainable development and international cooperation. We are made up of 58 member organisations representing more than 2600 NGOs and are supported by millions of citizens across Europe.

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About the AidWatch Report

Since 2005, CONCORD's AidWatch reports have monitored and made recommendations on the quantity and quality of aid provided by the EU and its Member States. With the AidWatch publications, CONCORD members want to hold EU leaders accountable for their commitment to dedicate 0.7% of their Gross National Income to development cooperation and to use this aid in a genuine and effective way. The AidWatch initiative carries out ongoing advocacy, research and media activities on a wide range of aid-related issues throughout the year.

See all AidWatch reports: <https://aidwatch.concordeurope.org/>

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



ENOUGH?

The EU collectively continued to fall far short of its internationally agreed Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending commitments in 2021.

- The EU spent EUR 65.5 billion in 2021, accounting for 43% of all ODA contributions reported to the OECD.
- Whilst the EU continued to hold its position as the largest global ODA donor bloc, ahead of the United States, Japan, the UK and Canada, its total reported ODA expenditure equates to only 0.48% of GNI.



EMPLOYED CORRECTLY?

In 2021, levels of inflated aid reached 16% of all EU ODA, breaking a trend of four years of progressive decrease. The EU continues not to employ all ODA correctly.

- The assessment of 'genuine' ODA is at the heart of the AidWatch approach. This is because there are a range of activities that, despite being reported as ODA, do not contribute to the sustainable development agenda in partner countries or do not represent a real effort on the side of donors.
- Counting in-excess vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the scale of this problem very significantly. Inflated aid has now ballooned to one euro in every six reported as ODA by the EU and its Member States.



EFFECTIVE?

The EU has developed three key policy initiatives aimed at improving coherence, coordination and visibility in its approach to international partnerships in the past two years. The results are not yet clear, so effective scrutiny remains essential.

- The Global Europe Instrument totalling EUR 79.5 billion has not progressed beyond the programming phase, and its lack of transparency is raising concerns among civil society stakeholders.
- The Team Europe approach has taken some tentative steps forward, but lacks visibility in partner countries and civil society organisations (CSOs) are not sufficiently involved.
- Global Gateway, a highly ambitious EU investment programme relying on significant development assistance resources, was announced in September 2021 and officially launched last December. Its results are still awaited.

There have been a proliferation of announcements, pledges and commitments linked to these EU initiatives. Tracing their funding arrangements across EU budget lines is challenging, and significantly more clarity is needed in this area.



EQUALITY-FOCUSED?

The EU's failure to support Least Developed Countries (LDCs) continues. It also continues to fall short on supporting climate financing, gender equality and CSOs.

- In 2020, EU ODA to LDCs stood at 0.12% of GNI. Despite this being an increase from 2019 figures, it shows that the EU still lags far behind the target of 0.15%-0.2% of GNI for ODA to LDCs. There is a disproportionate focus on the EU's neighbourhood.
- The EU must step up efforts on climate financing in order to reach the annual USD 100 billion commitment. Genuine additionality to ODA is needed to avoid dilution of efforts in the key priority areas of development assistance. Metrics on EU gender equality projects need to be tighter and include a funding dimension, with a target of 85% of new projects having gender equality as a principal or significant objective.
- The EU should support CSOs effectively by significantly boosting their core financing.



“Paying over playing?” The EU's response to COVID-19 global vaccination

EU support to international partners during the COVID-19 pandemic was the first key test for its declared objective of going ‘from payer to player’¹, and the EU failed. It still has a very long way to go to demonstrate a genuine partnership approach when facing a crisis like COVID-19.

- The EU was a key funder of the global vaccination effort and delivered vaccines to international partners, notably 250 million doses to Africa by the end of 2021. However, the EU hoarded 3.5 times the number of vaccines necessary to meet EU Member State needs. In-excess donated doses were then reported as ODA contributions.
- The COVID-19 experience demonstrated that the EU still prioritises its own interests, further weakening progress towards building genuine international partnerships.

¹ For reference, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/annual-activity-report-2021-international-partnerships_en.pdf (p.7).

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

The global pandemic and its aftermath were not over by the end of 2021. Rather, there was an escalation of the devastating socio-economic fallout of COVID-19:

- The UN has stated that the pandemic pushed over 90 million people into extreme poverty².
- Global income inequality also increased as a consequence of the pandemic. Though small (1.2% on average), it marks the first increase after two decades of steady decrease³.
- Meanwhile, over 2.5 billion people, of whom 2.3 billion live in low-income countries, remain unvaccinated at the time of writing.

These statements are deeply worrying, and they set the scene for the annual AidWatch report on levels of EU external aid. The report continues to use the “4Es” methodology to evaluate the situation: each of the numbers below help to tell the story of EU ODA in 2021.

ENOUGH?

Every year the AidWatch Report analyses the EU’s performance against the target of spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA; and every year it is confirmed that the EU has not met this target. This report details the scale of the gap and shows that only a few EU Member States are on target. More concerningly, an increasing number of Member States are also not even reaching the lower threshold of 0.33% in their ODA spending.

EMPLOYED CORRECTLY?

AidWatch also looks every year behind the headline failure to meet 0.7% target. By assessing how much of total EU ODA actually contributed to partner countries’ sustainable development purposes, CONCORD’s methodology for distinguishing ‘genuine’ and ‘inflated’ aid discounts items that do not genuinely contribute to the objectives of international cooperation from the total ODA budgets. The report reveals that, in 2021, 15.9% of EU ODA was inflated aid, that is one **euro in every six**. The main reason for this increase in aid inflation, breaking a declining

trend of four years, is because EU Member States reported high levels of in-excess COVID-19 vaccines as ODA.

EFFECTIVE?

In the past two years, the EU has launched three major initiatives in relation to development cooperation: a new budget instrument (NDICI-Global Europe), a new approach to joint programming (Team Europe) and an investment strategy (Global Gateway). The report assesses, under this “E”, whether there have been any improvements over the last year in terms of aid effectiveness, by evaluating the performance of these policy initiatives against the principles set out at the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

EQUALITY-FOCUSED?

3.5 times ... is how many more vaccines the EU purchased for its own people than it needed. As was the case in many high-income countries, the EU hoarded, did not initially share and then gave too little, too late.

The EU’s partner countries are getting left further behind. The disparities between high- and low-income countries are worsening. The gaps between the political rhetoric of the “haves” and realities on the ground for the “have nots” are growing.

It is time for the EU to match the commitment to ‘build the partnerships of equals’ it proclaimed in 2021, by meeting its pledges, applying policies and implementing budget decisions that strengthen its international partners, not weaken them.

² See the UN 2022 Sustainable Development Goals Report: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2022/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2022.pdf>

³ Ibid.

ENOUGH ODA

The EU collectively continued to fall far short of its internationally agreed ODA spending commitments in 2021.

In 2021, the EU accounted for 43% of all ODA contributions reported to the OECD. Despite a decrease in relative terms from 2020 figures, it continued to hold its position as the largest ODA donor bloc globally, ahead of the United States, Japan, the UK and Canada.⁴

AidWatch reports have calculated ODA expenditure in real cash flow terms since 2006, and it continues to use this approach to measure spending patterns across time. On this basis, in 2021, EU Member States' total ODA amounted to EUR 65.5 billion.⁵ This equates to 0.48% of their combined GNI as expenditure on ODA. This headline total shows a slight decline from 0.5% in 2020.


These latest figures demonstrate once again that the EU, in common with other high-income economies, continues to fall far short of the 0.7% target to which it is committed in signing up to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. In fact, the UN first agreed to the 0.7% target of GNI in 1970 and in October 1974 it was agreed that the target should be met by 1975, and in no case later than 1980. EU Member States in 2002 agreed to reach the target by 2015. In 2005, the 0.7% target also served as a reference for renewed political commitments to increase ODA, at the G8 Gleneagles Summit and the UN World Summit.⁶

Aid budgets in 2020 were clearly impacted by the immediate effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on ODA in terms of shrinking economies and therefore ODA automatically rose as a proportion of GNI. In contrast, and as last year's AidWatch Report already anticipated, in 2021 the opposite phenomenon was observed: despite a nominal increase, the final ratio of GNI to ODA decreased due to the economic recovery. At the same time, national governments across the OECD continued to spend massively to address the immediate challenges of the pandemic at home. For example, the US had spent the equivalent of EUR 5.03 trillion on stimulus packages by the end of 2021 and the UK added the equivalent of around EUR 355 to EUR 455 billion in public spending. For its part, the EU began to implement the EUR 2.018 trillion package which it had agreed in December 2020 to finance post-COVID recovery efforts.⁷ However, the scale of this domestic support contrasts markedly with the scarcity of flows going to partner countries for addressing COVID-19 recovery, in which ODA plays a key role.

TARGETS AND TOTALS:

The EU is committed as a bloc to achieving the 0.7% target, a pledge that applies to all Member States. At the same time, however, the 13 Member States which joined the EU since 2004 have agreed on a 0.33% target as an intermediate goal, without prejudice to the long-term commitment to reach the 0.7% target. The data analysis below groups the EU into the "EU-14" and "EU-13." More in-depth analysis is available in the Country pages of this 2022 Report.

Graph 1: ODA and genuine ODA as percentage GNI of EU Member States (EU27)



⁴ The final 2021 OECD assessment is due for publication by the end of 2022.

⁵ See Annex 1: Methodology.

⁶ See OECD: The 0.7% ODA/GNI target - a history: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm>

⁷ See European Commission: Recovery plan for Europe: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en

EU-14:

0.7% or above	Above 0.5%	Above 0.4%	Above 0.3%	Below 0.3%
Luxembourg 0.99%	France 0.56%	Finland 0.49%	Ireland 0.31%	Italy 0.29%
Sweden 0.92%	Netherlands 0.52%	Belgium 0.46%	Austria 0.31%	Spain 0.23%
Germany 0.72%				Portugal 0.18%
Denmark 0.7%				Greece 0.12%

Only four Member States met the 0.7% target in 2021. The same four Member States were the highest ODA spenders in 2020.

In terms of the 0.33% target, the list below indicates ODA expenditure by the **EU-13**:⁸

0.33% or above	Above 0.25%	Above 0.2%	Above 0.15%	0.15% or below
Malta 0.34%	Hungary 0.29%		Slovenia 0.19%	Croatia 0.15%
			Estonia 0.17%	Czechia 0.13%
			Poland 0.15%	Slovakia 0.13%
				Lithuania 0.13%
				Latvia 0.12%
				Bulgaria 0.12%
				Romania 0.12%

Looking at the tables above, three points are clear from these latest OECD figures when considering the 0.7% and 0.33% targets:

- Firstly, six EU-14 Member States failed not only to meet the 0.7% target, they also reported less than 0.33% ODA last year. These were Ireland, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.
- Secondly, only one of the EU-13 Member States reportedly met the 0.33% target, although this is before taking aid inflation into account.
- Thirdly, as Table 1 below illustrates, the gap between the 0.7% target and current EU ODA levels currently stands at 0.22% considering all reported aid.

SPENDING PATTERNS: ON THE WAY UP OR ON THE WAY DOWN?

Spending patterns across Member States showed several variations. The main reasons for variation (both up and down) include levels of COVID support, especially vaccines, declared as ODA; bilateral grants, especially humanitarian assistance; aid to multilateral institutions; and in-donor refugee costs.

In 2021, 11 EU Member States increased their level of ODA spending against their 2020 baseline contributions by over 5%. However, among those Member States recording increased expenditure, only Luxembourg met the 0.7% target, and even

Table 1: Aid gap to 0.7% target in 2021 ODA figures in million EUR

Total EU	2020		2021	
Total EU27 GNI	13 350 602	% GNI	13 545 426	% GNI
EU27 ODA commitment (0.7% GNI)	93 454	0.7	94 818	0.7
Total EU27 ODA	67 078	0.50	65 508	0.48
Genuine aid	57 916	0.43	55 151	0.41
Portion of inflated aid	9 162	0.07	10 357	0.08
Aid gap to 0.7% (considering all reported aid)	26 377	0.20	29 310	0.22
Aid gap to 0.7% (considering genuine aid only)	35 539	0.27	39 666	0.29

⁸ Data for Cyprus has not been received. Cyprus' total aid as % of GNI in 2020 was 0.08% (AidWatch Report, 2020).

with this rise in spending, six of the “EU-13” Member States still did not exceed 0.2% of their country’s GNI on ODA. Box 1 illustrates which Member States experienced significant variations in their ODA levels in 2021.

BOX 1:
Member States that increased or decreased ODA spending by more than 5% in 2021

- Italy (+27%)
- Slovenia (+14.7%)
- Estonia (+14.1%)
- Ireland (+10.6%)
- Croatia (+10.2%)
- Spain (+8.5%)
- Lithuania (+6.7%)
- Poland (+6.3%)
- Latvia (+5.9%)
- Finland (+5.7%)
- Luxembourg (+5.7%)
- Greece (-27%)
- Sweden (-18.7%)
- Netherlands (-10.5%)
- Bulgaria (-6.9%)

Italy’s large percentage increase last year has been accounted for especially by a debt relief operation for Somalia, but also due to an increase in in-donor refugee costs and support to the multilateral system to address the pandemic (including through vaccine donations). Slovenia’s reported increase would not have been possible without the inclusion of in-excess vaccine donations, despite some small increases in bilateral grants and contributions to multilateral organisations. On the other hand, Estonia increased its ODA figures due to the country’s commitment to meet the 0.33% target, which gave rise to important institutional developments, including the establishment of an International Cooperation Agency.

By contrast, 11 Member States reported a drop in ODA, with a decline of above 5% in Greece, Sweden, the Netherlands and Bulgaria. According to the OECD DAC, Greece reported a lesser amount of ODA due to lower in-donor refugee costs compared to 2020, but its very low level of expenditure (0.12%) is still concerning. Sweden reported a significant decline,

mainly due to the full inclusion in 2020 of its multi-year contribution to the Green Climate Fund. In more recent news, the 2022 elections in Sweden were won by a coalition in which the largest parties campaigned to decrease aid; that is a very worrying prospect given that Sweden is one of the few EU Member States that regularly meet the two ODA targets. The decline of over 10% since 2020 in the case of the Netherlands has been ascribed to lower levels of COVID expenditure in 2021, compared to exceptional levels in 2020.

This AidWatch report continues to assess the performance of the United Kingdom, notwithstanding its withdrawal from the European Union in 2020. That same year, the UK adopted a legislative decision to renege on its pledge to meet the 0.7% of GNI target, scaling this back significantly to 0.5%. Also in 2020, after nearly 25 years as a separate ministry in government, the Department for International Development (DfID)⁹ was dissolved and formally merged with the foreign ministry to create a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. UK ODA fell sharply from 0.72% in 2020 to 0.52%¹⁰ in 2021 as a direct result of these political decisions, which illustrates the negative consequences of addressing the 0.7% target as a ceiling rather than as a baseline on which to build genuine international partnerships. Such an approach also incentivises the inclusion of every possible element of aid inflation under the ODA budgets in order to make the numbers match; however, as examined in this report, the quality of aid is also important.

PRESSURES ON EU MEMBER STATES: PANDEMIC AND POLICY CHOICES

The anticipated gradual easing of budgetary pressures on EU Member States due to the pandemic receding and the consequent prospects for higher GDP growth already caused a decline in their ODA spending as a proportion of GNI. At the same time, Member States are opting for new policy choices that affect ODA.

Several EU governments are deciding not to maintain the level of priority they had given to ODA in relative terms to other areas of government spending in the pre-pandemic period. A senior EU policy-maker interviewed for this year’s AidWatch report expressed the view that some Member State governments do not increase ODA because they wish to avoid the risk of testing or alienating public opinion by focusing on

⁹ The UK Department for International Development (DFID) was created in 1997. Its stated mission was ‘to promote sustainable development and eradicate world poverty’. DFID was dissolved on 2 September 2020.

¹⁰ These figures differ slightly from the official targets due to the different methodology used for ODA reporting (more on the different counting methodologies is available in the “Employing Correctly” section of this Report and Annex I.)

development assistance, and its level of spending relative to other policy priorities.¹¹ However, evidence shows that governments may be mistaken. The recent Eurobarometer on development cooperation indicates strong public backing across the EU for the EU to support poverty alleviation. Public opinion polling data across the EU-27 indicated in June 2022 that 89% of respondents are in favour of the EU partnering with other countries outside the EU to

BOX 2: Russia's invasion of Ukraine: adverse and uncertain global impacts

While this report looks at 2021, the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine cannot be overlooked when assessing the EU ODA landscape and providing recommendations for the year ahead. CONCORD stands firmly with the people of Ukraine, and calls on the EU to provide the necessary support to respond to the immediate effects of the war.

There is a risk that the EU and its Member States may redirect ODA to focus on support to Ukraine, which would have a deleterious impact on the fight against global poverty and inequalities. So far, the war has created economic and financial shocks, significant price rises, and a drastic reduction of wheat exports from Russia and Ukraine. This has resulted in 47 million more people suffering acute hunger, according to the WFP. ODA is an invaluable tool to tackle these spillover effects of the war, but current ODA levels are simply not enough.

On the other hand, around four million people have already fled Ukraine, and more than seven million have been internally displaced at the time of writing. Whilst it is essential that the EU ensures adequate support for Ukrainian refugees, the use of an already scarce resource - i.e. ODA - risks reducing even more its development impact on partner countries. The funds for in-donor refugee costs should not come from the ODA budgets.

reduce global poverty. 85% of those surveyed said tackling poverty in partner countries should be one of the EU's main priorities and 67% of respondents overall expressed the view that their own national government should include tackling poverty in partner countries as one of its main priorities.¹²

KEEPING TO THE 0.7% GNI/ODA TARGET

So far, most higher income countries, including in the EU, are not meeting the 0.7% commitment. Given its current lack of progress, the EU will be **7 years behind** the 2030 target, based on the 2014-2021 trend, and will only reach 0.7% in 2037 (See Graph 2). But in reality, given the longevity of the 0.7% target, the richest countries in Europe are already **almost 50 years behind** in honouring their pledges. The EU needs to act decisively now to achieve the 0.7% target. In doing so, the EU would also deliver on the clearly stated wish of public opinion across the EU27 that national governments should do more to support international partners in tackling poverty.

The UN continues to emphasise the scale of global poverty in all its forms. Even before COVID-19, baseline projections suggested that 6% of the global population would still be living in extreme poverty in 2030, missing the target of eradicating extreme poverty (SDG1.1). The 2022 UN annual SDGs Report¹³ indicates that between 2015 and 2018, the number of people living on less than \$1.90 a day dropped from 740 million to 656 million, continuing a pattern of historical decline. COVID-19 has made a severe dent in that progress, with the global poverty rate increasing sharply from 2019 to 2020, from 8.3% to 9.2%, marking the first rise in extreme poverty since 1998 and the largest since 1990. The UN report notes starkly that, in addition to the 93 million people worldwide pushed into extreme poverty by the pandemic, between 75 and 95 million more people could be living in extreme poverty by the end of 2022, as the scale of the impacts of the war in Ukraine become clearer.

In addition, successive UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Reports since the 1990s have detailed the projected impact of a global increase in temperature, warming of oceans, diminishing ice and snow and higher emissions of greenhouse gases.¹⁴ The final COP-26 "Glasgow Climate Pact" in November

11 ONCORD interview with a senior EU policy official.

12 See Eurobarometer: special survey on development (June 2022): <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2673>

13 See the UN 2022 Sustainable Development Goals report: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2022/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2022.pdf>

14 See UN Climate reports: <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/reports>

2021 specified “the adverse effects of climate change in developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to these effects” and urged scaling up of action and support across finance, technology transfer and capacity-building.¹⁵

The commitment to meet the 0.7% target of GNI to ODA is essential to ensure governments remain accountable for their level of support to international partners, as well as to keep up the momentum to meet the demands of the UN 2030 Agenda. The target must not be missed and EU efforts must be stepped up now.

CONCORD continues to believe that the 0.7% ODA/GNI target is a crucial yardstick to hold the EU and its Member States accountable to their commitments. However, for many stakeholders and in some national contexts, even the figure of 0.7% GNI is not considered enough to address all the needs of partner countries and to live up to other commitments. The EU cannot turn its back on the poorest, most marginalised people on this planet, especially not in the face of a growing food crisis, an unfolding economic crisis and a climate crisis. Spending targets as a measure of ‘enough ODA’ are only one yardstick by which to assess ODA commitments. This is why AidWatch also monitors the quality of ODA through the “4Es” methodology.


EMPLOYING ODA CORRECTLY

In 2021, levels of inflated aid reached 16% of all EU ODA, breaking a progressively downward trend over the last four years. The EU continues not to employ all ODA correctly.

The assessment of ‘genuine’ ODA is at the heart of the AidWatch approach. According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) official definition, donors can report a number of financial flows as ODA, such as imputed costs of hosting international students, first year costs of receiving refugees in the donor country, interest repayments on concessional loans and, crucially for this year’s AidWatch analysis, the donation of in-excess COVID-19 vaccines. All of these issues are controversial; CONCORD considers such areas as inflated aid, since they do not genuinely contribute to the objectives of development or international cooperation or do not represent a real effort on the part of donors. The AidWatch methodology therefore discounts these and other examples considered under the following section of the Report, distinguishing what should actually be counted as ‘genuine’ ODA versus what should not.

Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development and ‘do no harm’ principles should underpin all ODA-related initiatives, practices and policies. As the 2020 AidWatch Report stated: “The European Commission and EU Member States should promote initiatives,

Graph 2: Estimated timescale for meeting the 0.7% commitment (inflated vs genuine EU ODA)



¹⁵ See Glasgow Climate Pact (2021): https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_2_cover%2520decision.pdf

practices and policies, internationally and at the DAC level, that set clear criteria to prevent reporting as ODA any activities that fund non-development related initiatives, such as arms procurement.”

Inflated aid only pushes further the date for the EU to meet its aid commitments. If only genuine aid is counted, the EU will not meet the 0.7% target until 2039.

Every year, CONCORD’s methodology¹⁶ for calculating the levels of ‘genuine’ ODA considers the following areas as ‘inflated’ aid across the Member States:

- In-donor refugee costs
- Student costs
- Debt relief
- Interest payments on loans
- Tied Aid

Furthermore, in the context of the pandemic, a new phenomenon has contributed significantly to levels of aid inflation. This concerns **in-excess vaccine donations by Member States to aid partners**, which, after last year’s discussions at the OECD DAC, and despite not agreeing on clear rules, allowed donors to report this as ODA. CONCORD does not agree with the inclusion of in-excess vaccines as ODA, and therefore considers them to be inflated aid. The main reasons are:

- Member States did not purchase these vaccines in the first instance to support partner countries, but to cater for their own needs in Europe. Hence, there was no donor effort involved in these donations.
- In buying and hoarding more doses of vaccines than they needed, EU countries reduced other countries’ capacities to access vaccines in a context of limited supply.
- Partner countries were not able to exercise ownership over these vaccine donations to meet their needs, which significantly reduced predictability of supply and delivery arrangements.

IN-DONOR REFUGEE COSTS

In 2021, the EU27 reported EUR 4.5 billion as ODA on in-donor refugee costs. As in recent years, Malta continues to report the highest spending on refugee costs as a proportion of its ODA (EUR 32 million), or 73% of its inflated aid total. France (EUR 931 million) and Germany (EUR 2.13 billion) reported the largest

ODA in this area in absolute terms. Greece reported a significant fall in in-donor refugee costs, from EUR 71 million in 2020 to EUR 1 million in 2021, due to a smaller number of documented arrivals. In terms of the EU collectively, the data show a slight decrease from 2020, accounting for 6.9% of total ODA. Overall, however, in-donor refugee costs still account for 38% of all EU inflated aid.

Whilst this declining trend is positive, CONCORD does not agree that in-donor refugee costs should be counted as ODA. These costs do not contribute to addressing the root causes of refugee flows and do not have any development impact on partner countries. Instead, the donor country becomes the recipient of its own ODA. If EU Member States lived up to their pledges on the 0.7% commitment, significant extra resources would be available to address the poverty and inequalities which contribute to breeding conflict and instability, and which in turn often force people away from their homes and in search of protection in other countries and regions, including Europe.¹⁷

STUDENT COSTS


The EU considers the encouragement of young people’s mobility as a key achievement, demonstrating commitment to broadening opportunity and access to institutes of education and training, both for EU citizens, notably through its Erasmus student exchange scheme, and to those outside its borders. At the same time, EU national governments also run access programmes for students, notably from less developed countries, which frequently serve the aims of their public and cultural diplomacy. These activities may take the form of scholarships or other financial support. Positive though these programmes are, such activities should not be categorised as ODA budget expenditure, not least because these funds are not spent in the partner but in the donor country, without a direct effect on partner countries. Indeed, most Member States do not include student costs in their reporting. Nevertheless, 2021 figures for this were EUR 2.36 billion. Notable examples of Member States with high student costs imputed to ODA were Germany (EUR 1.4 billion) and France (EUR 0.7 billion).¹⁸

¹⁶ Full methodology is available in Annex I.


¹⁷ For further analysis, see CONCORD policy paper on Setting the highest standards for Global Europe implementation: <https://concordeurope.org/2021/05/06/setting-the-highest-standards-for-global-europe-implementation/>

¹⁸ These figures are based on estimations made through CONCORD’s AidWatch methodology, as official data is not yet available. More information on this is in Annex I.


Graph 3: ODA and genuine ODA as a percentage of GNI



Graph 4: ODA and genuine ODA as a percentage of GNI (EU-14)



Graph 5: Genuine vs total ODA as a percentage of GNI, EU 13



DEBT RELIEF AND INTEREST PAYMENTS ON LOANS

United Nations SDG17 includes the aim to ‘assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress.’ In April 2020, the IMF announced grants of around USD 500 million covering debt repayments owed by 25 low-income countries for an initial six-month period, stating that this measure would enable them to better combat the impact of the global pandemic.¹⁹ A follow-up Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) was initiated by the G20 in May 2020 and implemented by the World Bank and the IMF; USD 12.9 billion in debts were suspended for 48 countries up to December 2021. The World Bank also noted that the “G20 had called on private creditors to participate in the initiative on comparable terms. Regrettably, only one private creditor participated.”²⁰ As CONCORD has already averred (including in previous AidWatch reports²¹), the current trend of greater private sector involvement in the sustainable development agenda, without being clear yet whether this approach delivers effective results, is a considerable matter of concern for civil society.

It is at least encouraging that all but one Member State opted not to report significant amounts of debt relief as ODA in 2021. Italy was the exception, reporting EUR 431 million. However, true debt cancellation for low-income international partners is the only equitable approach. It would improve their position significantly.

INTEREST PAYMENTS ON LOANS

The AidWatch report uses the net cash flow measure of ODA because of the problems inherent in the grant equivalent system (see section ‘How do new rules on ODA accounting boost aid inflation?’). Under the cash flow method, the repayments on ODA loans are subtracted from net ODA, but not interest payments.

These therefore represent inflated aid. Irrespective of the OECD reporting rules that are now applicable, CONCORD neither supports the attachment of interest payments to loans, nor agrees that such interest received on loan repayments should be included in ODA.

In 2021, interest payments received on loans counted as ODA across the EU totalled EUR 1.17 billion, equating to 11.3% of inflated aid. These included EUR 610 million reported by France, EUR 502 million by Germany, as well as EUR 455 million reported by the EU Institutions.²²

TIED AID

Tied aid is conditional on the purchase of goods and services from one donor country, or a restricted set of countries, hence reducing its development impact. It may be partially or fully tied. Tied aid reduces effectiveness and caters to the needs and interests of EU countries. OECD reporting rules on ODA currently allow Member States to present tied aid as a positive contribution to helping partners. CONCORD does not agree with this reporting approach, as it is actually a way of bringing in more value to the donor rather than to the partner country. In 2021, the EU Institutions projected EUR 797 million in tied aid as ODA, and Sweden recorded the largest figure (EUR 113.6 million²³) of all EU Member States, both figures being at constant prices. This represents almost 10% of all EU inflated aid.

IN-EXCESS VACCINE DONATIONS

The final area of inflated aid covered in this AidWatch report relates specifically to the challenges of combating COVID-19. The key issue is the reporting of in-excess vaccines as ODA on a very large scale, which artificially boosted ODA by EUR 1.5 billion.²⁴

Some donors, including the Netherlands, expressed concerns in the OECD DAC about the inclusion of surplus vaccines in ODA as they were not purchased with that purpose in the first place and this risked

¹⁹ For reference, see:

<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/13/pr20151-imf-executive-board-approves-immediate-debt-relief-for-25-countries>

²⁰ For reference, see: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative>

²¹ See 2019 AidWatch Report: *The State of EU Financing for Development* (p. 8)

²² These figures are based on estimations made through CONCORD’s AidWatch methodology, as official data is not yet available. More information on this in Annex I.

²³ This figure is far higher than usual in the case of Sweden, for two main reasons. The first one is that tied aid is only reported as commitments, and 2021 saw the renegotiation of many contracts with Swedish authorities and the sign-off of many multi-year commitments. Secondly, all ODA through Swedish authorities or Universities, as well as grants to different working groups and bodies, is reported as Tied Aid in the CRS database.

²⁴ The thematic chapter in this Report on the EU’s response to the global vaccination programme develops these points and wider analysis in more detail.

undermining partner countries' ownership of their development priorities.²⁵ In the end, the Netherlands did not follow OECD DAC guidelines and did not report in-excess vaccine donations as ODA. In marked contrast, however, it emerged in February 2022 that Hungary had blocked OECD DAC consensus on counting vaccine donations in 2021 aid totals due to its opposition to setting a common price per dose for the reporting. In the first ODA figures released in April 2022, Hungary was the only country to report these donations at a higher price than the one suggested by the OECD DAC guidelines.²⁶

The elements of inflated aid covered in this section of the Report already account for practically identical levels of inflated aid compared with last year's figures, representing 13.6% of total EU ODA. However, the inclusion of these donations (which amounted to EUR 1.5 billion) brings the inflated aid up to 15.9% of all ODA. The graph below sets out the scale of in-excess vaccine inclusions in data on inflated ODA.

The scale of in-excess vaccine donations reported by EU Member States was a game-changer for 2021 ODA figures. For some Member States, the reporting of these donations was crucial to show an increase in the overall figures, or even helped offset real decreases in their ODA levels. The graph below shows

the scale to which in-excess vaccine donations by EU Member States contributed to their overall levels of aid inflation.


INFLATED AID: 2021 SUMMARY

Inflated aid is a significant consideration in assessing EU ODA. The inclusion of in-excess vaccines has seriously aggravated the problem, because inflated aid has now ballooned to one euro in every six reported as ODA by the EU and its Member States.

HOW DO NEW RULES ON ODA ACCOUNTING BOOST AID INFLATION?

In 2019, the DAC adopted a new methodology for reporting concessional loans as ODA. Previously, they used the cash flow method so that disbursements would be counted at their face value and future repayments would count as negative ODA. If a loan were fully repaid, it would not be accounted as ODA overall. The DAC now uses the "grant equivalent" method. Instead of counting the full face value of a loan, the DAC estimates the degree of sacrifice involved with lending.

Graph 6: Share of in-excess vaccine donations as percentage of total inflated aid in EU Member States



²⁵ For reference, see: <https://www.devex.com/news/us-netherlands-unconvinced-on-aid-eligibility-of-surplus-vax-donations-102364>

²⁶ As a result, 30 OECD member states continued to be able to include the 6.73 USD per dose in their ODA calculations. For reference, see: <https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-hungary-thwarts-consensus-on-vax-donation-rules-102635>

The purpose of this change was ostensibly to better reflect “donor effort” and to make it easier to compare grants and loans. Under the old method, if a donor increased their lending, ODA would be exaggerated in the first year because the loans would count for the same as grants despite needing to be paid back. The grant equivalent would only record a percentage of the value of the loan and so give a lower figure. This can be seen in recent years: ODA from the EU Institutions, Germany and France has generally been lower under the grant equivalent method because each donor has increased its lending.

However, this does not mean that aid inflation is lower under the new method. In fact, the way that the DAC has decided to measure the grant equivalent of loans has made aid inflation far worse.


ODA BY NET CASH FLOW AND GRANT EQUIVALENT MEASURES (CONSTANT 2020 EUR BILLION)

The grant element of a loan is simply a net present value calculation: it is the difference between the face value of the loan, and the current value of future repayments (discount rates). The higher the rate used to discount future payments, the less they would be worth today, and so the bigger the difference. This discount rate should reflect the cost of borrowing for donors (higher borrowing costs make it more expensive for donors to provide loans) and the risk of not being repaid. If the discount rate is appropriately

chosen, then the difference between the cash flow and grant equivalent methods should be small²⁷: the cash flow method records ODA when losses occur, and the grant equivalent records ex ante estimates of those losses. However, choosing discount rates that are too high will permanently inflate the aid recorded on every loan.

Unfortunately this is exactly what the DAC has done. To create the discount rates by income group the DAC starts with a “base rate” of 5%, which is far above the cost of borrowing for any DAC donor, and then add margins of 1%, 2% and 4% for LDCs/LICs, LMICS and UMICs respectively, which grossly exaggerate the risk of lending to these groups. As such, reported aid is much higher for lending countries than a truer measure of donor effort would entail, contrary to the stated intention of the DAC. Some transactions which are not concessional in any meaningful sense count as ODA. This allows donors to make profits on their ODA: the French government has claimed that they make EUR 5 for every EUR 1 recorded as ODA. As an illustration, if a donor invested in China’s 10-year, USD-denominated government bond (with a yield of 2.8% at the time of writing), it could then count this as ODA despite the bond being bought and sold by investors for financial gain.²⁸ As a result, the grant equivalent method will produce much more ODA over the long-term, and this is exacerbated by the DAC’s decision to double count ODA on debt relief, as noted in the 2020 AidWatch report.

Graph 7: Difference in ODA levels for the EU Institutions, France and Germany (grant equivalent vs cash flow methodologies) (CONCORD visualisation)



²⁷ The grant equivalent method will still produce slightly higher results, because it acknowledges that there is a cost to lending for donors. See the worked example below.

²⁸ Grant element of around 25%.

BOX 3: Illustrating grant equivalent and cash flow methodologies

This example illustrates the impact of these DAC decisions:


A donor makes 100 interest-free loans every year, each worth EUR 10 million and all with grace periods of five years, after which the loans are repaid in equal instalments of EUR 1 million per year. Not all of these loans will be repaid in full, so we assume that each year there is a 2% probability that payments stop (following the DAC's 2% margin for LMICs). The chart (Fig 1) demonstrates what would happen under different ways of measuring ODA: Panel A shows annual ODA, and Panel B shows cumulative ODA.

The net cash flow method (red line) initially records much higher ODA than the grant equivalent method used by the DAC (blue line). But as repayments start, net ODA begins to decrease. If loans were fully repaid ODA would decrease to zero, but because there are some losses, repayments never

quite match disbursements (using the above assumption, these losses will equate to roughly 2% of disbursements). By contrast, the grant equivalent method starts at a lower level, but quickly catches up and eventually records much higher numbers, because each year the grant equivalent is exaggerated, and then additional ODA for debt relief is added on top.

The grant equivalent method is not inherently bad. The green line shows how ODA would be recorded if a more appropriate discount rate were used²⁹, and if debt relief were not double-counted. In this case, ODA each year is simply the grant equivalent of disbursed loans, constant each year in our example (Panel A). Because it compensates donors for their borrowing costs, each year the loans would record a slightly higher amount than ODA. But the end result is much closer to the cash flow method.

Fig 1: Simulation of ODA recorded on loans (constant disbursement) (Own elaboration)



Notes: Panel A shows ODA recorded each year on net disbursements of USD 1000 in loans. ODA on debt relief is simulated by assigning each year of the loan a probability of 2% that all future repayments will not be made. The panel shows only up to year 85, the last year of loan disbursements, after which the net cash flow method turns negative, but the DAC's current method continues to count additional ODA on debt relief. The other series drop to zero.

²⁹ We add the risk margin of 2% (accurate by assumption) to the appropriate Differentiated Discount Rate for EU lending. In reality, the risk margin of 2% is much higher than historical experience justifies.

EFFECTIVE ODA

As the largest global donor of ODA, the EU requires an effective institutional framework to deliver development assistance. Over the past two years, the EU has announced and launched three major initiatives:

- A new budget instrument: the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe;
- A new approach to joint development assistance programming across the European Commission, EU Delegations and Member States: “Team Europe”;
- A new investment strategy: Global Gateway.

CONCORD is concerned that the EU’s progress so far remains strikingly weak in supporting the needs of its international partners.

The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation³⁰, agreed in 2011 by consensus among global development assistance organisations, established a set of principles to guide aid effectiveness. These include: **focus on results; ownership of development priorities by partner countries; inclusive partnerships; and transparency and mutual accountability.** In this section, the report looks at whether any improvements have been made over the last year in terms of aid effectiveness. AidWatch interviewed several CSOs in partner countries and EU officials for their input.

FOCUS ON RESULTS: SLOW AND FEW

The EU has been slow to develop its new institutional framework and the scoreboard shows few results so far.

The EU launched an internal debate on a new budget instrument in 2019. Two years later, in June 2021, the “NDICI-Global Europe” Instrument was approved by the European Parliament. “Team Europe” was launched in early 2020 to improve the coherence and

coordination of efforts, notably at partner country level³¹ and the EU describes initiatives falling under Team Europe as “flagships that deliver concrete, transformational results for partner countries or regions pursued by European development/external action partners.”³²

The Commission has developed a Team Europe Initiative (TEI) tracker which indicates that there are currently over 150 regional and global initiatives,³³ with an important focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.” However, TEIs are clearly behind schedule. Initiatives are still in feasibility assessment and programme phases and “dates and timelines referred to are estimations and all information on TEIs at this stage is just indicative.”³⁴

Although the NDICI entered into force in June 2021,³⁵ the 2021 “Annual Activity Report” published by the European Commission a year later in May 2022 did not provide further information on disbursements beyond a statement that “despite the late adoption of the external financing instruments, the Commission managed to complete the next operationalisation steps”.³⁶ These included the adoption of 84 country, one multi-country and three regional Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs), complemented by ERASMUS+ and four thematic MIPs (a total of 93 MIPs) for NDICI-Global Europe. Following last year’s report recommendations, these documents can now be easily consulted by any interested party in the tracker.³⁷ The European Commission will have another opportunity to report on concrete progress against MIPs and budgets allocated in each case in 2023, which should serve to measure the progress of NDICI implementation and set the scene for a mid-term review.

The Global Gateway initiative was announced in the State of the Union speech by the President of the European Commission in September 2021 and was officially launched in December 2021. The stated aim of the initiative is to “contribute to narrowing the global investment gap worldwide, in line with the commitment made in June 2021 by G7 leaders to launch a values-driven, high-standard and

³⁰ *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation : Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November - 1 December 2011.*

³¹ *European Union, Working Better Together as Team Europe through joint programming and joint implementation, January 2021, cited in 2021 AidWatch Report, p.16.*

³² <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/>.

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/> *The Joint Programming (JP) process involves: feasibility and scoping exercises, roadmaps, joint analysis and joint strategies.*

³⁵ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/new-%E2%80%98ndici-global-europe%E2%80%99-2021-2027_en.

³⁶ *Annual activity report 2021 - International Partnerships | European Commission.*

³⁷ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/Global-Europe-Programming>.

transparent infrastructure partnership to meet global infrastructure development needs.”³⁸

The EU claims that Global Gateway is also fully aligned with the UN’s Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. It has also indicated that between 2021 and 2027, via a Team Europe approach, EU institutions and EU Member States will jointly mobilise up to EUR 300 billion of investments, by allocating around EUR 145 billion through European external aid and development programmes and the rest through private investments.”³⁹

A Commission official interviewed for this report openly acknowledges that “we need the means to achieve our ambitions and big plans, such as Global Gateway.”⁴⁰ Apart from clearly demonstrating the strategic added value of Global Gateway, it is crucial that the EU shows it will deliver on development impact. If it wants to justify the use of an already scarce resource like ODA, the EU should demonstrate how Global Gateway fits with existing processes, such as programming Global Europe and Team Europe, and how the relevant EU partners, including CSOs, are going to be involved.

OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES BY PARTNER COUNTRIES AND INCLUSIVE PARTNERSHIPS: VERY WEAK AND CONCERNING

Taking the Busan principles together, there is a clear and ongoing lack of ownership by EU partner countries in programmes specifically aimed at addressing their needs.

Based on CONCORD’s interviews with CSO partners for this report, inclusive partnerships continue to be the weakest and most troubling part of the TEI approach. An EU official confirmed in an interview that “CSOs were not too much involved at the central level and were not included in the consultation on TEIs” adding that local stakeholders were more involved “as things move into the design phase.”⁴¹ CSO partners expressed two main concerns about

their engagement in shaping TEIs when consulted by EU Delegations. First, *access to consultations* with EU Delegations was limited. One partner in Zambia said CSOs in remote areas were usually not engaged and, in addition, those without internet access were further restricted in their ability to participate if the EU Delegation did not reach out to them.⁴² Another DRC-based partner working on an EU-funded project said they were not aware which other CSOs had been involved in consultations with the EU Delegation. Second, *consultation periods were short*. One CSO partner said that, while commenting positively on how the EU Delegation engaged in a fragile security situation, they did not have time for information gathering at field level, for instance, to consult civil society, technical services and aid beneficiaries.⁴³

It seems clear from CSO stakeholder evidence gathered for this report⁴⁴ that the EU could do more to explain to CSOs what Team Europe aims to achieve, to enable civil society engagement in TEIs (consultation to decide the projects, involvement in design and monitoring). The EU describes Joint Programming for TEIs as “a strategic engagement process by Team Europe and other European partners that starts with a joint analysis of the challenges and opportunities in a partner country and then develops a joint response at country level based on the EU’s values and interests and *in support of that country’s development priorities* and associated financing strategy.”⁴⁵ However, this ‘joint’ approach is largely excluding CSOs when and where their inputs are most needed, and the EU is still not following the principle of partner country ownership. This mindset and operational approach need to change.

TRANSPARENCY AND MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY: LOW

There is an ongoing low level of transparency across both budgeting (Global Instrument) and programming (TEIs) and the linkages between them.

In June 2021, the Global Europe Instrument was endowed with a total overall allocation of EUR 79.5 billion, with 75% for geographic programmes and the

³⁸ *Global Gateway | European Commission.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *CONCORD interview with Laurent Sarazin, Head of Unit, DG INTPA, European Commission, 4 July 2022.*

⁴¹ *CONCORD interview with an EU official, July 2022.*

⁴² *CONCORD interview with a CSO representative, July 2022.*

⁴³ *Interview with a CSO representative in DRC, 28 June 2022.*

⁴⁴ *CONCORD interviews with CSO representatives, July 2022.*

⁴⁵ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/> *Emphasis added.*

remainder covering thematic programmes, a rapid response mechanism and a ‘cushion’ of unallocated funds. However, while CONCORD welcomes the introduction of a Commission tracker on regional MIPs and thematic MIPs, the allocation of funds to these programmes from these Global Europe Instrument envelopes must be made clear and traceable. Transparency and mutual accountability must apply to the Commission, to EU Delegations, to Member States and to the EU’s collective approach.

There are several significant challenges for the EU to address. First, Member State involvement in TEIs is uneven, ranging from over 100 (France, Germany) to one (Slovakia, Malta, Greece), or even none (Croatia).⁴⁶ Other heavily involved Member States are the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Belgium, participating in more than 50 country or regional TEIs. Second, in May 2022, Team Europe was presented with a Partnerships Portal, an Estonian-created platform for development cooperation projects. Although this is a positive new initiative, it is geared to the needs of EU institutions and Member States and is not readily accessible to CSOs or the public. This does not respect the Busan transparency principle.

Third, interview evidence reveals issues around effective collaboration among stakeholders engaged in “Team Europe.” Although some stakeholders are experienced in joint programming, one official notes ‘the key issue is trust’, adding that larger Member States want to maintain their influence and that “it is more difficult to achieve a ‘virtuous cycle’ of trust and cooperation.”⁴⁷

A fourth, related challenge appears to be the coherence and coordination of data management for TEIs. The Commission has its own process for up to two-thirds of Commission-run projects and is mainstreaming its TEI project tracking with its existing infrastructure. At the same time, one Commission official said in an interview for this report that “the difficulty lies with integrating Member State data on TEIs and the processes of feeding the OECD DAC database [...] the Commission is working closely with the Member States on their data, so there are at least some common elements across the Commission and Member States.”⁴⁸

EFFECTIVE ODA? “COULD DO MUCH BETTER”

CONCORD believes the EU’s institutional framework for development assistance, including its new initiatives, is too slow to deliver results, very weak in partner ownership and inclusivity, and lacking in transparency and accountability.

There have been very few improvements on effectiveness since the 2021 AidWatch report.

Finally, CONCORD believes that the European Parliament must play a far more central role in ensuring proper scrutiny and coherence of the EU’s key initiatives which underpin its approach to international partnerships, including the Global Europe Instrument, Team Europe Initiatives and Global Gateway.

⁴⁶ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/>.

⁴⁷ CONCORD interview with an EU official, July 2022

⁴⁸ CONCORD interview with an EU official, July 2022.

EQUALITY-FOCUSED ODA

The eradication of poverty has been an external relations' objective of the EU, since its explicit inclusion in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which also promotes equality as one of the European Union's founding values. The EU commits to "uphold and promote" these values "in its relations with the wider world"⁴⁹. Yet latest evidence on the EU's performance in 2021 shows that:

- EU ODA to LDCs is still far too low;
- more ambitious programming is needed for **gender equality**;
- **climate financing** has provided not much new, and even less additional money;
- **support to civil society** needs real commitment, backed by more core funding and the removal of constraints on CSOs' ability to operate in fragile and conflict environments.⁵⁰

EU ODA TO LDCS: STILL FAR TOO LOW

ODA financing is crucial for LDCs. Yet, according to the latest consolidated data (from 2020⁵¹), only 0.12% of EU Member State GNI was donated to LDCs. As already noted, this is well below the 0.15-0.2% target

agreed by the EU and demonstrates a continuing trend of lagging behind. Only five EU Member States reached the target in 2020: Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Germany.

Nevertheless, this is an increase compared to the 2019 figures, with EU collective ODA to LDCs rising from EUR 14.4 billion⁵² to EUR 15.5 billion. It is important to note that, following a recent change in the rules for ODA reporting, it is now possible to count regional ODA known to benefit LDCs. Applying the old methodology, the EU27 ODA to LDCs would have been slightly lower. It is important to note that the choice of methodology is significant in some cases, such as Germany, which reached the 0.15% target in 2020 under the new methodology, but remained at 0.14% under the previous one.

Aid 'orphans' and 'darlings' are a recurring challenge in the allocation of development assistance. The OECD has noted that providers of development cooperation decide individually which countries to assist and to what extent. As a consequence, the global development cooperation landscape is increasingly uneven. The resulting imbalances can impair the effectiveness of aid through aid fragmentation as well as accumulation of providers in some countries – so-called "darlings" – and gaps in aid provision in others – commonly known as "orphans".⁵³

Table 2: Aid gap to reaching the target of 0.15-0.20% ODA/GNI for LDCs

	2019		2020	
	ODA in EUR billion	As of per cent of GNI	ODA in EUR million	As of per cent of GNI
Total EU27 GNI	14 444 498		13 350 602	
ODA commitment (0.15% of GNI)	21 667	0.15	20 026	0.15
ODA commitment (0.20% of GNI)	28 889	0.2	26 701	0.2
Total ODA to LDCs	14 370	0.10	15 492	0.12
Aid gap to 0.15%	7 297	0.05	4 534	0.03
Aid gap to 0.2%	14 519	0.10	11 209	0.07

49 Article 5 of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.

50 For a more detailed analysis of the extent to which and how EU Member States' international cooperation addresses inequalities, read CONCORD: The Road to Equality, 2022: <https://concordeurope.org/resource/the-road-to-equality/>

51 The calculations for the EU ODA to LDCs is based on Eurostat data, rather than OECD, given the methodology used by the European Commission in order to avoid double counting with the imputed multilateral ODA from Member States to the EU Institutions. Further methodological guidance is given in Annex.

52 For the purpose of data consistency, the UK has been excluded from the counting of EU ODA in 2019. We must note that the UK is a big contributor of ODA to LDCs, providing 5.1 billion EUR in 2019.

53 See: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/Aid-Orphans-Development-Brief.pdf>, OECD, 2014.

It is clear that there is still a long way to go in order to ensure that EU ODA is allocated where it is most needed. When comparing the top 10 recipients of EU collective ODA against the world's 46 LDCs, only three countries were in both lists in 2020: Ethiopia, Somalia and Afghanistan. On the other hand, in 2021 Turkey -an upper-middle income country- remained the largest recipient of EU ODA (EUR 1.67 billion), followed by Syria (EUR 690.3 million) and Somalia (EUR 306.21 million).

Following a 15-year trend in EU ODA, Turkey has been the largest recipient (EUR 32.73 billion) since 2007, while India has received EUR 17.56 billion in assistance during the same period. Both countries have individually been well ahead of the DRC (EUR 13.16 billion), Ethiopia (EUR 13.07 billion), Iraq (EUR 12.5 billion), Syria (EUR 12.35 billion), and the West Bank and Gaza (EUR 11.43 billion).⁵⁴

Current ODA priorities, of both the EU and individual Member States, must be changed, so as to ensure that ODA reaches the countries and people most in need, efficiently and transparently. The EU should therefore redirect its aid to support those countries on the UN list of LDCs.⁵⁵

Furthermore, the EU should better measure and track ODA provided to partner countries with the explicit goal of tackling inequalities. The inequality marker that the European Commission will adopt should serve to measure income inequality as well as other types of inequality and the relationships between them.

SUPPORTING GENDER EQUALITY: MORE AMBITIOUS PROGRAMMING NEEDED

Gender inequalities are a significant and persistent barrier in unleashing the potential of societies.⁵⁶ The EU has committed to addressing gender equality, both in the EU and in its wider international engagement in its series of Gender Action Plans, the third of which (GAP III), was published in November 2020.⁵⁷ In 2020, 44% of bilateral aid was allocated to projects with gender equality components. In percentage terms, this figure is unchanged from 2019. Broken down into 'principal' and 'significant' support, however,

spending where the 'principal' as opposed to 'significant' focus fell from 5.57% to 5.13%.

In 2021, Sweden reported the highest proportion of projects with a gender focus among EU Member States (78.25%), reflecting the significant emphasis placed on gender equality, in line with its Feminist Foreign Policy.⁵⁸ Sweden has led the way in this field and several other EU Member States have either adopted, or are moving towards Feminist Foreign Policy positions, including France, Spain and Luxembourg. For these policy ambitions to succeed, however, it is essential that proper funding is ensured. The data on gender policy disbursements indicates a mixed picture across Member States. Looking at spending in this area as a proportion of bilateral ODA, Sweden has a consistent record of around 80%, and Ireland over 75%. France has increased its spending since 2013 against a low baseline (8.6%), but still reached only 34.7% in 2020. The EU institutions have steadily increased their expenditure on gender equality since 2013 (16.4% of ODA) achieving 38.9% in 2020. However, five Member States recorded a spending of under 10% of total ODA on gender equality in 2020.

Clear and ambitious targets are essential for achieving demonstrable and sustained improvements on gender equality. The present target applied by the European Commission is to ensure that 85% of the *projects* it supports have a gender equality focus. CONCORD believes that this does not capture sufficiently the level of change needed to lift funding levels decisively, not least because the target does not include a specific measurement of financing. The Commission should develop its approach further by requiring and achieving that at least 85% of all the project funding provided includes gender equality measures.⁵⁹ On top of this, 20% of the funding should specifically have gender equality as its principal objective. Furthermore, the levels of 'principal' and 'significant' support in projects require a more granular definition. This should use a similar methodology to the existing OECD gender equality policy marker's three-point scoring system which "qualitatively tracks the financial flows that target gender equality and allows the OECD to identify gaps between DAC donors' policy commitments and financial commitments."⁶⁰

⁵⁴ https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/explore/recipients_en.

⁵⁵ LDCs at a Glance | UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (updated November 2021).

⁵⁶ See *Maps of anti-LGBT Laws Country by Country* | Human Rights Watch and [www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637949/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)637949_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637949/EPRS_BRI(2019)637949_EN.pdf).

⁵⁷ https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/join-2020-17-final_en.pdf.

⁵⁸ www.government.se/4a7738/contentassets/efcc5a15ef154522a872d8e46ad69148/gender-equality-policy-in-sweden

⁵⁹ For further analysis, see CONCORD factsheet on the gender targets in EU external action: [\[link\]](#).

⁶⁰ DAC gender equality policy marker - OECD.

CLIMATE FINANCE: NOT MUCH NEW, EVEN LESS ADDITIONAL MONEY

Partner countries⁶¹ are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impact of the climate crisis. In the vast majority of cases, their geographical positioning exposes them more seriously to the climatic effects of global warming. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group 2 Report revealed that around 3.3 to 3.6 billion people are living in areas highly vulnerable to climate change, and around one billion people are at risk of coastal hazards. It is projected that 80% of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean will be submerged due to rising ocean levels by 2050.⁶² Excessively high temperatures in desert areas have contributed to worsening famine, notably in Ethiopia. Climate impacts are worsening day by day even at 1.1°C of warming above pre-industrial levels. This is not going to slow down. The drought in the Horn of Africa, tropical storm Ana impacting Malawi, Mozambique and Madagascar, flooding in South/South East Asia and South Africa, catastrophic typhoons in the Pacific regions and breaking “century-old” heatwave records in India, are just some of the signs of the worsening climate catastrophe already witnessed in 2022.

There is a fundamental link between inequality and climate justice. Oxfam research has found that between 1990-2015 “the richest 10% of the world’s population were responsible for 52% of the cumulative carbon emissions, while the poorest 50% were responsible for just 7% of cumulative emissions.”⁶³ Eight out of the 10 countries most affected by the quantified impacts of extreme weather events in 2019 belong to the low- and lower-middle-income categories. Half of them are Least Developed Countries.⁶⁴

The international community has responded to the challenges of climate change in a series of pledges under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which entered into force in March 1994.⁶⁵ Climate finance is one of the three key pillars of the COP-21 2015 Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC

process. The Paris Agreement calls for action on the climate crisis and its impacts that reflects “equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”⁶⁶ The most significant pledge to date is the commitment to reach annual funding of USD 100 billion, agreed by the COP-15 Climate Conference in 2009 with a 2020 deadline. However, this pledge had not been delivered by the time of the COP-26 meeting in Glasgow in October/November 2021.

Not only are the EU’s partner countries more vulnerable, they also have a lower coping capacity. Climate financing packages are intended to cover projects in partner countries that both mitigate the worst effects of climate change and help them adapt. From an equality perspective, CONCORD, joining many other CSOs, calls for increased efforts on adaptation finance, as this helps prevent the direct effects of climate change on people, hence improving their ability to cope with it. According to the COP-15 pledge, climate financing should also be based on the key principle of being ‘new and additional’, committing donors to spend extra money on climate financing. They should therefore not divert ODA for this purpose.

With COP27⁶⁷ taking place in November 2022, the negotiations must centre on the needs of those countries hit hardest by the impacts of the climate crisis. The recent IPCC Intergovernmental report has dramatically shown⁶⁸ how harshly the climate crisis is hitting the most vulnerable and marginalised, and that adaptation needs to be scaled up by all major greenhouse gases emitters.

The EU, as a major climate finance contributor, will therefore have a central role in the negotiations. The key questions that will determine the extent to which EU efforts on climate financing are equality-focused are:

- How much financing are Member States and the EU providing from their ODA budgets?
- Is the funding donated new and additional to ODA budget support?

61 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change refers formally to partners as “developing countries (non-Annex I Parties)”. This Report uses the term ‘partner countries’.

62 President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih of the Maldives stated in his speech to COP-26 in Glasgow in November 2021 that ‘if we fail to make the right decisions here and now, billions more will suffer, including the entire population of the Maldives. My people would be stripped of their livelihoods, their identity and their homes.’ His full speech is at: *Statement by His Excellency Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, President of the Republic of the Maldives at the Commonwealth Leaders’ Summit held in Glasgow, Scotland.*

63 *Confronting Carbon Inequality: Putting climate justice at the heart of the COVID-19 recovery.*

64 <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-climate-risk-index-2021>

65 A Biennial Review (BR) process has been instituted under which donors report to the UNFCCC on their levels of climate financing support, both in aggregate value terms and on individual projects. A BR5 (Fifth Report) to the UNFCCC is due by December 2022.

66 See 2015 Paris Agreement at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

67 <https://cop27.eg/>.

68 <https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/>

- Is project funding donated to support both mitigation and adaptation?⁶⁹

How much?⁷⁰

The OECD report on climate finance⁷¹ states that developed countries provided the equivalent of only around USD 83 billion (EUR 73 billion⁷²) in climate finance in 2020, some USD 16.7 billion (or EUR 14.7 billion) short of the intended target. Mitigation finance remained the main focus, although adaptation finance continued to grow. Despite CSO calls for more grant-based finance and focus on LDCs, loans remain the main instrument to provide climate finance which mainly targets Asia and middle-income countries. This seems set to continue through to 2025 which will push developing countries further into debt.

Climate financing accounted for 14% of bilateral ODA for EU Member States and the EU institutions in 2020, amounting to EUR 12 billion. This has doubled the bilateral ODA spent on climate finance over the past eight years from 7.3% (2012), and represents an increase from an average share of ODA on climate financing of around 9.5% since 2014. Climate financing spending in most Member States is on an upward trajectory. However, only four Member States (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) spent over 10% of their ODA budgets on climate finance in 2020.


New and additional money?

There is a very clear headline finding on climate financing by the EU in relation to the additionality principle. In reality, most funding has been taken from ODA budgets. This budgetary practice has a direct impact on the availability of funds to support development assistance needs. In a study published by CARE International in June 2022⁷³, the issue of additionality is closely analysed. Their report contends that the additionality principle is not being followed by most of the 24 UN signatories to Annex II, UNFCCC. This includes 15 EU signatories including Member States and the European Commission. The UK is also a signatory. Among EU Member States, the study finds that Sweden and Germany lead on climate financing. The study also develops a two-tier concept of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ additionality and applies this to the projects supported by EU Member States and the EU institutions. It finds that most of the climate financing donated by the EU is only weakly additional.

Balance between mitigation and adaptation?

The latest data available for the EU show that a balance between projects aimed at adaptation to climate change and mitigation of its effects has not yet been achieved. The EU share of climate finance on adaptation in 2020 was 43%, totalling EUR 5.2 billion.

Graph 8: Climate finance with an adaptation focus as of total EU ODA to climate finance (2010-2020)



69 OECD DAC has employed methodology on climate mitigation with reporting mandatory since 2006, and on climate change adaptation, with reporting on ODA flows mandatory since 2010. *Climate Change: OECD DAC External Development Finance Statistics*.

70 2020 data are currently being analysed for adaptation and mitigation financing to provide EU27 projections for 2021, since BR5 reporting is not due until December 2022.

71 <https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/finance-usd-100-billion-goal/aggregate-trends-of-climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-in-2013-2020.pdf>.

72 In EUR constant 2020.

73 *That's not new money - Assessing how much public climate finance has been "new and additional" to support for development* | CARE International, CARE International, June 2022.

Despite the increase from the very first years after the adoption of the commitment to reach a balance, the evolution over the last decade shows a stagnation of progress.

On a positive note, though, the EU institutions' expenditure has averaged over 50% on adaptation over the past seven years and amounted to 52.5% in 2020. The highest Member State donors on adaptation financing in 2020 included Luxembourg (62.60%), Spain (61.3%), the Netherlands (60.8%) and Sweden (55.3%). CONCORD believes that adaptation finance should consistently reach at least 50% of total climate finance across the EU, as swiftly as possible.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY: REAL COMMITMENT NEEDED, BACKED BY MORE CORE FUNDING

CSOs in EU partner countries are best placed to reach people in communities, in both urban and rural areas. They engage with and advocate for specific groups in their local communities, especially those who are marginalised, underrepresented or disadvantaged.


In recent years, civil society space has become increasingly restricted. There has been a decline in global freedom over the last 15 years⁷⁴, with greater repression and the erosion of civil liberties. This diminishes the capacity for CSOs to meaningfully engage with their governments, a trend that, as CONCORD has already noted in its previous report, has been accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. CIVICUS is a global alliance of civil society organisations with a strong presence in the Global South. Its Civic Space

Initiative focuses on civil society legal initiatives at the global, regional and national levels. CIVICUS notes "civil society activists, journalists and human rights defenders are further facing escalating intimidation, harassment and reprisals, including imprisonment, for undertaking their legitimate activities."⁷⁵

In 2020, the EU and Member States contributed just 12.7% of their total bilateral ODA to CSOs, accounting for EUR 7.7 billion, which is down from 14.6% in the previous year. However, this overall figure has to be examined in greater detail: only EUR 1.5 billion was core funding, that is, funds that can be used by the organisations to cover organisational costs, as well as to achieve their desired results without being specifically attached to a project or programme. This type of funding is key to ensure independence, long-term stability and the right of initiative of CSOs. However, the vast majority of EU ODA to CSOs is usually 'earmarked,' that is, projects implemented by the organisations, but initiated by the donor; in 2020, this accounted for 81% of all EU ODA to CSOs, while the remaining 19% was for core funding.

Over and above the lack of core funding, restrictive measures imposed by the EU on individual countries are an additional constraint for CSOs in their ability to deliver support on the ground. The EU states that it uses such measures where it considers there is a need to safeguard the EU's values, fundamental interests and security, for preserving peace, consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law preventing conflicts, and for strengthening international security.⁷⁶ Measures may be political and/or financial and can target individuals, groups and governments.

Graph 9: EU ODA to CSOs by type, constant 2020 EUR million



⁷⁴ Freedom in the world 2022: The expansion of Authoritarian Rule: Freedom in the World 2022.

⁷⁵ CIVICUS Civic Space Initiative.

⁷⁶ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/>.

The EU has stated its commitment that restrictive measures “are developed in such a way as to **minimise adverse consequences for those not responsible** for the policies or actions leading to the adoption of sanctions. In particular, the EU says it works to minimise the effects on the local civilian population and on legitimate activities in or with the country concerned.”⁷⁷ The EU currently requires CSO compliance in vetting final beneficiaries in the context of countering fraudulent terrorist activity. However, this contributes to the further shrinking of civic space in EU partner countries and presents particular challenges for CSOs operating in fragile crisis environments such as Mali, Syria, Somalia and Myanmar.

There are differing interpretations among authorities including some EU Member States on what constitutes compliance. Trust is weakened between CSOs and communities at risk or under threat, who are reluctant to share potentially sensitive personal information. CSOs have reduced their ability to access people in remote areas, especially in conflict zones where the EU may no longer work with government agencies and local authorities (e.g. Myanmar). Rapid action is hampered due to increased workloads to achieve compliance. There is violation of the core values of most CSOs such as non-discrimination, as well as of humanitarian principles such as impartiality. In addition, financial flows are affected, delaying or even cancelling CSO programmes due to risk management by banks which prohibit funds destined for listed countries under the restrictive measures, e.g. in Syria. Restrictive measures are thus having significant impacts on CSOs.

EQUALITY-FOCUSED ODA: CONCLUSIONS

There are clear deficiencies and gaps in the current EU approach. The following recommendations could go some way to address these:

- EU ODA is **not reaching the lowest income parts of the world in the quantities it should**; there is disproportionate focus on the countries around the EU’s geographical borders. This trend needs to be changed.
- Figures for **gender equality projects** should adopt a funding dimension: 85% of the project funding provided should include gender equality as either a principal or significant objective.
- Efforts on **climate financing** need to be stepped up to reach the annual USD 100 billion commitment. There should be more effort to support adaptation and mitigation projects. Above all, **genuine additionality is needed** on the climate financing challenge in order to avoid dilution in the key priority areas of development assistance.
- Civil society organisations working in EU partner countries are **not receiving sufficient backing and need significant extra core funding** to deliver projects with outcomes that reduce poverty and inequalities. The **Commission should urgently address constraints on CSOs resulting from the application of EU restrictive measures**, which are affecting their ability to work effectively in fragile and conflict environments.

⁷⁷ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/>. The bold text is EU emphasis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU and its Member States must increase the quantity and improve the quality of ODA to meet their commitments. The long-term effects of the pandemic, the spillover effects of the war caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the climate emergency require the EU to step up efforts to mitigate the adverse effects of these crises, while not forgetting the original ongoing problems which ODA was designed to alleviate.



ENOUGH ODA?

- The European Commission and EU Member States must scale up efforts to meet the longstanding target of spending 0.7% GNI on ODA before the 2030 deadline.
- EU Member States should refrain from making cuts to their ODA budgets and ensure steady progress is made towards meeting the 0.7% target.
- EU Member States should approach the 0.7% commitment as a baseline for building genuine partnerships, not as a ceiling for expenditure.



EMPLOYING ODA CORRECTLY?

- The European Commission and EU Member States should ensure that ODA resources focus on supporting partner countries and ensure ownership for their development agenda. In-donor refugee costs, tied aid, student costs, debt relief and interest payments on loans should be excluded from their total reporting of ODA.
- EU Member States should abandon all plans to keep counting in-excess COVID-19 vaccine donations as ODA, since that opens the door to other types of aid inflation through in-kind aid that was never purchased with development purposes.
- The European Commission and EU Member States should encourage the use of grants instead of loans as the main modality through which ODA is channelled.

- The European Commission and EU Member States that are members of the DAC should support an external review of the ODA modernisation process which ensures that the grant equivalent methodology and discount rates do not artificially inflate ODA figures.



EFFECTIVE ODA?

- All Team Europe partners should ensure that CSOs are fully consulted and involved in all phases of the planning and implementation of Team Europe Initiatives.
- The European Commission should improve the current online TEI tracker in order to add detailed information about the financing sources for TEIs. Following last year's report recommendations, this tracker should also include implementation modalities and disbursements, opportunities for CSOs and the financial contributions from each member of a Team Europe Initiative, including those from the private sector.
- The European Commission should ensure that projects developed under Global Gateway respond to the developmental objectives of partner countries, and conduct the planning and implementation of projects in close collaboration with all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations.
- The European Commission should ensure, given the key involvement of the private sector in Global Gateway, that this is fully aligned with the sustainable development agenda, and that it contributes to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and the principles underpinning Agenda 2030.



EQUALITY-FOCUSED ODA?

- The European Commission should ensure that the inequality marker currently being developed incorporates a comprehensive approach to inequality, including the different dimensions of inequalities and the intersections between them. Both ex ante and ex post analyses of the impact of EU-funded activities on inequalities are

needed as part of meaningful implementation. The inclusion of targets is also of paramount importance to ensure a proper evaluation of the marker.

EU ODA to LDCs

- The European Commission and EU Member States should comply with the immediate target of 0.15% ODA/GNI for LDCs, and rapidly scale up efforts to reach the 0.20% ODA/GNI target before the 2030 deadline.
- The European Commission and EU Member States should ensure that ODA is going where it is needed the most. The current allocation per country shows that MICs are still favoured over LDCs and other low-income countries. This trend must be reversed.
- The European Commission and EU Member States should oppose any methodological change for tracking ODA going to LDCs that results in inflating overall aid levels without incurring a real increase in numbers, and should not apply those changes in their own data reporting.

EU ODA aimed at supporting gender equality

- The European Commission should adopt the target of dedicating 85% of EU ODA to gender as a principal and significant objective, and reach the target of earmarking 20% of EU ODA for projects directly addressing the root causes of gender inequalities and having gender equality as a principal objective.
- The European Commission and EU Member States should ensure that the EU can speak with one voice. Hostile attitudes to gender equalities by some Member States undermine the overall message that the EU sends to partner countries on the importance of gender equality.

EU ODA to climate finance

- The European Commission and EU Member States should ensure that the EU collectively contributes its share of the global commitment to allocate USD 100 billion per year on efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
- EU Member States should ensure that climate finance is new and additional to previous ODA commitments.
- The European Commission and EU Member States should ensure a balance between spending climate finance on mitigation and on adaptation.

EU ODA to civil society

- The European Commission and EU Member States should recognise the threat to CSOs and support organisations in situations where they face repression and attacks on civic space.
- The European Commission and EU Member States should increase the resources going to CSOs both in donor and partner countries. They should especially increase the core funding programmes for CSOs in partner countries.
- The European Commission should address the implementation of EU restrictive measures in the NDICI-Global Europe Instrument and support the implementation of programmes in fragile situations. The Commission should issue new guidance exempting beneficiaries implementing such programmes.

Paying over Playing? The EU's response to COVID-19 global vaccination

“*While we recognise that every EU Member State has the responsibility to respect, protect and promote the right to adequate healthcare for all those living on their territory, we will not be safe until we are all safe, especially given the new variants of the virus developing in various locations around the globe. It is therefore clear that universal access to the COVID-19 vaccine is the only solution to end the pandemic and mitigate the deepening socioeconomic inequalities.*”

Letter to President Ursula von der Leyen:
Call for equitable vaccination drive - CONCORD,
15 February 2021.

COVID-19 is a global challenge on a scale not seen since the 1920s and has ravaged human populations in every part of the world. It has exerted severe pressures on both individual governments and multilateral institutions, testing the strength and capacity of their responses to the demands of the pandemic, not least the EU, its Member States and EU financial institutions.

This thematic chapter assesses the EU's role in the global response to the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. AidWatch argues that it failed the COVID test, given the EU's stated ambition to become more of a 'player' than a 'payer' in its international partnerships.⁷⁸ This becomes clear, in particular, when considering the EU's failure to support its African partners, including the African Union, set against its stated commitment to the bolstering EU/AU partnership.⁷⁹ The EU's track record manifestly did not demonstrate a “true change in paradigm towards equal partnerships”⁸⁰. In reality, the EU became “stronger in the world” during the COVID-19

pandemic, significantly weakening international partners' access to vaccines, in order to serve its own interests first.

Following the “4Es” methodology, this chapter argues that the EU:

- Did not provide enough timely funding for vaccines to supply partners;
- Did not deploy potential support to partners correctly, as Member States hoarded vaccines massively;
- Demonstrated no equality focus in its approach, especially by denying low-income partners access to vaccine patents;
- Did not provide an effective response in global or bilateral contexts, delivering far too few vaccines, far too late to support partners.

COVID-19: GLOBAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK – COVAX

The global framework developed in early 2020 for the COVID-19 response was COVAX (COVID-19 Global Vaccines Access), with the stated aim of “working for global equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines.”⁸¹ Although the European Commission and France, together with the WHO, designed and launched COVAX, in formal institutional terms, the EU was not involved and did not publicly pledge financial support to COVAX until late summer 2020. In September 2020 a first global threshold of 20% vaccination across populations was set – in higher and lower income economies alike – by the end of 2021.⁸² This was raised to ‘approximately 30%’ ahead of the G7 Summit in June 2021.⁸³ Change in paradigm towards equal COVAX design allowed higher income economies partnerships to obtain vaccine doses by paying a share of their cost in advance⁸⁴, while

78 For reference, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/annual-activity-report-2021-international-partnerships_en.pdf (p.7).

79 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/en_strategy_on_strengthening_the_eus_contribution_to_rules-based_multilateralism.pdf.

80 See February 2020 blog post by Jutta Urpilainen, new European Commissioner for International Partnerships at: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/stories/geopolitical-commission-builds-international-partnerships_en.

81 COVAX

82 Fair allocation mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines through the COVAX Facility, WHO 9 September 2020.

83 A New Commitment for Vaccine Equity and Defeating the Pandemic, 31 May 2021.

84 An EP research report indicates that EU member states did not do this: Understanding COVAX: The EU's role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19 | Think Tank | European Parliament, February 2022, p.4.

low- and middle- pandemic, significantly weakening international income economies participating could get partners' access to vaccines, in order to serve its vaccine doses through the 'COVAX Facility'.⁸⁵

NOT ENOUGH

Tracing and calculating funds pledged, committed and delivered by the EU and its Member States to the COVID-19 response is not a straightforward exercise, both over time during the pandemic, and given the internal complexity across EU institutional budgets (grants and loans) and EU Member State bilateral contributions to COVAX. This already shows a lack of transparency in assessing how such large-scale public funds have been administered by the EU internally, and in terms of its contributions to a global response effort. However, based on the data from Gavi⁸⁶, the total figure for EU contributions between August 2020 and March 2022 is the equivalent of EUR 3.6 billion, which is broken down as follows:

EU institutions:

EUR 400 m in EU budget grants as a direct contribution comprising:

- EUR 100 m from the 11th European Development Fund pledged in November 2020 to the Gavi COVAX AMC plus
- EUR 300 m from the new Global Europe Instrument, pledged at the G7 Leaders' Meeting in February 2021.

EUR 600 m in guarantees:

- EUR 400 m from the EIB pledged in August 2020
- EUR 200 m from the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), guaranteeing an EIB loan, pledged in February 2021.

EUR 300 m in re-orientation to COVAX:

- EIB support to third countries in the Gavi COVID-19 Vaccines Advanced Market Commitment (COVAX AMC) 'cost-sharing mechanism' announced by the Commission President at the COVAX AMC Summit in June 2021.

EU Member States have contributed to the Gavi COVAX AMC as follows (in EUR constant 2021):

- Germany: 1.03 billion;
- Sweden: 455 million;
- Italy: 397 million;
- France: 202 million;
- Spain: 107 million;
- Netherlands: 94 million
- Denmark: 15 million;
- Finland: 15 million;
- Other EU-27 totalling: 41 million.

Total EU Member States: EUR 2.36 billion

With donations amounting to just under 30% of the total USD 11.04 billion Gavi COVAX AMC, the EU (Team Europe with 20 Member States and the European Commission) has overall been among the major global donors.⁸⁷ However, funds pledged are not funds delivered, still less translated into vaccines supplied. The EU claimed that 250 million vaccines had been donated to lower income partners by the end of 2021.⁸⁸ In reality, Gavi source data show a considerable shortfall in COVAX delivery to AMCs during 2021. By early February 2022, only 50% of the EU's announced doses (262 million) had actually reached low- and middle-income countries.⁸⁹ Moreover, the scale of the EU contribution on doses was dwarfed by global vaccination needs. The scale and pace of EU funding to COVAX came nowhere near to matching the vaccination needs of lower income populations. This was not a matter of scarce supply for higher income countries. The real story was the extent of their vaccine hoarding, including in the EU. By December 2021, 72% of people in the EU had been vaccinated.⁹⁰ This contrasts with a figure of only 14% for the African continent, way behind the WHO's 30% target for the year. This figure clearly demonstrates the lack of genuine EU commitment to partnership with lower income partners.

⁸⁵ The Facility is supported by the Gavi COVAX AMC (Advance Market Commitment), which is funded voluntarily by the ODA of higher-income countries and private donors. Contributions can be received either as funds or as in-kind vaccine doses. 'AMC economies' could be required to contribute to domestic delivery of vaccines, and can access additional doses through a cost-sharing mechanism, financed by multilateral development banks under conditions negotiated by the COVAX Facility.

⁸⁶ <https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-AMC-Donors-Table.pdf>. Accessed on 11 August 2022. This figure covers "resources assured" and excludes loans and guarantees. The table references a "EUR 440 m EIB frontloading facility for COVAX AMC grants" and "up to EUR 300 million committed capital to Gavi Cost-Sharing activities from the European Investment Bank".

⁸⁷ <https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-AMC-Donors-Table.pdf>.

⁸⁸ https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/annual-activity-report-2021-international-partnerships_en.pdf, p.6.

⁸⁹ Gavi, COVAX dose donations pledge table, 17 February 2022 (since updated by Gavi on 4 July 2022). <https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-Dose-Donation-Table.pdf>.

⁹⁰ Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations - Our World in Data Accessed, 9 Aug 22. These figures are calculated on the basis of shares of people with a 'completed initial protocol' plus those 'only partially vaccinated.'

NOT EMPLOYED CORRECTLY

As CONCORD asserted in its letter to the Commission President in February 2021, everyone in the world ‘must have access to an effective vaccine in a timely manner.’ However, by the beginning of 2021 it was already clear that the EU was set on prioritising its own interests over those of its lower income partners. The EU and other higher income countries were irresponsible in employing the means at their disposal to gain access to vaccine supplies. EU Member States could have made policy choices from the outset that enabled sharing doses with lower income countries as they became available. Instead, they opted for ‘vaccine nationalism’ in three key ways:

First, there was a very high **lack of price transparency** in negotiated market access to vaccines which has been criticised, including by the EU Ombudsman.⁹¹ Individual governments were able to strike deals in terms of both volume and price with pharmaceutical companies.

Second, higher income countries, and the EU, massively hoarded available vaccine supplies. By summer 2021, according to the *British Medical Journal* the EU had purchased over 3.5 times more doses than needed to vaccinate Member State populations. The same publication mentions other countries such as Canada (7 times), Australia (4.6 times) and the UK (4 times).⁹² The EU already announced in August 2021 that it had met its 70% vaccination target. The consequences of buying up the available supplies deprived lower income populations of vaccines.

Third, specifically in relation to ODA, OECD member countries, including in the EU have been able to distort ODA calculations reported to the Development Assistance Committee by **counting in-excess vaccines purchased originally for national consumption, as ODA contributions**. As detailed in the Overview of this report, the level of in-excess vaccines donations recorded by EU Member States as ODA amounted to EUR 1.5 billion which was crucial to show an increase in the overall figures, or even helped offset real decreases in ODA levels by several EU Member States.

Taken together, therefore, Member States across the EU did not employ their resources to support international partners in vaccinating their populations;

in fact, their whole approach consistently and severely weakened their partners.

NO EQUALITY FOCUS

The EU did not follow an equality-focused approach in its COVID-19 response, in three vital respects:

- First, it did not ensure equitable sharing of vaccines with its partners in need as the pandemic worsened during 2021.
- Second, a significant proportion of vaccines donated were not medically safe. Third, it actively helped to deny low-income countries access to patents that would help them to scale up and roll out local vaccine development.

Inequitable sharing of vaccines

COVAX announced vaccine supply agreements with pharmaceutical providers in December 2020 totalling nearly two billion doses, and indicated it planned to deliver 1.3 billion doses to the 92 low and middle economies in 2021.⁹³ However, the gap in provision between high- and low-income states widened very quickly and worsened during the year. It is notable that the European Commission introduced an EU vaccine sharing mechanism in February 2021, geared to matching Member State proposals for dose sharing with third state requests. This mechanism, reportedly involving ‘earmarking’ of doses, has primarily supported health workers and humanitarian needs in the Western Balkans, and in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhood – none of which are LDCs – with pledges during 2021 amounting to 250 million doses, to reach 700 million doses by mid-2022.⁹⁴ Data on levels of doses delivered to the European neighbourhood are not readily available, but the effects of this EU approach are clearly significant when compared to how little support they provided to LDCs.

By April 2021, when the UN convened a special high-level session on vaccination, it was already clear that, out of the 832 million vaccine doses that had been administered, 82% had gone to high- or upper-middle-income countries, while only 0.2% had been sent to their low-income counterparts. The WHO Director-General opened the gathering saying that “vaccine equity is the challenge of our time [...] and we are

⁹¹ EU Ombudsman Decision 12 May 2021 Decision in joint cases 85/2021/MIG and 86/2021/MIG on the European Commission’s refusal to give public access to documents concerning the purchase of vaccines against COVID-19 | Decision | European Ombudsman.

⁹² The global health security agenda rewards rich nations for their selfish behaviour - The BMJ, 20 August 2021.

⁹³ COVAX announces additional deals to access promising COVID-19 vaccine candidates; plans global rollout starting Q1 2021, 18 December 2020.

⁹⁴ Understanding COVAX: The EU’s role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19 | Think Tank | European Parliament, February 2022, p.7. See also MEPs probe Europe’s global vaccine strategy | Devex, 6 February 2021 which notes the AU were already purchasing doses, and Inside the European Commission’s global vaccine-sharing plan | Devex, 18 February 2021.

failing.”⁹⁵ From spring 2021, the UN began to issue the clearest statements that ‘no-one is safe until everyone is safe’ from COVID-19⁹⁶ and Unicef stated that COVAX should already have delivered 170 million doses rather than 65 million by that point, adding that G7 nations and ‘Team Europe’ could donate around 153 million vaccine doses if they shared just 20% of their available supply in June, July and August, while still meeting their commitments to vaccinate their own populations.⁹⁷

Meanwhile, the EU continued to make more pledges, but delivered very few vaccines. In her State of the Union address in mid-September, the President of the European Commission stated that “we delivered more than another 700 million doses to the rest of the world, to more than 130 countries.” Dr von der Leyen repeated the EU’s commitment to share 250 million doses with Africa, and announced that the Commission would add a new donation of another 200 million doses by mid-2022.⁹⁸ During the annual UN General Assembly, the EU renewed its commitment to share over 500 million doses with AMC countries. However, as vaccine inequity became more glaring, African partners became more publicly vocal, with a senior AU official declaring undelivered vaccine pledges as being ‘not useful’.⁹⁹ In October, UN Secretary General, António Guterres lamented “the tragedy of an unequal distribution.”¹⁰⁰

The EU has since reached third doses for adults and has started to vaccinate children, while the persisting challenge in Africa is low vaccination rates. The DRC, with a population of some 89.5 million, had a vaccination rate of just 0.27% by the end of 2021. On 29 December, the WHO announced that 92 of its 194 member states had missed the target of vaccinating 40% of their population by the end of 2021¹⁰¹ an indictment of the failure of the EU and other high-income states to combat global vaccine inequity.

Medically unsafe vaccines

Among the very low level of doses eventually supplied, millions of doses shipped to lower income countries were rejected as medically unsafe. Between October and November 2021, 15 million doses were not accepted. COVAX asked AMC donors to comply with standards, notably for large volume deliveries, vaccine shelf-lives, notice periods for doses and improved tracing of surplus shots to ensure they were not wasted. However, in December 2021 alone, wasted dose volumes climbed to 100 million, as two-thirds of the doses supplied had a shelf life of less than three months.¹⁰² In the words of the WHO Director-General, this is “not only a moral shame; it costs lives.”¹⁰³

Denying low-income countries access to vaccine patents

At the start of the pandemic, the EU announced EUR 20 billion towards the implementation of the Africa Joint Continental Strategy for COVID-19 Outbreak. In June 2020, the African Union confirmed they had received EUR 10 million from the EU.¹⁰⁴

However, the real priority on the part of low-income partners was not to receive future pledges of financial support from the EU and other high-income countries. It was to gain access to COVID-19 vaccine patents that would enable local scaling up and rollout of vaccinations. Many African states have a well-developed, co-ordinated infrastructure for disease control and management, not least given their extensive experience combating Ebola, malaria and other diseases.¹⁰⁵ However, they could simply not access vaccine doses in the same conditions as their European partners. Africa accounts for around 25% of global vaccine demand but depends on the rest of the world for 99% of its supply.¹⁰⁶ The EU actively helped to deny low-income countries access to COVID-19 vaccine patents, which is a travesty: African states could have co-owned the public health response to the pandemic.

95 *Unequal Vaccine Distribution Self-Defeating, World Health Organization Chief Tells Economic and Social Council’s Special Ministerial Meeting*, 16 April 2021.

96 *No-one is safe until everyone is safe – why we need a global response to COVID-19*, 24 May 2021.

97 *The COVAX Facility will deliver its 65 millionth vaccine dose this week. It should’ve been at least its 170 millionth. The time to donate excess doses is now*, 17 May 2021.

98 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/soteu_2021_address_en_0.pdf p.4. Gavi data released in February 2022 notes Team Europe had announced 700 million doses for COVAX in 2021-22.

99 *Africa CDC official: Undelivered COVID-19 vaccine pledges ‘not useful’* | Devex, 21 September 2021.

100 *Vaccine Nationalism, Hoarding Putting Us All at Risk, Secretary-General Tells World Health Summit, Warning COVID-19 Will Not Be Last Global Pandemic* | UN Press, 24 October 2021.

101 *WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 29 December 2021*.

102 https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/PB_220217_UE-Afrique_Marchais_EN.pdf, p3.

103 <https://www.euractiv.com/section/coronavirus/news/short-shelf-lives-see-poor-nations-decline-millions-of-covid-jabs-un/>, 14 January 2022.

104 *The European Union Supports Africa’s COVID-19 Continental Response*, African Union website, 26 June 2020.

105 *For the structure and work of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, see About Us – Africa CDC*.

106 https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/PB_220217_UE-Afrique_Marchais_EN.pdf, p3.

Since October 2020, South Africa and India have been arguing formally in proposals submitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to introduce a time-bound waiver to the TRIPs provisions governing Intellectual Property Rights. This, combined with technological transfers and sharing know-how, would have enhanced the manufacturing capacities of local producers to supply vaccines that high-income states have not provided, and thereby reduce dependency by lower income states on suppliers based in the US and Europe. The proposal was supported consistently by over 100 members of the WTO. The EU, despite the clear European Parliament position in support of the waiver, continued to block the proposal. Nonetheless, the European Commission President preferred to boast that Europe was “the pharmacy of the world”.¹⁰⁷ This has led to further concerted protest from different advocacy groups, including CONCORD Europe.¹⁰⁸

Behind the declaratory diplomacy of the EU-AU Foreign Ministers meeting in Kigali in October 2021¹⁰⁹, discord over the vaccine patents issue understandably riled African states very considerably, demonstrated a woeful lack of genuine commitment to partnership by the EU side and delayed progress towards an EU-AU Summit.¹¹⁰

Only five EU Member States (Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal) supported a call by the WHO to make the COVID-19 response a public common good through the voluntary sharing of knowledge and patents.¹¹¹ In June 2022, WTO governments finally agreed a text that is not a broad intellectual property waiver at all. It merely re-iterates lower income countries’ existing rights to override patents in certain circumstances; as Oxfam International emphasises, “it tries to restrict even that limited right to countries which do not already have the capacity to produce COVID-19 vaccines. Put simply, it is a technocratic fudge aimed at saving reputations, not lives.”¹¹²

NOT EFFECTIVE

The Busan principles outlined in this report offer a guide to evaluating the levels of development cooperation effectiveness of the EU’s response to the global vaccination challenge.

In its 2021 Activity report, the European Commission DG for International Partnerships claimed that:

“In 2021, working via a Team Europe approach, the EU played a significant role in tackling the COVID-19 crisis in the world. It has provided access to COVID-19 vaccines and other tools, supported related research and innovation and facilitated local production of health products and vaccines in Africa.”¹¹³

However, the realities of the situation for lower income partners look markedly different. The EU did not deliver an effective response.

In terms of results focus, the EU failed collectively in its responsibility as a genuine partner to try to shape and structure the global COVID-19 infrastructure in COVAX that could meet the needs of lower income partners equitably. It was institutionally slow to start pledging, and even more so to deliver financial support and vaccine doses to lower income partners.

To compound this lack of focus on results for partners, on partner ownership, transparency, mutual accountability and inclusive partnerships the EU failed comprehensively to support the needs and interests of lower income states. Aid partners could not take ownership because the provision of vaccines was neither timely nor predictable. Such inequities seriously weakened mutual accountability and notions of inclusive partnerships.

¹⁰⁷ See Speech by President von der Leyen at the State of the Union conference of the European University Institute, 6 May 2021.

¹⁰⁸ #Vaccines4All - CONCORD, Open letter to EU Leaders, EU and UK Heads of State and Government from civil society, July 2021.

¹⁰⁹ www.consilium.europa.eu/media/52671/20211026-au-eu-fam-meeting_joint-communique.pdf, 25-26 October 2021. See also this AU summary of the meeting: Joint Press Statement Second AU-EU Ministerial Meeting | African Union.

¹¹⁰ See also A people-centred EU-AU Summit: Letter ahead of the European Council regarding the EU-AU Summit - CONCORD, 7 December 2021. The EU/AU Summit communique is at 16th European Union - African Union Summit: A Joint Vision for 2030 We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States as well as this piece in which South African President Ramaphosa slams EU for protecting vaccine profits, 18 February 2022.

¹¹¹ Understanding COVAX: The EU’s role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19 | Think Tank | European Parliament, February 2022, p.7.

¹¹² WTO agrees a deal on patents for COVID vaccines - but campaigners say this is absolutely not the broad intellectual property waiver the world desperately needs | Oxfam International.

¹¹³ https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/annual-activity-report-2021-international-partnerships_en.pdf.

CONCLUSION: PAYER, PLAYER OR NEITHER?

In February 2021, the EU stated that it wanted “to become a more forward looking, coherent and strategic partner with multilaterals (“from payer to player”) and seek to build and reinforce a wide range of coalitions of like-minded partners based on key priorities and clear objectives.”¹¹⁴ The EU’s COVID-19 response was the first test of this declaratory statement, and the EU failed on an epic scale to support its partner countries.

The EU clearly prioritised ‘paying over playing’ during the pandemic. Having put its own interests first, the EU added insult to injury by reporting in-excess vaccines to the OECD as ODA, thereby inflating ODA levels and significantly over-playing their generosity as donors - yet still failing to reach the 0.7 per cent of GNI target. On top of that, access by African and other partners to develop vaccines locally was actively hampered by the EU, including in the WTO.

The challenge of the pandemic response demonstrated that the EU has not moved on from a “donor-recipient” modus operandi and remains reluctant to address deep-seated partner concerns and interests. Such a misguided approach manifestly cannot meet the ambition to create a partnership of equals.

The EU, while seeking to project itself as a major player on the global stage in its COVID-19 response, has in reality, created a mammoth task for itself to demonstrate henceforth that it is a player seeking genuine mutual respect and accountability, equality between partners and reciprocal commitments”, as agreed in the new EU-AU “Joint Vision” during the February 2022 Summit.¹¹⁵

Towards becoming a “player” in genuine partnership: Recommendations on EU support for COVID-19 global vaccination

- **Support scaling up vaccination rollout in African partner countries, notably through funding and expertise transfer.**
- **Support the vaccines as a common public good, in line with calls by the WHO, and support a WTO TRIPs waiver on patents.**
- **Enhance transparency and simplification of funding streams across the EU and Member States, starting with a full Commission assessment of COVAX support, as the European Parliament advocates.**

¹¹⁴ For reference, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/annual-activity-report-2021-international-partnerships_en.pdf (p.7).

¹¹⁵ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf.

**PART
TWO
Country
pages**

EU INSTITUTIONS



Distributing vaccines globally is our exit strategy from the pandemic”,

Jutta Urpilainen, European Commissioner for International Partnerships, speaking to the European Parliament Development Committee, 4 February 2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

There were three key initiatives across the EU Institutions in 2021, as the EU continued to develop its responses to the pandemic.¹¹⁶ These included efforts across budgeting, programming and investment to support development assistance to partner countries.

Firstly, the NDICI-Global Europe Instrument was finally approved in June 2021. A total overall allocation of EUR 79.5 billion was indicated at that time, across geographic and thematic programmes, as well as a rapid response mechanism and a flexibility “cushion” of unallocated funds.

In second place, Team Europe was launched in early 2020 as an immediate EU response to the Covid-19 pandemic. During 2021, almost 150 Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) were developed as “flagships that deliver concrete, transformational results for partner countries or regions pursued by European development/external action partners as Team Europe.”¹¹⁷

Finally, the Global Gateway initiative, which was announced in the State of the Union speech by the President of the European Commission in September 2021, and officially launched in December 2021. It set out “a new European strategy to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, and people to people connectivity, through education and research across the world.”¹¹⁸ The stated aim of the initiative

is to “contribute to narrowing the global investment gap worldwide, in line with the commitment made in June 2021 by G7 leaders to launch a values-driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership to meet global infrastructure development needs.”¹¹⁹

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

Despite being already one year since the definitive approval of the NDICI, the “Annual Activity Report”¹²⁰ for 2021 published by the European Commission in May 2022 did not provide further information on disbursements beyond a statement that “despite the late adoption of the external financing instruments, the Commission managed to complete the next operationalisation steps: for the countries and regions under DG INTPA responsibility”. These included the adoption of the regional and thematic Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) for NDICI-Global Europe. The first real opportunity to report on concrete progress against MIPs and allocated budgets looks most likely to be in 2023.

On Team Europe, and just over a year after its launch, the Commission’s TEI tracker indicates there are over 150 regional and global initiatives,¹²¹ with an important focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Results of the TEI approach are not yet evident, however. Initiatives are in feasibility assessment and programme phasing and “dates and timeline referred to are estimations and all information on TEIs at this stage is just indicative.”¹²² **Ownership, Transparency and Mutual Accountability** across the Team Europe actors will be tested by their ability to deliver results. Inclusive partnerships continue to be the weakest and most concerning part of the TEI approach, especially in relation to CSOs, who

¹¹⁶ The EU’s response to Covid-19 pandemic in the context of international partnerships, and particular focus on EU support to Africa, is addressed in the thematic chapter of this Report. This section reviews key EU Institutional developments in development assistance - the “Effective ODA?” chapter discusses each initiative in more depth.

¹¹⁷ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/>

¹¹⁸ Global Gateway | European Commission

¹¹⁹ Global Gateway | European Commission

¹²⁰ Annual activity report 2021 - International Partnerships | European Commission

¹²¹ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/>

¹²² <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/> The Joint Programming (JP) process involves: Feasibility & Scoping Exercises; Roadmaps; Joint Analysis; and Joint Strategies.

report that they remain inadequately engaged by the EU in consultation and involvement in design and monitoring. In addition, Member State involvement is uneven, ranging from involvement in over 100 initiatives to just one or even none.¹²³


Finally, the EU has indicated that between 2021 and 2027, via a Team Europe approach, EU Institutions and Member States will jointly mobilise up to EUR 300 billion of investments, by allocating around EUR 145 billion through European external aid and development programmes and the rest through private investments.¹²⁴

One key example of the challenges ahead for Global Gateway is the implementation of its Investment Package for Health, announced at the time of the AU-EU Summit. The Package covers support for vaccinations, manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies, strengthening health preparedness, and sexual and reproductive health and rights.¹²⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EU INSTITUTIONS:

- **Greater involvement and engagement of CSOs in defining the objectives for Team Europe (in terms of consultation, design and monitoring), enabling genuine civil society engagement, not least as TEIs are projected by the EU as a flagship approach to international partnerships.**
- **Improve data processes, sharing and integration across all EU stakeholders engaged in TEIs to achieve enhanced coherence and co-ordination of implementation and evaluation among the Commission, EEAS, Member States, working in transparency with CSOs.**

- **Ensure the European Parliament is able to play a central and proper scrutiny role in ensuring accountability and overall coherence in budgeting, programming and delivery by EU Institutions across the Global Europe Instrument, Team Europe Initiatives and Global Gateway, as key initiatives to underpin EU international partnerships.**



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (EUR million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	666.7	762.6	1429.3	53.4	9.2
2018	786.5	816.5	1603.0	50.9	11.1
2019	777.5	895.1	1672.6	53.5	11.9
2020	820.8	907.4	1728.2	52.5	9.4

¹²³ <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/>

¹²⁴ Global Gateway | European Commission

¹²⁵ EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package - Health

AID MODALITY (EUR million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	17597.2	12908.2	4689.0	26.6	2.3
2018	16624.6	12571.9	4052.6	24.4	3.4
2019	16373.5	13262.1	3111.4	19.0	2.9
2020	21039.9	14940.5	6099.4	29.0	16.7

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	16265.6	16265.6	0.0	10988.6	4884.2	392.8	30.0	2.4
2018	15446.5	11393.8	4052.6	5725.2	5167.9	500.7	45.4	4.4
2019	15107.8	11996.4	3111.4	6391.3	5099.1	506.1	42.5	4.2
2020	17673.1	13263.8	4409.4	6383.2	6228.1	652.5	47.0	4.9

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	13380.4	1711.9	10.5	11.4	11.1	0.1	0.1
2018	12486.8	1663.3	17.5	11.9	11.6	0.1	0.1
2019	11987.4	1781.1	12.1	13.0	12.7	0.1	0.1
2020	16346.7	1905.1	4.5	10.5	10.3	0.0	0.0

0.26% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.31% TOTAL AID/GNI

AUSTRIA



Looking at crises worldwide shows that the pandemic has not only negatively impacted development partnerships, but also frequently inflamed international crises and conflicts. We need to provide help in those places where help is most urgently needed,”

Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg,
7 October 2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

Austria's Official Development Assistance (ODA) figures increased only slightly from 0.30% in 2020 to 0.31% in 2021. This minimal rise shows that, despite repeated political commitment, Austria still lags behind in achieving the 0.7% target. Considering the needs caused by multiple crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, rising extreme poverty, and the climate crises, Austria still needs to substantially step up funding.

The 2021 funding uplift was allocated to increased humanitarian assistance, the COVID-19 pandemic response, and in-donor refugee costs that almost doubled from 2.4% to 4.3% (total ODA). The government doubled the amount for humanitarian assistance from EUR 50 million 2020 to EUR 97 million in 2021. Funding to counteract the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic increased to EUR 53 million. Funding for the LDCs rose to EUR 70 million, representing only 5.7% of total ODA. Although Sub-Saharan Africa is a priority for Austria's development cooperation, only EUR 78 million, representing 6.3%, have been allocated to support this region. Instead, the government still allocates most of its ODA to middle-income countries (MICs), and thus Austrian ODA does not reach those left furthest behind.

AUSTRIAN FOREIGN DISASTER FUND (FDF) AND HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY



The government increased the Austrian FDF, as part of the Austrian Development Agency's (ADA) humanitarian assistance, from EUR 50 million to EUR 67.6 million in 2021, which included a one-off allocation of EUR 15 million for Afghanistan. Funds were allocated according to a plan drawn up with the participation of Austrian civil society organisations. A special representative for humanitarian assistance was appointed and consulted to develop a strategy for Austria's humanitarian assistance. This was a recommendation made by the 2020 OECD peer review of Austria.

RELATIONSHIP WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

The ADA finances some Austrian and international civil society organisations' activities through a separate budget line. In 2021 funds to finance projects implemented by national as well as international civil society organisations (CSO) remained stable at around EUR 42 million, which represents 35% of ADA's total bilateral project funding. Funds to support CSOs, however, are limited and data for 2021 is not yet available. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Austrian CSOs adapted their programmes to COVID-related project activities. This required some administrative effort, but proved to be an example of the effective partnership between ADA and Austrian CSOs. However, greater support to Austrian and international CSOs would be welcome.


TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

The budget for the Austrian FDF has been increased by EUR 2.5 million and a one-off allocation of EUR 42 million in 2022 to Ukraine and neighbouring countries has been pledged. Although this increase is welcome, allocating the rest of the planned funds to protracted crises in other regions still remains essential. Considering the higher amounts spent on humanitarian assistance in 2022, it is likely that ODA figures will rise slightly, but still not enough to reach the 0.7% target. It is also expected that in-donor refugee costs will increase aid inflation. Although government projections of ODA figures in 2022 include considerable debt relief for Sudan, which would increase ODA to above the 0.7% target, it is highly unlikely that this will take place. If it does, however, it would be a one-time measure and not a sustainable increase in ODA.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT

- Ensure enough development funding (through a comprehensive strategy) is allocated to people in the Global South who are suffering from the negative consequences of multiple crises.
- Increase bilateral funding for development cooperation to ensure that LDCs, priority countries as well as the poorest and most marginalised people get enough support to eradicate poverty, reduce social and economic inequalities, strengthen gender equality, human rights and support civil society organisations.
- Draw up a comprehensive whole-of-government approach strategy, including practical steps to increase policy coherence for sustainable development, and to raise ODA figures to the promised 0.7% target.
- Accelerate the implementation of the Agenda 2030 in and through Austria, by performing the steps outlined in the first Voluntary National Review (VNR) from 2020, including the introduction of SDG checks, SDG budgeting, and SDG reporting, and plans for a new VNR in 2024.

AUSTRIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	276.92	0.07	23.33
2018	269.75	0.07	27.22
2019	290.32	0.07	25.44
2020	268.20	0.07	23.13

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	573.6	560.4	13.1	2.3
2018	418.1	404.0	14.1	3.4
2019	421.8	409.5	12.2	2.9
2020	498.6	415.2	83.4	16.7

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	30.1	16.9	47.0	36.0	4.0
2018	24.7	14.2	38.9	36.5	3.9
2019	26.9	25.7	52.6	48.9	4.6
2020	76.2	23.0	99.2	23.2	8.6

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	266.0	241.2	24.8	137.9	94.6	8.7	39.2	3.6
2018	213.6	202.9	10.6	108.5	84.3	10.1	41.6	5.0
2019	238.5	231.3	7.2	106.1	105.2	20.0	45.5	8.6
2020	307.3	306.9	0.4	200.7	91.0	15.2	29.6	5.0

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	504.2	64.1	1.3	11.5	5.5	0.2	0.1
2018	363.9	45.7	0.9	11.4	4.7	0.2	0.1
2019	354.4	57.2	1.3	14.2	5.1	0.3	0.1
2020	433.6	58.1	0.9	12.0	5.1	0.2	0.1

BELGIUM



0.40% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.46% TOTAL AID/GNI



There is agreement in the government to discuss the growth trajectory towards 0.7% as part of the preparation of the 2023 budget. [...] I am counting on my partners in government to support this approach.”

Minister for Development Cooperation
Meryame Kitir, 4 May 2022

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

According to preliminary OECD DAC statistics, Belgian ODA increased by 2.3% between 2020 and 2021, rising from EUR 2.3 billion to EUR 2.4 billion in constant prices. However, this is largely due to an increase in in-donor refugee costs. After increasing by more than 80%, these costs represented 9.7% of Belgian ODA in 2021, that is almost double the international average of 5.2%. Excluding these costs, Belgian ODA would have actually decreased in constant prices by 2.1%. Furthermore, despite ethical concerns voiced by civil society at the DAC, in-excess vaccine donations to partner countries were also counted as ODA by Belgium in 2021, accounting for 1.3% of its total ODA. And even with such superficial inflation, Belgian ODA still decreased from 0.49% to 0.46% of its gross national income (GNI), largely as a result of rising GNI. Belgium thus moved even further away from the international target of 0.7%.

According to the European Union (EU) Annual Report on Development Aid targets, however, Belgium reached the international commitment of allocating 0.15% of its GNI to LDCs in 2020. On another positive note, the year 2021 witnessed the adoption of four new governmental development programmes, as well as an increased envelope for the future programme with Belgium’s most important partner country, the Democratic Republic of Congo. Belgian ODA can also be commended for its high proportion of formally untied aid and grants rather than loans.

BEST PRACTICE: SUPPORTING THE AFRICAN PRODUCTION OF VACCINES AND MEDICINES



New projects to strengthen local production of vaccines, medicines and other health-related products in South Africa, Senegal and Rwanda were announced in 2021, reflecting a willingness to go beyond the mere donation of COVID-19 vaccines and to fight against global vaccine inequality. As part of Team Europe Initiatives, Belgian development cooperation supported the structuring of the Senegalese pharmaceutical sector, the launch of a pharmaceutical production hub in Dakar, as well as capacity building on pharmaceutical regulation for the Senegalese Ministry of Health. In Rwanda, Belgium contributed to strengthening the Rwandan Food and Drugs Authority through capacity development in market registration and licensing, clinical trials and quality management systems, as well as the digitalisation of pharmaceutical systems. Finally, Belgium contributed to a technology transfer hub for mRNA vaccines in South Africa: in June 2022, the South African company Afrigen announced that it would start sharing mRNA vaccine technology with 15 local producers in low- and middle-income countries, including research into the application of mRNA technology to local health needs such as neglected tropical diseases.

THE GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs

The government’s relationship with CSOs generally has a good track record in terms of dialogue, especially within the Development Cooperation Ministry and agencies. Belgian CSOs have, however asked to be more systematically and inclusively involved in consultations on governmental development programmes. In 2021, CSOs’ five-year funding programmes were also adopted. The funding for these programmes increased by 9%, and this can be commended. But in reality, this will not cover inflation during the five upcoming years and therefore does not represent a real increase.

TRENDS FOR THIS YEAR AND BEYOND


In June 2022, the Belgian government confirmed its October 2020 commitment to adopt a growth trajectory for the development cooperation budget, in order to reach the 0.7% target by 2030. This decision must be implemented together with the 2023 budget. The proportion of humanitarian aid in Belgian ODA has almost tripled in a decade. The war in Ukraine will certainly emphasise this trend and Belgium can be commended for mobilising EUR 25 million of additional funds for humanitarian aid and multilateral contributions to support Ukraine. Climate finance increased by 42% in 2021, although Belgium continues to count almost all of its climate finance as ODA (98% in 2020), running counter to the principle of additionality enshrined in the Paris climate agreement.

Another trend which will hopefully give rise to change in the coming years is the need to overcome the shortcomings linked to the principles of alignment and country ownership, as confirmed by several recent reports and indicators. The Belgian government's own evaluation of its cooperation strategies recommends that dialogue with partner countries be formalised further, to better respect the prioritisation of the partners' needs. This principle should be a priority in the development of the bilateral agency Enabel's new management contract, to be adopted at the end of 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

- Adopt a linear and binding growth trajectory to ensure that ODA reaches 0.7% GNI by 2030 at the latest. This entails a strongly increased budget for the Directorate-general of development cooperation as of 2023 and subsequent years.
- Enshrine this growth trajectory in law.
- Ensure that the Ministry for development cooperation (1) adopts a new management contract for its governmental development agency Enabel that ensures the dialogue with partner countries will be more formalised and systematic when developing bilateral programmes; (2) have as a longer-term ambition the strengthening of national systems in all partner countries, and to use these when possible in development cooperation management; (3) decide that Belgium will stop counting in-donor refugee costs, debt relief, surplus vaccine donations and imputed student costs as ODA.

BELGIUM – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDGS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDGS	%GNI	% ODA
2017	601.55	0.13	29.19
2018	634.23	0.14	32.04
2019	685.29	0.14	33.70
2020	684.30	0.16	32.82

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	1250.6	1232.2	18.4	1.5
2018	1139.0	1119.1	19.9	1.7
2019	1058.2	1040.2	18.0	1.7
2020	1031.9	1021.1	10.8	1.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	77.5	103.0	180.6	57.1	8.8
2018	95.1	100.4	195.5	51.4	9.9
2019	96.7	128.2	224.9	57.0	11.1
2020	87.8	117.3	205.1	57.2	9.8

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	819.9	819.9	0.0	289.6	502.9	27.4	61.3	3.3
2018	805.7	733.4	72.3	284.1	422.1	27.3	57.6	3.7
2019	790.7	716.4	74.3	200.8	486.9	28.7	68.0	4.0
2020	798.2	711.8	86.4	178.2	490.5	43.1	68.9	6.1

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	959.7543	84.93985	170.5966	21.02676	12.40071	14.0375	8.278738
2018	870.9949	78.82869	176.4321	22.66459	12.8935	15.66539	8.911775
2019	796.0167	58.88736	191.8051	23.95057	12.32874	18.32461	9.432736
2020	759.7565	73.55578	185.5372	25.43	12.42489	18.21049	8.897499

0.11% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.12% TOTAL AID/GNI

BULGARIA



OECD best practices and standards set the guiding principles for developing effective policy responses. As a candidate country for accession, Bulgaria is committed to implementing and promoting these highest standards in the SEE region in the interest of our citizens and businesses.”

Velislava Petrova, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria (17 May 2022)

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021, preliminary data indicates that Bulgaria provided EUR 77.12 million in ODA, representing 0.12% of GNI. This was an increase of 0.5% in real terms in volume, but marked a slight decrease in share of GNI compared to 2020.

Bulgaria took an active part in the coordinated response of the EU and its Member States to the challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, Bulgaria continued its support to the Team Europe approach. As part of the EU response, Bulgaria provided EUR 20 000 to Namibia to deal with the severe epidemic situation in the country caused by the third wave of COVID-19. Bulgaria bilaterally donated vaccines to the Republic of North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bangladesh, and Bhutan.

In response to the current crisis in Ukraine and in addition to in-kind support, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria urgently redirected EUR 185 000 from its budget for humanitarian aid to Ukraine, which was provided through international organisations on the ground. In financial terms, Bulgaria’s support so far amounts approximately to EUR 1 million. The war is causing a massive influx of refugees to the country. Since the start of the war 532 470 Ukrainian refugees entered Bulgaria, 123 170 of whom were registered for temporary protection and 85 483 officially remained in the country. 39 143 were children. Bulgaria is open to Ukrainian refugees, and there was unprecedented humanitarian mobilisation in solidarity of the people of Ukraine.

Ukraine is a priority country for Bulgarian Aid with education as a longstanding thematic priority.



CASE STUDY BOX

Since 2018 Bulgaria has had successful cooperation with Japan on joint projects in the framework of the Western Balkans Cooperation Initiative. In 2021, Bulgarian Development Aid and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) co-financed the “Bulgaria and Japan Western Balkans specialised seminar on seismic risk challenges,” implemented by the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. Disaster management is a common challenge in the Western Balkans region. Good practices in using disaster management policy frameworks and infrastructure development as preventive measures, risk education for citizens and school children, as well as private sector engagement were shared with the representatives of the six non-EU countries in the region: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia. In addition to learning about the experiences of Bulgaria and Japan the participants were able to broaden their knowledge in the field by hearing from representatives of international organisations such as the World Bank, UNESCO, the European Space Agency, and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR).

Bulgaria stands ready to resume the implementation of development projects, once the situation allows.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND


The Mid-term Programme for the period 2020-2024 produced a Programme for Global Education and Awareness Raising (GEAR) to fund global education projects at national level to raise awareness about development cooperation, sustainable development and SDGs, human rights, tolerance and peace, media literacy, and combating fake news. In January 2021 a round table and workshops were held to develop the priorities and goals of the new GEAR Programme.

Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Bulgarian CSOs and representatives of the Council of Europe's North-South Centre and the Global Education Network Europe (GENE) took part, but there were no follow-up actions to launch the programme. This is particularly concerning given the continued spread of a far right narrative in Bulgarian society and the lack of public support for Bulgaria's development cooperation efforts.

Moreover, there is still a barrier for Bulgarian CSOs to submit project proposals for Bulgarian Development Aid funding. According to the Law on the State Budget bilateral aid can be only transferred abroad, so all CSOs eligible to implement Bulgarian ODA projects are foreign and registered in the partner country, either locally or internationally. This can be considered as discriminatory towards Bulgarian CSOs. An even more serious concern is that the experience and good practices gained by the Bulgarian organisations in the transition years are not effectively implemented in work with the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries, which are currently in transition.

The OECD has launched official talks for Bulgaria's accession to the organisation with the adoption of a roadmap outlining the process. This step was taken at the annual Ministerial Council Meeting on 9-10 June 2022 in Paris. The OECD accession process will boost national reforms for good governance including those relating to Bulgarian Development Aid.

BULGARIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT

- The government should further accelerate the process of developing a new law on development cooperation and include broad representation of stakeholders in the drafting process. The law should establish a new Agency for Development Cooperation to distribute bilateral ODA.
- The urgent introduction of specific regulations to improve the involvement of Bulgarian CSOs in the implementation phase of development cooperation programmes.
- Bulgarian bilateral aid should be increased, which will result in the increase of the total ODA as a percentage of GNI.
- A communication strategy and communication campaign that highlights the mutual benefits of development cooperation policies for both donors and beneficiaries should be formulated to include the effective implementation of the GEAR Programme as a tool for changing attitudes among young people.

ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	11.4	0.0	17.9
2018	11.1	0.0	18.1
2019	13.0	0.0	21.0
2020	16.3	0.0	21.7

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	10.1	10.1	0.0	0.0
2018	8.8	8.8	0.0	0.0
2019	8.3	8.3	0.0	0.0
2020	8.1	8.1	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

Bulgaria has not screened any of its ODA to climate finance.

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	5.8	0.0	5.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2018	8.8	0.0	8.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2019	4.3	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2020	3.9	0.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	10.12925	0	0	0	0	0	0
2018	8.753333	0	0	0	0	0	0
2019	8.345751	0	0	0	0	0	0
2020	8.081775	0	0	0	0	0	0



It is crucial to strengthen partnerships with countries of origin, transit and destination countries, as well as to encourage their stronger engagement in addressing the challenges of migration. For Croatia, the key focus is on EU neighbourhood countries in the Western Balkans, Middle East and Africa, but also on countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh.”

Gordan Grlić Radman, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, 15 March 2021, informal videocall of EU MFAs on migration.

MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN 2021

Croatia increased its total ODA as a percentage of GNI from 0.13% to 0.15% during 2021, which presents a step forward in reaching the 0.33% target by 2030. Croatia has contributed to combating the COVID-19 pandemic through bilateral and multilateral vaccine donations, primarily through the COVAX initiative.

The Croatian MFA launched a grant programme in 2021 aimed at funding CSO projects in development cooperation, which is a positive step forward in its partnership with civil society. This new programme aims to strengthen cooperation between government and civil society, as well as Croatian CSOs' capacity to participate in development cooperation projects. However, the current budget of only EUR 400 000 is insufficient for the needs of the organisations in the sector, and there is significant potential for its improvement.

Croatia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' report on ODA in 2021 is currently under parliamentary consideration, but is not yet adopted. Consequently, all the data used in this AidWatch report for Croatia are preliminary.

The Croatian government partially addressed our recommendations from last year's AidWatch report by starting its civil society granting programme, and by slightly increasing its ODA both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GNI. However, it failed to improve in other important aspects, such as transparency and openness towards more meaningful cooperation with civil society in its policy making.

There are some shortcomings in its ODA reporting, specifically concerning refugee and in-donor refugee costs, student costs, vaccine donations, as well as a somewhat discriminatory practice of making donations based on ethnic background and religious affiliation.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

The key government document for development cooperation policy, the National Strategy for Development Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia, expired in 2021, and currently there is a policy vacuum pending the completion of the upcoming strategy. The new strategy should strive to place more focus on previously neglected issues such as gender equality, sustainable development, better cooperation with civil society and building partnerships with LDCs. Currently civil society is not included in the strategy formulation process, although there are assurances from the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs that CSOs will be included.

Croatia reacted positively to the war in Ukraine by accepting all incoming Ukrainian refugees and providing them with necessary aid. However, it is very likely that these in-donor refugee costs will be counted towards ODA, thus causing aid inflation. It is currently unclear whether this will impact on total ODA commitments by decreasing real, non-IDRC aid in the coming years.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT

- Step up efforts to increase aid, honour Croatia's commitments to ODA financing and develop and adopt a specific timetable to reach ODA targets.
- Improve reporting and increase transparency on Croatia's ODA spending.
- Continue improving partnerships with CSOs.
- Expand the policy priorities in its upcoming national strategy for development cooperation from 2022 and beyond with more focus on gender equality, sustainable development and partnerships with LDCs.


ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	10.0	0.0	20.3
2018	14.5	0.0	22.4
2019	5.4	0.0	8.3
2020	9.2	0.0	13.6

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	13.0	13.0	0.0	0.0
2018	13.7	13.7	0.0	0.0
2019	18.2	18.2	0.0	0.0
2020	17.0	17.0	0.0	0.0

CROATIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

Bulgaria has not screened any of its ODA to climate finance.

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	13.0	0.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2018	13.5	0.0	13.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2019	14.3	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2020	14.7	0.0	14.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	12.6	0.4	0.0	3.4	0.9	0.0	0.0
2018	13.2	0.5	0.0	3.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
2019	18.0	0.2	0.0	1.2	0.3	0.0	0.0
2020	16.9	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0



The need for a renewed increase in total funding for foreign development cooperation, humanitarian aid and transformational cooperation from the state budget is urgent.”

**The then Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Jakub Kulhánek, 6 June 2021**

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021, Czechia disbursed USD 361.74 million in ODA. Compared to 2020, this is a nominal increase in the total amount of funds, mainly due to the increase in the share of the contribution to EU foreign development cooperation (a total of CZK 4.4 billion and 56.7% of the total ODA) and also by reporting the donation of COVID vaccines at an aggregate value of over half a billion CZK. However, due to GNI growth, the total share of ODA remains at 0.13%, or it continues to decrease slightly (now 0.126 in thousandths). Due to the reduction of bilateral foreign development cooperation and humanitarian aid, multilateral ODA at 78.5 % remained the most significant and growing part of the total ODA figures.

Decision-making power on development assistance and cooperation remains at the MFA. The capacities of the Czech Development Agency (CZDA) which is responsible for the implementation of a significant part of bilateral development cooperation, including intentions to get effectively involved in EU delegated cooperation, remained basic. Efforts continued to stabilise the CZDA in terms of staffing and processes. Unfortunately, the trend of significantly reducing bilateral ODA from 2020 onwards has continued. There was an additional reduction of CZK 200 million in the budget for foreign development cooperation and humanitarian aid, agreed in parliament in late 2020, as part of a trade-off between the government and the opposition in order to pass the 2021 State Budget Bill. As a result, the biggest burden of the cuts fell on the CZDA, whose resources fell by CZK 100 million, (i.e. 20 % of its budget for bilateral projects) and for humanitarian aid under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CZK 100 million, i.e. 46% of the aid budget), in spite of the continued exceptional humanitarian needs in the context of the pandemic, but also those in fragile countries.



CASE STUDY

Diaconia CZ implemented an innovative menstrual health project in Cambodia that improved access to healthy menstrual products for women and girls in Kampong Chhnang province. At the same time, they sought to increase awareness of menstruation and reproductive health. A set of menstrual packs was created that included reusable cloth menstrual pads, which are a sustainable, affordable and healthy alternative to disposable pads. The project supported the entrepreneurship of local women involved in sewing the pads.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs

The government that was in power in 2021 had a rather controversial attitude towards civil society. Nevertheless, the lower levels of administration remained relatively open to NGOs. However, a systemic approach to involve CSOs properly in consultation processes was lacking. A positive move was the adoption, in July 2021, of the Strategy for Cooperation between the Public Administration and NGOs for the period 2021-2030. In addition, a new government came to power in late 2021 following a general election. This new government takes mostly, but not exclusively, conservative policy positions. Overall, the space for further positive moves in advocating the CSOs' agenda in the country has been widened.

Under the responsibility of the MFA, in close cooperation with the CZDA, a revision of Czech development cooperation methodology took place in 2021. This placed particular emphasis on an integrated approach across all phases of the project cycle in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of development cooperation, supplemented the chapter on communication and also specified the procedures for identification of new projects and results-focused monitoring.

In the context of the EU, the fundamental change was the introduction of the new comprehensive external action tool NDICI-Global Europe and the concept of Team Europe Initiatives (TEI). The Czech Republic decided to join a number of regional and global TEIs. The MFA maintained its efforts to strengthen the use and ease of access to the new instruments to engage national private sector actors in development cooperation.

Very few recommendations proposed in the AidWatch 2021 report were achieved, and they therefore continue to be the focus of action needed over the next few years. At the same time, the active approach of the CZ MFA towards the NDICI-GE and TEIs mentioned, can be presented as an increased focus on development effectiveness and impact in partner countries.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

Budgets projected for bilateral ODA and humanitarian aid for the coming years are clearly not in line with the need for a steady increase to reach 0.33 % of GNI by 2030. 2022 ODA figures, and possibly for the years immediately ahead, will be influenced by the “Ukraine factor.” 2022 has seen extraordinary humanitarian aid measures and these will be increased further following the massive influx of refugees from Ukraine with public spending on people with refugee status.


The share of bilateral ODA is constantly decreasing, and comprises only 20% of total ODA in 2021. This problem will probably persist, with the exception of bilateral aid and stabilisation funding for Ukraine.

The global impact of the war in Ukraine (in particular the rising prices of food and the energy supply crisis), as well as the Czech Presidency of the EU are factors that push Czech decision-makers to act more proactively on the international scene. This also involves efforts to strengthen the humanitarian aid and development cooperation agenda, as well as intensification of the Czech government’s pro-human rights agenda.

The Czech government will continue to combine a values-based approach (such as support for the human rights agenda) with a more utilitarian approach. There will also be increased attempts to involve the private sector in development via different tools, such as economic diplomacy.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CZECH GOVERNMENT

- Put genuine ODA figures on a growth trajectory in terms of the ODA/GNI percentage from 2023, particularly for bilateral development cooperation and humanitarian assistance; and at the very least, stop decreasing ODA.
- Increase focus on development effectiveness and impact in partner countries and strengthen systematic monitoring and evaluation in line with Leave no one behind (LNOB) principles. This requires looking more closely at ways of increasing the localisation of development cooperation activities.
- Ensure expertise and capacity are sufficient to enable the CZDA and the entire Czech ODA system to operate effectively.
- Increase allocation of financial resources for global development/citizenship education and awareness raising. This is particularly important given the relatively low support of Czech citizens for development cooperation (as documented by various Eurobarometer surveys); and more so in the context of the combined crises Czech society is facing in this turbulent period, which have significant impacts on people’s livelihoods.



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	60.39	0.03	19.97
2018	59.79	0.03	22.76
2019	65.07	0.03	22.84
2020	54.10	0.03	20.61

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	80.1	80.1	0.0	0.0
2018	86.2	86.2	0.0	0.0
2019	88.3	88.3	0.0	0.0
2020	63.8	63.8	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	1.6	2.4	3.9	60.3	1.3
2018	1.5	3.1	4.5	67.4	1.7
2019	2.1	2.2	4.2	51.3	1.5
2020	1.5	2.5	4.0	62.0	1.5

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	53.8	37.1	16.7	10.5	23.3	3.4	62.6	9.2
2018	59.5	41.4	18.2	28.9	10.7	1.8	25.9	4.3
2019	57.7	57.7	0.0	35.1	21.4	1.3	37.0	2.2
2020	56.6	55.3	1.4	29.3	25.0	1.0	45.3	1.7

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	63.5	15.8	0.8	20.7	5.5	1.0	0.3
2018	66.6	18.9	0.7	22.7	7.4	0.8	0.3
2019	76.5	11.1	0.7	13.4	4.2	0.8	0.3
2020	52.2	10.5	1.1	18.2	4.4	1.7	0.4

0.68% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.70% TOTAL AID/GNI

DENMARK



In many ways the world is in disarray, so development cooperation is of increasing importance. It is a direct investment that Denmark can make to create a better world for the world's poorest and at the same time a more just and safer world for ourselves."

Flemming Møller Mortensen, Minister for Development Cooperation, 21 April 2022

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

For Danish development cooperation 2021 was a year of change. In June, a new strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action called "The World We Share" was adopted. The strategy is supported by a broad coalition of eight of the 12 parties in the parliament and it will set the course for Danish development cooperation until 2025. The strategy places democratic values and human rights as the foundation of Danish development cooperation and focuses on two main pillars: 1) climate change, environment and nature, as well as working in fragile contexts with focus on 2) irregular migration, displacement, and conflict. The strategy also includes an agreement that Danish ODA will as a minimum stay at 0.7% of GNI.

Furthermore, the Danish MFA renewed its strategic partnerships agreements with civil society organisations until 2025. Eighteen civil society organisations were selected to partner with the MFA based on an open application round. The strategic partnerships agreements are closely linked to the implementation of the new strategy.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

The effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are felt worldwide. In Denmark, the influx of people displaced from Ukraine means reallocation of ODA from projects in partner countries to spending ODA within own borders on in-donor refugee costs. Denmark has reallocated EUR 270 million from the 2022 budget and is expected to allocate at least EUR 80 million on the 2023 budget for in-donor refugee costs.

THE VOICE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DENMARK'S VOLUNTARY NATIONAL REVIEW ON AGENDA 2030:



In 2021, Denmark submitted its second VNR on the Sustainable Development Goals to the UN High Level Political Forum. As a result of strong collaboration between civil society and the Ministry of Finance – responsible for the Danish implementation of Agenda 2030 – the Danish VNR report included inputs from various stakeholders. Civil society contributed to the report with two uncensored writing submissions: seven pages on "civil society contributions," including lessons learned and challenges in the Danish SDG-implementation and civil society's assessment of Denmark's contribution to each of the 17 SDGs presented next to the government's assessment. Civil society was furthermore represented in both Denmark's official VNR presentation and in the panel for Q&A, e.g. by representatives from the Danish SDG platform Global Focus and from the Danish LNOB coalition. The LNOB representative was granted the last word by the Minister of Finance. The strong inclusion of civil society has laid the foundation for a strong and trusting collaboration on Danish implementation of the SDGs and strengthened multi-stakeholder inclusion. The inclusive VNR reporting and presentation has furthermore served as a best practice on civil society inclusion globally and inspired a demand for inclusion from other civil society platforms.

In addition to reallocating ODA from the existing budget, a broad coalition of Danish parties agreed to increase Denmark's defence budget to reach 2% of GNI in 2033 – an increase that will amount to EUR 2 bn every year.

Domestically, the upcoming general election has the potential to change the political course of the country. Although the new strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action has broad support and will apply until 2025, general elections always are a moment for political change which can affect development cooperation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DANISH GOVERNMENT

- Do not use ODA to cover in-donor refugee costs.
- Create a new budget line to support the rebuilding of Ukraine that is additional to ODA flows and targets.
- Make climate finance additional to ODA flows and targets.
- Increase spending through and to civil society to 25% of ODA, to make Denmark a champion of civic space.


ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	677.73	0.22	29.83
2018	607.65	0.20	27.98
2019	730.18	0.22	30.84
2020	676.90	0.21	29.21

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	1667	1630	37	2
2018	1562	1562	0	0
2019	1693	1693	0	0
2020	1508	1508	0	0

DENMARK – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	114.2	75.9	190.1	39.9	8.4
2018	125.1	104.3	229.5	45.5	10.6
2019	157.0	116.8	273.8	42.7	11.6
2020	102.2	89.5	191.8	46.7	8.3

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	1407.3	1306.5	100.8	804.9	407.6	94.0	31.2	7.2
2018	1358.7	1313.4	45.3	749.0	465.9	98.5	35.5	7.5
2019	1502.4	1464.5	37.9	816.9	543.3	104.4	37.1	7.1
2020	1307.1	1288.7	18.4	694.5	521.5	72.7	40.5	5.6

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	1206.3	215.7	175.0	24.5	17.2	11.0	7.7
2018	1125.6	356.7	32.4	25.7	17.9	2.1	1.5
2019	1192.0	424.2	21.4	27.2	18.8	1.3	0.9
2020	1066.9	375.2	38.6	27.9	17.9	2.6	1.7



War in Ukraine has profoundly shaken Europe and it is our moral responsibility to promote the fight against impunity for serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity. Providing support to affected communities through effective development cooperation and humanitarian assistance is Estonia's duty."

Urmas Reinsalu, Minister of Foreign Affairs

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

Estonia introduced significant structural changes in its development cooperation in 2021. The Estonian Centre for International Cooperation was established in early 2021 and started functioning as the main administrative body for development cooperation in 2022. The process, initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2020, was inclusive by nature and involved numerous consultations with civil society and development cooperation practitioners to design best systems for the future. Some funding calls, which had been cancelled in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, were restored.

Overall, Estonia is on a stable course to increase its ODA, yet more rapid changes are needed to reach its goals by 2030. The country's ODA stood at 0.17% of GNI in 2021, indicating a slight increase from 0.16% in 2020. However, there has been a significant change in net increases, showing a remarkable 18% increase from 2020. This amounts to around EUR 6 million in net terms. There is still a long way to go to reach the projected 0.33%, but important measures have been taken to increase the contributions in the following year, including establishing a national development agency.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

There are increasing concerns about the quality and quantity of development finance. In 2022, Estonian bilateral ODA to civil society had been cut almost entirely, marking a significant decrease from previous years. It is a clear tendency that the new development centre EstDev is focusing on bilateral business relations



CASE STUDY

In mid-2021, the MFA entered bilateral discussions with civil society to design its new decree for development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The MFA made space for equal meaningful discussions, taking into account the expertise of civil society and other implementing parties. All participating parties were able to shape the updated decree and ensure inclusive legislation will be adopted. As one of the most significant changes, we were able to position civil society as an integral part of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, which is especially relevant in light of the shrinking civic space across Europe, including in Estonia.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs

Civil society has been a strategic partner in development cooperation since Estonia became a donor country in 1998. The MFA has an increasingly good working relationship with civil society, having both contractual strategic partners and more occasional partners within the sector. Overall, cooperation between the government and civil society is meaningful and results-oriented, taking into account the unique expertise civil society has to offer.


and development through the private sector. This evident shift from civil society to the business sector comes with an overall shrinking of civic space and threatens not only the quality of Estonia's development cooperation, but also to the scope of Estonia's civil society in general.

On a positive note, Estonia applied to become an OECD DAC member in 2022, indicating an increasing dedication to international commitments and the ODA targets. In the long-term, this will constitute a stronger political will and more structural resources for development cooperation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ESTONIAN GOVERNMENT

- Make continuous efforts to meet the 0.33% ODA commitment by 2030.
- Safeguard civic space by ensuring sustainable and consistent access to resources for civil society, while ensuring that Estonian development cooperation will not serve Estonia's business sector's export interests.
- Continue meaningful bilateral engagement and strategic dialogue with development cooperation practitioners.
- Proceed with an inter-ministerial joint programme for development cooperation by promoting policy coherence for a sustainable development approach across foreign and development policies.
- Develop a cross-sectoral Global Citizenship Education joint platform in line with the recommendations made by GENE.

ESTONIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	7.51	0.03	18.20
2018	7.61	0.03	18.55
2019	8.35	0.03	19.03
2020	8.20	0.03	18.72

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	19.5	19.5	0.0	0.0
2018	18.2	18.2	0.0	0.0
2019	15.3	15.3	0.0	0.0
2020	14.6	14.6	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2018	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2019	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2020	0.1	0.1	0.3	50.0	0.6

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	13.6	1.7	11.9	0.9	0.1	0.7	7.6	39.3
2018	14.4	1.6	12.9	0.2	0.4	0.9	26.7	59.2
2019	12.0	1.4	10.7	0.5	0.3	0.6	19.8	44.6
2020	11.4	11.4	0.0	10.3	0.2	0.9	1.8	8.0

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	14.4	4.4	0.6	26.0	12.3	3.2	1.5
2018	12.7	5.1	0.5	30.4	13.5	2.6	1.1
2019	10.2	4.4	0.6	32.8	11.4	3.8	1.3
2020	10.2	3.5	0.9	30.1	10.1	6.3	2.1

0.47% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.49% TOTAL AID/GNI

FINLAND



We are aiming for a budget that corresponds to our UN commitment to use 0.7% of gross national income for development cooperation. The year 2030 was set as the year for reaching the 0.7% target. We are far behind our Nordic partners in achieving this goal. [...] Finland examines development cooperation funding in light of its overall economic situation.”

Minister for development cooperation and foreign trade, Ville Skinnari, speech in the parliamentary discussion of the Report on Development Policy Extending Across Parliamentary Terms, 14 September 2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021, the Finnish government was able to increase its ODA contributions and thus move towards the goal of 0.7% of GNI. In 2021, Finland spent 0.47% of its GNI on ODA. However, to achieve the 0.7% target, Finland would need to add the equivalent of almost EUR 1 billion to its development cooperation budget. To put this into perspective, the Finnish State Budget in 2021 was around EUR 68 billion.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

As noted above, there is no particular trend in overall governmental support for the ODA. However, Finnish citizens have consistently supported development cooperation, and throughout the 2000s some 80-90% of the Finnish population have considered development cooperation very important or quite important.

A more notable trend from 2010 concerns the role of investment and private sector activities, which have increased in Finnish development cooperation (and ODA). This trajectory means that:

- Goals and criteria of development cooperation of different sectors (especially private and CSO sectors) should be more clearly mutually supportive and comparable; and
- Different sectors should understand each other and learn from each other to a greater extent.



CASE STUDY

There is no particular trend in overall governmental support for the ODA, which has been variable since 2000.

In electoral terms 2003-2015 Finland had a centrist-leftist government that increased the country's ODA contribution from 0.33% to 0.59%. In the 2015-2019 electoral term Finland had a more right-wing government with a nationalist populist party (“the Finns Party”) as one of the three parties in the government coalition. That government reduced the development cooperation budget from 0.59% of GNI in 2014 to 0.36% of GNI in 2018 – an approximately one third cut. Since 2019, the present leftist-centrist government has increased ODA levels to 0.47% (in 2021).

Between 2000 and 2014, Finland's ODA had incrementally risen from 0.3% from 2000 to 0.59% in 2014. Had the government of 2014-2019 kept up the same pace of ODA spending, Finland would currently be around the 0.7% mark.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs

Finland is moderately supportive of CSOs. In 2021, Finland directed around 7% of its ODA to CSOs for which there are several funding instruments. The Finnish state in general has a good level of interaction on development cooperation with CSOs. To a certain extent, Finnish CSOs and the Finnish government work together with the CSOs of partner countries, but this type of engagement should be further developed.


RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT

In the Finnish government programme for 2023-2027 there should be a clear roadmap to achieve 0.7% GNI by 2030. The target of 0.7% has already been expressed in several national and international commitments.

In addition to the 0.7% target, three other figures and one principle are important:

- 0.2% of GNI to support for LDCs: These countries have the greatest need for development. It is difficult for LDCs to get market-based financing or domestic financing. Finland is internationally committed to support these countries with 0.2% of GNI. In 2021 the ratio was 0.18% of GNI.
- 85% of supported ODA actions should promote gender equality. Equality is strongly linked to other development goals. Finland is committed to the achievement of equality. Gender equality is also one of the cross-cutting principles of the UN SDGs.
- 15% of ODA funding for CSOs. The work of CSOs is an important part of development cooperation and should be sufficiently and consistently funded. The work of CSOs is based on the needs of local people. CSOs can adapt their operations to changing social needs and situations. Their work and results are also straightforward to evaluate and verify.
- And a principle: strong support for the CSOs of partner countries. In addition to justifications for the funding for CSOs in general, the CSOs in the partner countries ensure that citizens lead the way on the societal development in each country.

FINLAND – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	312.01	0.13	30.62
2018	253.52	0.11	30.64
2019	349.72	0.14	33.04
2020	334.00	0.14	29.79

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	571.9	535.8	36.1	6.3
2018	415.7	371.3	44.4	10.7
2019	556.7	505.7	50.9	9.1
2020	576.5	482.2	94.2	16.3

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	73.0	54.9	127.9	42.9	12.6
2018	25.8	21.6	47.5	45.6	5.7
2019	74.2	42.2	116.4	36.3	11.0
2020	54.5	32.0	86.4	37.0	7.7

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	451.0	448.3	2.7	180.7	234.9	32.8	52.4	7.3
2018	321.0	320.7	0.3	147.0	150.1	23.6	46.8	7.4
2019	421.6	421.4	0.2	220.6	176.4	24.4	41.9	5.8
2020	474.7	429.7	45.0	193.9	200.5	35.2	46.7	8.2

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	451.9	89.1	21.1	19.6	10.8	3.8	2.1
2018	301.6	78.9	19.6	24.6	11.9	4.9	2.4
2019	446.1	87.3	20.7	19.5	10.2	3.7	2.0
2020	451.0	100.5	23.8	21.6	11.1	4.1	2.1

FRANCE



0.45% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.56% TOTAL AID/GNI



To get out of a mindset that was a bit of a continuation of our habits, of a relationship that was structured by past performances, for better or worse, by tools that had become technical, and to rediscover the strength of the project, the meaning of an initiative that is created and built together.”

**Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic,
on relations between the EU and Africa,
Paris on 16 February, 2022**

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

2021 was the first year of the implementation of the law on solidarity development and the fight against global inequalities, which sets out the French policy framework. Accordingly, the French government continued its efforts to allocate more resources to ODA. It has again reached a record level with EUR 13 billion. The new framework also underpins the desire to improve the quality and evaluation of French aid. But France can still improve the qualitative targets, rely more on innovative sources of financing such as the tax on financial transactions and increase the transparency of its policy.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

The implementation of the 2021 law sets an ODA trajectory for 2021 and 2022 (with a respective allocation of 0.52% and 0.55% of GNI). However, the law does not set out the trajectory for credits beyond 2022 and leaves a way out for the government not to reach 0.7% in 2025.

The law sets objectives to reconfigure the balance between loans and grants; targets prioritised countries; includes a gender dimension in funding volumes, and increases the share of ODA channelled through CSOs. Each of these targets can be strengthened. Parliament and government need to work, on the one hand to finalise the trajectory until 2025 and, on the other hand, to monitor the achievement of the qualitative objectives of ODA. In addition, no clear commitment has been made to the additionality of aid in response to the war in Ukraine.



CASE STUDY

Currently, ODA data are recorded in many different databases. The French government, in accordance with the law, is working on a single database that will cover all French ODA. It will allow both sectoral and geographical analysis and provide access to raw data and project descriptions. This will have two objectives: to facilitate the monitoring of the use of development aid and to make information available to citizens.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs


The 2021 legal framework details, in an article dedicated to civil society, the modalities of partnership with civil society organisations. It recognises the role of civil society and stipulates that the state involves French and partner country CSOs in policy by promoting their participation in the design and implementation of programmes and projects. To this end, the state must organise an annual dialogue with CSOs. Nevertheless, while efforts are to be welcomed, the quality of the dialogue can be improved by strengthening consultation mechanisms and taking better account of proposals in decision-making.

France is increasing the share of its ODA channelled through and for CSOs. The objective set in the law is to double the amount in 2022 compared to 2017. In 2021, the amount of ODA transiting through and for CSOs represented EUR 574 million, quite close to the desired doubling (EUR 620 million) but still far from the initial objective of EUR 1 billion in 2022 as determined by Coordination SUD. Furthermore, the law recognises the CSOs' right of initiative and the government has committed to strengthening the mechanism dedicated to CSO initiatives. Coordination SUD would like to see a major share of funding go to this type of initiative.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

- Translate into action the orientations and programming law adopted in 2021.
- Translate development policy priorities into specific commitments:
 - Set out a trajectory in volume until 2025 to reach 0.7% of GNI allocated to ODA and its sustainability;
 - Rebalance up to 85% of grants in total ODA;
 - Ensure that 50% of ODA funds basic social services and 50% goes to the LDCs;
 - Ensure the achievement of the OECD and EU objectives in terms of gender equality; and
 - Set out a trajectory for ODA channelled through CSOs to ensure alignment with the average of OECD countries.
- Strengthen the tax on financial transactions to deal with crises.
- Make the policy of international solidarity a transparent, effective and accountable policy.

FRANCE – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	2489.8	0.1	23.4
2018	2894.2	0.1	26.5
2019	2839.6	0.1	25.4
2020	3354.8	0.1	23.9

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	8131.3	4083.7	4047.7	49.8
2018	8106.9	3972.2	4134.7	51.0
2019	9007.0	4853.7	4153.3	46.1
2020	11484.9	4982.9	6502.0	56.6

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	1300.0	419.5	1719.5	24.4	16.1
2018	763.4	400.0	1163.4	34.4	10.7
2019	1640.5	701.5	2342.0	30.0	21.0
2020	2179.8	1458.3	3638.1	40.1	25.9

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	5404.5	4505.4	899.2	3529.1	871.6	104.6	19.3	2.3
2018	5674.3	5656.9	17.4	4487.3	905.7	264.0	16.0	4.7
2019	6077.6	6030.7	46.9	4430.7	1404.9	195.2	23.3	3.2
2020	8556.6	8064.0	492.7	5093.0	2696.2	274.8	33.4	3.4

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	6023.7	150.2	79.4	3.7	2.2	1.3	0.7
2018	5988.0	260.7	14.3	4.4	2.5	0.2	0.1
2019	6530.8	393.7	16.1	5.9	3.7	0.2	0.1
2020	8828.4	516.1	19.3	5.7	3.8	0.2	0.1

0.59% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.72% TOTAL AID/GNI

GERMANY



This war has consequences for the whole world. The increase in energy and food prices hits hardest the people who have to spend almost all their income on them.”

Svenja Schulze, Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021 Germany's ODA contributions increased a second consecutive year in a row as a result of additional spending in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in real and absolute terms. Germany allocated an estimated USD 3 billion in 2021 to COVID-related activities, most prominently through the ACT-A initiative. However, Germany has remained one of the staunchest opponents of a patent waiver on COVID vaccines to ensure a more equitable distribution of vaccines in the world. Germany's new minister for international cooperation and development, Svenja Schulze (SPD), has declared a feminist development policy as one of her strategic aims.

The German parliament passed a mandatory human rights due diligence law in June 2021, which forces large companies to identify, document and counteract risks of human rights violations and environmental destruction at direct and indirect suppliers.

The takeover by the Taliban in Afghanistan in August 2021 has upended Germany's humanitarian and development work in the country and the chaotic withdrawal from the country exposed a fateful lack of preparation by the government for this scenario. Moreover, the sanctions regime has crippled the local banking system, fuelling the rapid spread of poverty and hunger and making humanitarian activities exceedingly difficult.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

Germany's new administration was on a path of significantly reducing Germany's ODA at the beginning of 2022. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and in the face of the global consequences on food and energy prices, the German government reversed that decision and allocated around EUR 3 billion of ODA to tackle the regional and global effects (excluding in-donor refugee costs).

Nevertheless, the government seeks to limit its ODA spending. There is a growing pressure on the budget of Germany's Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) through cuts to its multi-year commitments. This makes meaningful responses to global crises and Germany's fair share climate finance contributions increasingly difficult. Civil society funding (to and through NGOs) remains at around half of the OECD average.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

- Focus development policies and strategies on the SDGs and on the LNOB principles.
- Increase ODA spending in order to support the recovery from the pandemic, strengthen international climate finance, tackle the global food crisis and humanitarian emergencies.
- Ensure that climate finance is new and additional to existing ODA spending and double climate finance from EUR 4 billion in 2020 to EUR 8 billion annually by 2025.
- Raise civil society funding to the OECD average of 15 per cent of ODA.


ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	3907.51	0.11	16.48
2018	4154.71	0.12	19.08
2019	4021.09	0.11	18.04
2020	4999.80	0.15	19.43

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	21475.4	17063.2	4412.2	20.5
2018	19021.4	14454.2	4567.2	24.0
2019	19662.2	15466.0	4196.2	21.3
2020	11484.9	4982.9	6502.0	56.6

GERMANY – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	2548.9	1139.6	3688.5	30.9	15.6
2018	2427.0	1142.1	3569.1	32.0	16.4
2019	2986.2	1543.0	4529.2	34.1	20.3
2020	2905.5	1659.6	4565.1	36.4	17.7

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	13701.4	13623.6	77.9	7974.2	5476.2	173.1	40.2	1.3
2018	13506.6	13418.3	88.3	7376.7	5828.1	213.4	43.4	1.6
2019	14040.5	13942.2	98.3	7483.6	6154.7	303.9	44.1	2.2
2020	17818.4	17725.2	93.2	9896.3	7499.4	329.5	42.3	1.9

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	6023.7	150.2	79.4	3.7	2.2	1.3	0.7
2018	5988.0	260.7	14.3	4.4	2.5	0.2	0.1
2019	6530.8	393.7	16.1	5.9	3.7	0.2	0.1
2020	8828.4	516.1	19.3	5.7	3.8	0.2	0.1

0.24% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.29% TOTAL AID/GNI

HUNGARY



Migration and terrorism, which are closely interlinked, pose the greatest threat to the security of Europe. [...] It is a vested interest of European countries and people that the European Union, Brussels, should support these countries."

Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 November 2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In real terms Hungarian ODA and the ODA/GNI ratio have been steadily increasing since 2017 rising from 0.11% (2017) to 0.29% (2021). If this trend is to continue, Hungary will reach the 0.33% commitment within the next one to two years, achieve the DAC average of the last two years, and outperform several "old" donor states. Hungary's share of bilateral assistance has also been continuously increasing during the last five years from 26% in 2017 to 60% in 2021. All of this demonstrates that if the political will exists, radical and swift changes can be made in policy areas that are not necessarily a priority. In addition to political will, the other factor in this exceptional growth was setting a specific target for increasing ODA in the government's new development strategy for 2020-2025. This strategic approach is refreshing after the rather ad hoc planning and implementing mechanisms of previous years. However, what NGOs see as a less welcome change is the export promotion-centred approach of Hungarian development cooperation of recent years, which has become more focused on the interests of the donor, and less on those of the partner countries. Apart from the increasing levels of ODA, less is known about the real results and long-term impacts of Hungarian activities.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

There is no indication at the moment that the steady growth of Hungarian ODA will end soon. The impact of Russian aggression on Ukraine might be another motivation for the already growing Hungarian ODA to further expand, although economic realities stemming from the war may impact policy decisions otherwise. With the fusion of the previously split humanitarian and development frameworks NGOs hope for a more integrated development cooperation policy to emerge.



CASE STUDY

A new development in 2022 is the transfer of the department responsible for humanitarian programmes and actions to assist persecuted Christian communities directly from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), which manages the international development cooperation portfolio. This way the Hungary Helps Agency, which was previously assigned only to implement humanitarian actions, will also be responsible for the development programmes from now on. This step meets Hungarian NGO calls for more integrated coordination and implementation and will certainly have a positive impact on the previous fragmented institutional framework of Hungarian development cooperation. In the view of the NGOs, further measures are still required to achieve an appropriate level of alignment of humanitarian and development areas, and of the activities of the line ministries.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs

Before 2015, Hungarian CSOs had the opportunity to engage in open calls for proposals and in consultations with the government. This relatively intensive phase of cooperation and the open calls had come to a halt after 2015. With the emergence of new actors in the field like the Prime Minister's Office and the Hungary Helps Agency, cooperation with NGOs has been completely transformed. NGOs are perceived predominantly as aid implementers, although there is no specific policy instrument or focused budgeting for NGOs. Support to and through NGOs has been increasing during the last 2-3 years, and local NGOs are positively engaged by government. However, there are no mechanisms for structured dialogue or regular consultations with either donor country or developing country-based organisations. Recent years' open calls for development actions published by the MFAT have been tender calls more targeted at private companies than at NGOs. Project support provided




by the Hungary Helps Agency over the last two years is meant to assist the NGO sector and smaller NGOs in particular to grow. However, the lack of open calls prevents NGOs from gaining application experience and does not provide a transparent and predictable process and a level playing field for all.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

- Keep up the positive trend of the growing overall and bilateral ODA.
- Move towards more results-based and partner country-focused policy thinking, decision-making and implementation, in line with the principles of development effectiveness.
- Create the conditions for more integrated programming and implementation as part of a whole-of-government approach.
- Ensure broader and more inclusive involvement of NGOs as implementers and partners in structured dialogue with stakeholders.
- Further increase transparency, especially with respect to the results and long-term impacts of Hungarian ODA.

HUNGARY – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	24.7	0.0	18.0
2018	56.3	0.1	23.9
2019	52.5	0.0	18.8
2020	45.2	0.0	12.3

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	36.3	36.3	0.0	0.0
2018	106.7	106.7	0.0	0.0
2019	141.8	141.8	0.0	0.0
2020	198.3	198.3	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2018	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2019	0.2	1.0	1.2	82.9	0.4
2020	12.4	12.4	24.8	50.0	6.8

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	32.2	0.0	32.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2018	103.7	2.6	101.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	100.0	0.0
2019	140.6	140.6	0.0	68.9	71.7	0.0	51.0	0.0
2020	194.6	194.6	0.0	105.4	88.9	0.3	45.7	0.2

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	36.0	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.1
2018	100.3	5.4	1.0	6.0	2.7	0.9	0.4
2019	65.5	75.2	1.2	53.6	27.3	0.8	0.4
2020	186.1	10.6	1.5	6.1	3.3	0.8	0.4

IRELAND



0.30% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.31% TOTAL AID/GNI



Throughout the global upheaval caused by COVID-19, Ireland has stepped up to protect the most vulnerable. Throughout the pandemic, our vital development and humanitarian work has continued. Irish Aid funding has improved food production, increased incomes and supported education. When disaster strikes, Irish Aid is there to help people affected. Irish Aid is an expression of Irish people's values. Its work continues to change lives around the world."

Simon Coveney, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
December 2021.

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

As Ireland's term on the UN Security Council ends this year, the state has an opportunity to leverage its knowledge, influence and reputation on a global stage to tackle the structural and root causes of extreme poverty and inequality, conflict, the climate emergency and hunger. Ireland can and should increase its investment in sustainable food systems, peace and security and gender equality to ensure basic human needs and rights can be met, particularly in conflict-affected countries and among the most vulnerable groups, including women, children, minorities and people living with disabilities. Ireland's support to organisations and institutions that operate on the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality, is of vital importance.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

Ireland has committed to scale up Irish ODA to 0.7% of GNI by 2030. However, in reality we are not making progress on this commitment year on year. In 2022, despite a monetary increase in budget of EUR 176 million on the 2021 allocation, Ireland's spending on ODA is estimated to remain at 0.32% of GNI. In 2021, 14 OECD DAC countries spent more in percentage terms and 18 OECD DAC countries spent more in monetary terms.

We recognise the pressure on budget 2023, given the impact of the global food crisis, rising inflation and

the subsequent cost of living increases. However, we urge Ireland to show support and solidarity to crisis-affected communities internationally, and at EU level, through our commitment to and delivery of ODA. Now is the time for Ireland to step up and leverage our high-quality development, humanitarian and diplomatic interventions and expertise to ensure a sustainable, long-term effect on those who are furthest behind. Research has shown that 77% of Irish people believe that ODA is vitally important and is a way for Ireland to clearly demonstrate its global solidarity, shared humanity and respect for human rights.

Ireland must engage in concerted diplomacy and cooperation to develop rights-based trade, economic, climate, food systems and social protection policies, and avoid restrictive trade measures that threaten to plunge millions more people into acute food insecurity.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT

- Increase Ireland's ODA budget in 2023 by EUR 223 million, to ensure it can play its part in responding to these urgent global needs. Increasing ODA in those real terms will also set Ireland on a path to reach the target of 0.7% over the course of the next seven years.
- Play a leadership role in reaching, and advocating for, those who fall furthest behind. This can be achieved through:
 - Increased investment in LDCs and fragile states to ensure that universal human rights and minimum standards are being fulfilled, including access to food, water and healthcare.
 - Making real progress on meeting the commitment to spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA by 2030.
 - Increased investment and support to civil society organisations, particularly women's organisations, who are working directly with affected communities at local, regional and national levels.

- Increased predictable, multi-year, unrestricted, flexible and discretionary funding to ensure timely and effective responsiveness to changes in contexts and environments.
- Long-term investment in sustainable solutions to tackle the effects of climate change, including making a fair contribution to climate financing and implementing a national climate action plan.


ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	343.4	0.1	44.1
2018	324.8	0.1	41.4
2019	332.3	0.1	38.0
2020	339.1	0.1	39.1

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	17.9	49.8	67.7	73.6
2018	7.0	31.9	38.9	82.1
2019	19.9	49.8	69.7	71.5
2020	17.7	41.0	58.7	69.9

IRELAND – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	105.6	108.4	214.0	50.6	3.9
2018	56.9	46.6	103.5	45.0	2.4
2019	74.4	71.0	145.4	48.8	3.7
2020	136.3	182.6	318.9	57.3	8.3

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	386.4	369.3	17.1	47.8	261.3	60.2	70.8	16.3
2018	365.6	365.0	0.6	81.3	257.2	26.6	70.5	7.3
2019	393.9	377.8	16.1	76.1	248.3	53.4	65.7	14.1
2020	386.5	364.7	21.8	74.0	241.8	49.0	66.3	13.4

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	284.2	65.3	108.1	37.9	22.3	23.6	13.9
2018	279.8	65.3	100.7	37.2	21.1	22.6	12.8
2019	327.1	79.1	104.0	35.9	20.9	20.4	11.9
2020	273.2	99.6	85.2	40.3	21.3	18.6	9.8

0.22% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.29% TOTAL AID/GNI

ITALY



“Public opinion in our country must be made more aware of how strategic development aid is. We have long been committed to allocating 0.7% of GNI to this. It is time, gradually, to meet this commitment.”

Marina Sereni, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Vita magazine, June 2022

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021, Italy went through the third government change since March 2018. However, with respect to development cooperation, leadership continuity was ensured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Luigi Di Maio; Marina Sereni became Deputy Minister for Development Cooperation.

The 2021 G20 Rome summit made progress in several areas that speak to development cooperation, including a voluntary framework to support Integrated National Financing Frameworks, the official acknowledgement of the Finance in Common Summit (FiCS) of public development banks, and an ad hoc summit on health and pandemic preparedness together with the EU.

This groundswell of interest in the development agenda was then confirmed by the allocation of more resources for development cooperation in the budget law for 2022, including a climate fund worth EUR 840 million annually for five years. Initial figures for 2021 also indicate an increase, from 0.22% to 0.28% ODA/GNI (grant equivalent measure). CSOs reacted positively to this welcome but highly volatile increase, which was largely due to COVID-19 expenditures, debt relief and refugee costs. The Afghanistan crisis left a definite mark on Italian public opinion and development cooperation. Given Italy's direct involvement in the country's affairs, support for refugees from Afghanistan is still very high on the agenda.



CASE STUDY

Dialogue with CSOs in the response to the Afghanistan crisis is a good practice that speaks to the multistakeholder approaches incorporated in the sector legislation and mirrors what happened the previous year during the COVID-19 pandemic. There was full recognition of the role the Italian CSOs had been playing in the country for many years: at a time of crisis civil society provided exceptional resources that helped save lives. Despite the challenges, dialogue with CSOs on the Afghanistan crisis continues in 2022 and has informed the debate on reviewing Italy's policies on emergency response

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs

The centrepiece for CSO involvement is the National Council for Development Cooperation (CNCS) and its working groups, which are mostly CSO-led and bring together a great variety of development actors. After the government reshuffle in early 2021, the dialogue process regained momentum, and a major item on the agenda was the multi-year draft plan, which went through several consultation rounds. CSOs were immediately involved in the aftermath of the Taliban's retake of Kabul, with a first crisis meeting on 26 August. Discussions covered the most urgent items including support for local partners who needed to leave the country. In terms of resources, there were no major new allocations for CSOs; these materialised only the following year as part of the call for proposal launched in 2020.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND


The abrupt government crisis and early general elections in September 2022 are jeopardising the efforts in place to reinvigorate Italy's development cooperation. For a more comprehensive assessment, a full review later in the year is needed; however, it is hard to expect a major aid increase in the budget law for 2023.

Worthy of note is the second National Conference on Development Cooperation, mandated by the sector legislation, in June 2022, which displayed renewed support for development cooperation from the national leadership, including the President of the Republic and key Cabinet members, who spoke in favour of the 0.7% target in line with CSO messages and especially with the Campagna 070 platform. Other trends to watch include Italy's support for Ukraine after Russia's invasion (through a budget support agreement of EUR 110 million in additional resources), the CSOs call for proposals of 2020 reaching the decision phase, an action plan on global citizenship, the DAC Mid-term peer review, and initial consultations for a more inclusive general planning process.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

- Renew commitments to increasing ODA levels steadily from 0.28% in 2021 to 0.70% in 2030, including by ad hoc legislation.
- Revamp the Italian national plans on development effectiveness, including commitments for all the actors acknowledged by the national legislation.
- Implement the national programme on policy coherence for sustainable development drafted in 2022.
- Consolidate multi-stakeholder dialogue and support for CSOs in line with the DAC Recommendations on Enabling CSOs.
- Further develop inclusive programming to enhance the democratic ownership of Italy's development cooperation.

ITALY – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	1080.495	0.06	19.9
2018	1046.097	0.06	24.5
2019	1114.132	0.06	28.2
2020	938.9	0.056267	24.3

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	2968.5	2693.9	274.6	9.2
2018	1877.9	1804.0	73.9	3.9
2019	1349.9	1242.5	107.4	8.0
2020	1231.1	908.6	322.6	26.2

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	105.6	108.4	214.0	50.6	3.9
2018	56.9	46.6	103.5	45.0	2.4
2019	74.4	71.0	145.4	48.8	3.7
2020	136.3	182.6	318.9	57.3	8.3

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	1065.0	767.5	297.5	376.9	363.6	27.0	47.4	3.5
2018	878.0	655.2	222.7	282.0	318.9	54.4	48.7	8.3
2019	857.1	706.8	150.2	348.3	300.0	58.5	42.4	8.3
2020	935.3	821.8	113.5	457.1	334.6	30.1	40.7	3.7

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	2555.3	78.9	120.6	7.2	3.7	4.4	2.2
2018	1556.6	107.6	123.3	12.9	5.4	6.9	2.9
2019	1002.6	92.7	121.6	17.6	5.4	10.0	3.1
2020	967.8	71.3	106.7	15.5	4.6	9.3	2.8



“Although there is still a long way ahead for Ukraine, we must give credit to the number of serious reforms undertaken so far.”

Edgars Rinkēvičs at the Ukraine Reform Conference, July 2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

The new framework document “Policy Guidelines for Development Cooperation 2021-2027” was adopted by the government in April 2021. The document sets out thematic priority areas, priority countries and policy indicators. Significant increase of national development aid allows also to widen the geographical support from Eastern Partnership and Central Asia also to Africa. The document is followed by the three year plan starting also to apply the multi-annual approach. Both documents are based on the SDGs and multi-stakeholder approach, giving the significant role also to the civil society and CSO projects. The process of the development of the new national agency has started and is expected to increase the engagement in the development aid activities.

In 2021 Latvia increased its bilateral aid, and it is positive that the approach of 50% of the open call financing to CSOs is continued. Still, the ODA goal will not be met by 2027 as stated in the new policy guidelines. Certain amounts have been also devoted to support civil society in Belarus. In 2021, the Latvian government increased participation (mostly financial) in the different UN agencies as well as support multilateral EU-based initiatives. This included donations of COVID-19 vaccination doses to both specific recipients and via the COVAX scheme.

New initiatives on capacity building together with the OECD have been started and CSOs have been invited as equal partners to participate. Also with the mutual cooperation with the Ministry of foreign affairs, the new guidelines on the implementation of horizontal priorities have been developed in the Latvian Platform for Development Cooperation (LAPAS).



CASE STUDY

During 2021, the NGO Centre “Marta” created and executed a development cooperation project with partners in Uzbekistan. The project aimed to increase the capacity of non-governmental organisations in the provision of public services to women and other population groups in vulnerable rural areas in Uzbekistan and promote the creation of women’s consultative groups in 5-7 pilot sites, public service centres. This was considered a Team Europe Initiative and received financial support of Latvian MFA amounting to EUR 31 230. TEI projects carried out by NGOs effectively strengthen local civil society and thus, society as a whole. This is crucial for the region faced with the war carried out by Russia.

The recommendations of the previous report have been mainly addressed, including a 50% of open calls in bilateral secured by CSOs; the definition of the approach to the humanitarian aid system in the policy framework (and practiced in the remarkable amount of the humanitarian aid to Ukraine); the increase of the bilateral aid and the work on capacity-building of the impact assessments. However the support to the civil society in Belarus has not been continued due to the aggressive invasion of Russia in Ukraine and related challenges.

THE GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS CSOs

CSOs have taken an active role and have been supported in the process of defining the policy framework and capacity events, direct support is provided to the national platform to cover membership fees in the international platforms, attend main events and implement educational and information activities. The specific competence of the CSOs has been used in the cooperation with Belarus civil society. The overall concern is about the benefits to civil society in the partner countries and the

understanding that CSOs are not defined so much by their legal status rather by their activities on behalf of civil society. Some private sector or local government formed CSOs formally meet the requirements, but the impact of their work might not be directed towards civil society itself.


TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND:

- The route to membership of the UN Security Council in 2025 could play an important role in the recognition of development cooperation policy and increase in the ODA.
- More attention will be paid to the implementation of the horizontal priorities like climate change, human rights, digitization and gender equality.
- Involvement of the private sector in development cooperation will increase, so there still is a need to develop a clear distinction between national development cooperation and export policies.
- Ukraine will most likely be the recipient of a major part of Latvian ODA for the foreseeable future, so the multi-stakeholder approach and investment monitoring must be implemented.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:

1. The Latvian MFA should still secure at least 50% of the open call in the bilateral aid to the CSOs as this is the main financing source for smaller local CSO cooperation and building social resilience in the partner countries.
2. The MFA should also develop further the humanitarian aid system as global political, social and environmental crises become part of the day-to-day agenda.
3. The increase of bilateral ODA should be combined with the review of the overall project impact assessment and improvement of the financing system ensuring equal and open access to all.
4. ODA targets as % of GNI should be updated to be more ambitious and reach the required 0.33% sooner than 2030.

LATVIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	5.78	0.02	18.96
2018	5.67	0.02	19.65
2019	6.11	0.02	19.57
2020	6.10	0.02	17.11

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	4.3	4.3	0.0	0.0
2018	4.1	4.1	0.0	0.0
2019	4.1	4.1	0.0	0.0
2020	4.4	4.4	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
2018	0.0	0.0	0.0	46.5	0.1
2019	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.9	0.0
2020	0.0	0.0	0.0	53.5	0.0

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	3.7	3.7	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.2
2018	2.9	1.2	1.7	0.6	0.6	0.0	45.8	3.7
2019	2.7	0.8	2.0	0.4	0.3	0.0	44.8	5.2
2020	3.2	3.2	0.0	2.4	0.7	0.1	20.6	3.5

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	4.1	0.1	0.1	4.1	0.6	1.6	0.2
2018	4.0	0.1	0.1	3.8	0.5	2.1	0.3
2019	3.9	0.1	0.1	4.1	0.5	2.4	0.3
2020	3.7	0.5	0.1	15.1	1.8	2.5	0.3

0.12% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.13% TOTAL AID/GNI

LITHUANIA



Lithuania's development cooperation strategy needs to include steps on how we will implement the commitment to allocate 0.33% of gross national income to official development assistance by 2030."

Gitanas Nausėda,
the President of the Republic of Lithuania

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

Lithuania's development cooperation policy reflects its national foreign policy priorities by focusing on the Eastern Partnership countries, in particular Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. The largest share of Lithuania's bilateral aid went to Ukraine (17%) and Belarus (11%). In 2021, support to Ukraine focused on education and health reforms in eastern Ukraine, and the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in the field of law and justice. Support for Belarus focused on supporting civil society and strengthening its political activism, as well as supporting independent media.

The number of war refugees and migrants arriving in Lithuania across the Lithuanian/EU border with Belarus has increased sharply since mid-2021. Refugees from war-stricken Ukraine are welcome in Lithuania; however, refugees from Africa and Middle Eastern countries are being pushed back across the border to Belarus. A three-storey high barrier made of razor wire is under construction along the 502-kilometre border with Belarus. The financial cost and the environmental damage of this are enormous.

In 2021, Lithuania's ODA constituted about EUR 70 million (0.13% GNI), up from EUR 63 million in 2020. This was an increase of 10.7% in real terms in volume and the same share of GNI as in 2019 and 2020. Lithuania is committed to achieving the lower ODA target of 0.33% of GNI by 2030. Lithuania's bilateral assistance has increased to EUR 15 million or 21% of Lithuania's ODA in 2021.

The key mechanism for implementing ODA is the Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Programme of the MFA. The projects are managed by the Central Project Management Agency. In 2021, the

government-imposed quarantine and anti-pandemic restrictions negatively affected the implementation of projects. There were very few small-scale calls for proposals. The Development Cooperation website and its database are not accessible, and the new website is currently under construction. There is only a Facebook account for LTaid.

At the end of 2021, the Strategic Directions for Development Cooperation of the Republic of Lithuania were adopted. With the military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, this strategy document has lost its practical relevance, but has not been updated or amended. Since the invasion, Lithuania's aid flow to Ukraine has grown exponentially. At the Lugano conference on 5 July 2022, the Prime Minister of Lithuania stated that Lithuanian aid for Ukraine already exceeded EUR 500 million and that they would add a further EUR 10 million. The government's unprecedented scale of aid to Ukraine is not linked in any way to its development cooperation strategy.

The MFA recognises the importance of and need for education to achieve greater public support for development cooperation, but limits itself to public information about the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and the importance and benefits of developing cooperation. In 2021, the development cooperation programme contributed to implementing three NGO development cooperation education projects, designed and delivered in partnership with organisations and programmes in other countries.

The Fund for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid was approved at the end of 2021. It was set up to ensure that Lithuania's future official development assistance is in line with its international commitments. The Fund's provisions set out how the funds will be allocated and used, but not their sources.


The Fund's seven-member council, comprises a chairperson appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and includes one NGO representative. The Central Project Management Agency acts as the Fund's administrator and secretariat.

As an observer since 2013, Lithuania has continued to strengthen its engagement with the OECD, and has announced its intention to apply for DAC membership. In 2021, Lithuania was awarded six EU Twinning Projects. These projects will be implemented in Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Serbia and North Macedonia. In 2021, Lithuanian experts shared their experience at 58 EU Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) programme events, nine of which were held in Lithuania. Since 2004, the Lithuanian authorities have already participated in 125 twinning projects.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT

- Boost the competence of the National Development Cooperation Commission and ensure a balance with the activities and competence of the Fund for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid.
- Open the website of the Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Programme www.LTaid.lt.
- Publish an annual report on the implementation of the Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Programme, including information from other public entities and NGOs.
- Publish a separate report on Lithuania's aid to Ukraine.
- Report in-donor refugee costs and student costs in Lithuania separately from aid flows.
- In partnership with the Ministry of Education, develop a meaningful national development and global education strategy and raise the level of its funding to 2% of aid flows.

LITHUANIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs (€ million)	%GNI	% ODA
2017	8.8	0.0	15.4
2018	9.1	0.0	16.5
2019	9.7	0.0	15.6
2020	10.7	0.0	16.9

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross) (€ million)	Grants (€ million)	Loans (€ million)	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	14.8	14.8	0.0	0.0
2018	10.3	10.3	0.0	0.0
2019	11.1	11.1	0.0	0.0
2020	10.4	10.4	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.1	0.1	0.2	50.2	0.4
2018	0.1	0.0	0.2	16.0	0.3
2019	0.3	0.2	0.5	43.7	0.9
2020	0.6	0.3	0.8	33.3	1.3

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	8.8	4.7	4.0	4.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.9
2018	6.8	3.8	3.0	1.5	2.1	0.2	55.4	4.1
2019	6.5	3.5	3.0	1.1	2.1	0.3	60.9	7.4
2020	7.7	7.7	0.0	5.5	2.0	0.2	25.6	2.7

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	14.3	0.4	0.0	3.2	0.8	0.2	0.1
2018	9.7	0.6	0.0	5.8	1.1	0.1	0.0
2019	10.3	0.8	0.0	7.3	1.3	0.4	0.1
2020	9.4	0.9	0.1	9.8	1.6	1.2	0.2



As one of the few countries to pursue a feminist foreign policy, Luxembourg defends gender rights and dignity in the various committees and is committed to the fight against all forms of discrimination and inequality. Our strategy is to adopt an evolutionary approach to gender equality in all areas. We are also working on concrete tools to support our different actors in implementing our new cross-cutting strategy”

Declaration on Luxembourg’s cooperation policy to the Chamber of Deputies. Mr Franz Fayot, Minister for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Affairs, November 2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

After a COVID pandemic-related reduction in 2020, due to the overall fall in gross national income, economic recovery led to a 9.7% increase of ODA in 2021. This increase made it possible, among other things, to strengthen Luxembourg’s humanitarian aid and support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, notably by raising its contribution to the COVAX Facility. Driven by the collaborations created in 2020 in response to the pandemic, Luxembourg has expanded its collaboration with EU Member States by participating in 16 TEIs at country level and seven at global and regional level. In 2021 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed a new Environment and Climate Change Strategy and revised and updated its gender strategy.

THE GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS CSOs

The Luxembourg government has consistently shown its commitment to funding civil society organisations. Each year, about one fifth of ODA is channelled through NGOs, of which about 15% goes to Luxembourgish NGOs. Nevertheless, NGOs would like to contribute more to topical debates. With the inter-ministerial committee on development (CID), a space for dialogue between the different development cooperation stakeholders in Luxembourg exists.

BUDGETISED AID IN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH SENEGAL



The national execution modality, called “budgetised aid,” is the intervention modality prioritised in the bilateral component of the cooperation agreement between Luxembourg and Senegal (2018-2022). It has been designed and implemented progressively since 2011, promoting ownership and alignment of programmes to national policies. This support is accompanied by a capacity building component for local actors. While budgetised aid uses Senegal’s public finance systems and procedures, it differs from traditional budget support in that the resources made available are uniquely identifiable to guarantee their availability and traceability in order to ensure their eligibility in relation to agreed programme activities.

However, NGOs are not invited when topics which are traditionally risk areas for Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) are being presented. Although Luxembourg’s 2019 sustainable development strategy includes policy coherence as an explicit priority alongside other domestic policy objectives and although a new regulatory impact assessment will consider planned regulation against this priority, the CID does contribute to discussions on the impact of national policies on developing countries and therefore has no impact on the formulation and adaptation of national policies.

Although some efforts are made to involve civil society actors in devising bilateral cooperation programmes with partner countries, greater involvement of local CSOs, Luxembourgish NGOs and their partners in PCSD-risk areas and topics would enhance debate on policy coherence issues, contribute to better policy making and resolve problems of inconsistency.


TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

For the years 2022 and 2023 no major changes are planned in relation to ODA. The encouraging economic forecasts for 2022 and 2023 suggest that the ODA budget will continue to grow steadily. National elections will be held in 2023, so it remains to be seen how the next government will position itself on this issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT

- Make public and easily accessible all information on ODA provided to support the private sector, including (but not be restricted to) information on ODA used to support public private partnerships, to leverage private sector funds or to provide technical assistance for private sector actors.
- Develop a clear strategy for the private sector and apply relevant criteria to their stakeholders to evaluate progress towards leveraging funding. For the financial sector: assess how this funding contributes to the strategic objectives, countries and sectoral targets of Luxembourg's international cooperation. For development banks: clarify how the Luxembourg MFA perceives its role in mobilising funds for local development assistance projects.
- Commit to keeping its leadership role in Europe on the quantity and quality of aid – especially considering the major geopolitical factors that could have an impact on EU Member States aid allocation and priorities.
- Develop spaces for critical and transformative dialogue between development cooperation actors, the private sector and civil society in Luxembourg and in partner countries for the monitoring and drafting of development policies and programmes and for strengthening PCSD.
- Develop a strategy for the inclusion of human rights in cooperation programmes and policies.

LUXEMBOURG – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	175.3	0.4	43.2
2018	189.9	0.5	46.8
2019	203.2	0.5	45.5
2020	183.1	0.5	46.1

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	293	293	0	0
2018	302	302	0	0
2019	348	348	0	0
2020	276	276	0	0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	6.8	8.1	14.9	54.5	3.7
2018	6.4	6.5	12.9	50.6	3.2
2019	7.1	8.1	15.3	53.4	3.4
2020	1.1	1.8	2.8	62.6	0.7

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	270.6	270.6	0.0	194.4	62.5	13.6	23.1	5.0
2018	280.3	280.3	0.0	192.6	76.8	10.9	27.4	3.9
2019	324.2	129.5	194.7	24.4	82.7	22.4	63.8	17.3
2020	254.4	20.9	233.5	4.9	9.1	6.9	43.7	32.9

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	209.3	57.9	23.6	28.0	20.1	8.1	5.8
2018	212.8	66.7	15.1	27.8	20.2	5.1	3.7
2019	254.2	72.7	16.3	25.9	19.9	4.7	3.6
2020	182.6	70.5	15.5	32.0	21.7	5.8	3.9

0.48% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.52% TOTAL AID/GNI

THE NETHERLANDS



And it requires the Netherlands to continue to take its broad international responsibility. International cooperation through trade and aid contributes to peace, security, and a dignified existence, worldwide.”

King Willem-Alexander in a speech to the Parliament, 20 September 2022

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

The Dutch ODA budget is calculated as the 0.7% of Dutch's GNI, minus a yearly cut of EUR 1.4 billion. This structural cut was created by a previous government and stays in place, despite incidental additions to the ODA budget. An example of an incidental addition is the increase of 2018, which was mainly used to fill the gaps created by the previous government to cover refugee costs and other migration-related spending in 2015 and 2016.

By the end of 2021, a new government agreement was reached, in which an extra investment for Development Aid was agreed for up to EUR 500 million per year structurally. This makes up partly for the previous budget cuts, and shifts from future budgets. It also helps to get closer to the 0.7% target, but the Netherlands is still far away, and will not reach that target in the short-term.


TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

In 2022, the new cabinet was put in place. The new Minister for Foreign Trade and Development is Liesje Schreinemacher, a former Member of the European Parliament for the VVD (Renew Europe). In the first half of 2022, she will develop a new policy note.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT

- Make the Netherlands an international champion in the fight against shrinking civic space.
- Present a concrete step-by-step plan to return to the delivery of the 0.7% aid target by 2025.
- Do not use future ODA to cover current gaps in the budget. Instead, make available extra money from the general government budget.
- Make sure that neither Dutch nor EU Aid are used for border control.
- Introduce a ceiling for covering asylum costs from the Development Aid budget.
- Ensure that trade-related activities are in line with inclusive, sustainable development.

NETHERLANDS – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	94.3	0.02	14.8
2018	190.0	0.04	29.7
2019	102.6	0.02	14.7
2020	114.0	0.02	16.0

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	232.0	219.3	12.7	5.5
2018	223.2	142.9	80.4	36.0
2019	214.3	183.6	30.7	14.3
2020	204.5	182.4	22.1	10.8

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.3	1.0	1.3	75.4	0.2
2018	0.5	51.0	51.5	99.0	8.0
2019	4.1	1.4	5.5	25.4	0.8
2020	0.8	3.8	4.6	82.6	0.6

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	155.7	155.7	0.0	152.2	2.1	1.3	1.4	0.9
2018	143.8	143.8	0.0	141.0	2.3	0.5	1.6	0.4
2019	90.3	90.3	0.0	84.1	5.4	0.8	6.0	0.9
2020	94.5	94.5	0.0	90.9	2.4	1.1	2.6	1.2

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	17.6	0.0	8.5	2.8	0.0	0.0	17.6
2018	18.0	0.7	9.3	2.9	0.3	0.1	18.0
2019	14.8	0.5	8.0	2.2	0.2	0.1	14.8
2020	28.9	0.0	15.8	4.1	0.0	0.0	28.9

0.11% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.15% TOTAL AID/GNI

POLAND



Thanks to all these activities (...), we are constantly strengthening our international position as a reliable and credible donor. Solidarity, as our national brand, is also inscribed in the title of the Multiannual Development Cooperation Plan, (...) and the sign of Polish aid together with the Polish national colours appear on the implemented projects, becoming an increasingly recognisable symbol. Thanks to this, Poland's international position is also improving."

Paweł Jabłoński, Undersecretary of State for Economic and Development Cooperation, Africa and the Middle East in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 July 2021

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

2021 is the first year covered by the new long-term development cooperation strategy Solidarity for Development ("Solidarność dla rozwoju") for 2021-2030. Since 2019, there has been no significant change in Poland's level of ODA, which slightly increased from 0.14% of GNI in 2020 to 0.15% in 2021. Poland's top 10 bilateral ODA recipients also remained largely unchanged, with Ukraine and Belarus still at the top of the list.

Bilateral ODA channelled through national NGOs was PLN 50.75 million, less than 5% of bilateral ODA. Still no significant action has been taken to ensure that core/institutional support for CSOs is incorporated into the Polish development aid system.

In 2021, PLN 210.02 million were reported as donations for COVID-19 vaccines to developing countries. In addition, the MFA made a contribution to the Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunisation - the GAVI Alliance (GAVI COVAX AMC) in the amount of PLN 3.53 million.

The government failed to implement most of the recommendations made in the AidWatch 2021 report, although it did include several recommendations from the 2017 OECD DAC peer review in Poland's new strategy for 2021-2030. The DAC recommended setting a clear quantitative goal for ODA, untying aid to LDCs, and referring to Agenda 2030 in the

strategy. The MFA has also committed to producing a multiannual strategy for global education and country strategies for two to three crucial partners. But so far, no steps have been taken in this direction.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

In 2022 an unprecedented estimated 1.5-2 million people from Ukraine fled to Poland, with 1.2 million Ukrainians registered under a Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). The Polish MFA already declared that Poland will apply the OECD DAC rule allowing the counting of certain refugee-related expenses as ODA for the first year after their arrival. In 2021, the cost of hosting refugees in Poland (under ODA) was PLN 65.16 million. We expect this amount to increase significantly in 2022, which will result in a huge change in the size of ODA and the ODA/GNI indicator.

In January 2021 the Polish government adopted a new multiannual development cooperation programme (2021- 2030). While the programme reiterates the commitment to spending 0.33% of GNI on ODA, and outlines thematic/geographical strategies to be developed, setting up a development agency (and national development bank) is regarded as a long-term goal and is connected to the need to increase funds for ODA, especially bilateral ODA. However, political support for these objectives may be limited, with development cooperation remaining low on the political agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT

- The Polish government should present an operational plan for increasing the level of ODA to 0.33% of GNI by 2030.
- Multiannual thematic/geographical strategies (global education, priority countries) should be prepared in an inclusive manner, with an openness to broad discussions with all interested stakeholders, including CSOs in partner countries and in Poland.

- Increase the core-funding programmes for CSOs in Poland and in partner countries.
- Increase share of bilateral ODA to (1) climate finance, (2) gender equality as a principal and significant objective.
- The Polish parliament should become more involved in monitoring the implementation of development cooperation policies and – through its Foreign Affairs Committee – should be involved in monitoring the current development cooperation strategy.


ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	94.3	0.02	14.8
2018	190.0	0.04	29.7
2019	102.6	0.02	14.7
2020	114.0	0.02	16.0

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	232.0	219.3	12.7	5.5
2018	223.2	142.9	80.4	36.0
2019	214.3	183.6	30.7	14.3
2020	204.5	182.4	22.1	10.8

POLAND – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.3	1.0	1.3	75.4	0.2
2018	0.5	51.0	51.5	99.0	8.0
2019	4.1	1.4	5.5	25.4	0.8
2020	0.8	3.8	4.6	82.6	0.6

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	155.7	155.7	0.0	152.2	2.1	1.3	1.4	0.9
2018	143.8	143.8	0.0	141.0	2.3	0.5	1.6	0.4
2019	90.3	90.3	0.0	84.1	5.4	0.8	6.0	0.9
2020	94.5	94.5	0.0	90.9	2.4	1.1	2.6	1.2

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	17.6	0.0	8.5	2.8	0.0	0.0	17.6
2018	18.0	0.7	9.3	2.9	0.3	0.1	18.0
2019	14.8	0.5	8.0	2.2	0.2	0.1	14.8
2020	28.9	0.0	15.8	4.1	0.0	0.0	28.9

PORTUGAL



0.13% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.18% TOTAL AID/GNI



We remain committed towards sustainably increasing ODA.”

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Francisco André, Launch of the OECD Development Cooperation Peer Review Portugal, April 2022

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

During the first six months of 2021, Portugal held the Presidency of the EU Council and pushed for the adoption of Council Conclusions on Human Development, highlighting health and education as key sectors in the EU's external action and committing to benchmarking 20% of NDICI eligible ODA flows to those sectors.

Portugal's ODA increased by 4% in 2021 due to the donation of in-excess COVID-19 vaccine doses. While this increase remains out of pace with Portugal's commitment, it builds on inflated aid components that if not considered would lead to lower levels than in 2020.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

After nearly two years in the making, the Portuguese Cooperation Strategy 2030 is due to come into effect before 2023. Civil society expects the strategy to produce a roadmap to increase Portugal's ODA, following the government's reassurance on the country's commitment. As the platform has recently stated in a communication to members of parliament, his roadmap will have to pave the way for a five-fold increase for the 0.7% target to be met by 2030.

Following the approval of the budget, it is also expected that the government fulfils its commitment to boost support for CSO projects, even if further clarifications on the specific amounts are yet to be provided.

After the snap parliamentary election in early 2022, the political landscape has changed significantly – the right-wing populist Chega! party increased their vote to around 7% and are now the third largest group in parliament. The incumbent PS (S&D) secured a landslide majority that allows it to approve or block



CASE STUDY

Since they were first established in 2018 within Portugal's embassies in partner countries, Portuguese Cooperation Centres (PCC) have contributed to closely monitor programmes and projects funded by Portugal's development agency Camões IP. The Portuguese Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDO) platform has welcomed this move and has since been calling for scaling up both the Centres' financial capacity and authority, as has the OECD/DAC in its latest peer review.

PCCs are a key element in Portugal's development cooperation architecture and, if properly strengthened, can play a critical role in further moving decision-making to partner countries, and increasing aid effectiveness.

any piece of legislation; it had already rejected several amendments to the budget proposal on ODA increase, more support to CSOs and the parliament's role in approving the upcoming Strategy.

The coming years will thus require a strong commitment towards establishing meaningful and inclusive dialogue among stakeholders. The platform calls on the government to deliver on its promise to promote dialogue throughout the whole mandate.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

- Programme a steady increase of its ODA in the framework of the upcoming strategy in order to reach the 0.7% target by 2030.
- Monitor the implementation of the strategy by a committee that includes civil society representatives and whose progress must be regularly reported to parliament.
- Include a specific heading in the state budget for development policies that allows transparent

programming and to boost coordination capacities within Camões IP.

- Increase support to civil society and implement the OECD's recommendation on reviewing funding modalities based on an open dialogue with CSOs.


ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	120.8	0.1	33.5
2018	118.1	0.1	35.9
2019	110.7	0.1	31.3
2020	99.7	0.1	27.0

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	157.8	132.4	25.4	16.1
2018	159.2	137.0	22.1	13.9
2019	164.7	160.9	3.7	2.3
2020	202.2	141.9	60.3	29.8

PORTUGAL – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	1.5	2.2	3.7	59.1	1.0
2018	0.9	2.1	3.0	69.4	0.9
2019	0.6	1.7	2.2	74.9	0.6
2020	0.4	0.9	1.3	68.8	0.4

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	109.8	109.8	0.0	76.4	31.8	1.7	28.9	1.5
2018	106.8	106.8	0.0	75.7	29.4	1.6	27.6	1.5
2019	99.4	99.4	0.0	64.5	33.1	1.8	33.3	1.8
2020	137.6	137.6	0.0	100.3	35.9	1.5	26.1	1.1

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	96.5	11.8	0.1	11.0	3.3	0.1	0.0
2018	100.9	11.0	0.1	9.9	3.4	0.0	0.0
2019	95.8	13.1	0.2	12.2	3.7	0.2	0.1
2020	135.2	11.3	0.1	7.8	3.1	0.0	0.0

0.11% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.12% TOTAL AID/GNI

ROMANIA



Romania recognises the role of civil society in identifying the needs of partner states and their development particularities, as well as in promoting the various missions of education, namely to ensure peace, eradicate poverty and support sustainable development.”

2020-2023 Multiannual Strategic Programme for International Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021, Romania’s total ODA amounted to EUR 304.7 million (preliminary data), equivalent to 0.12% of GNI. As in previous years, multilateral ODA remained the most significant part of the total ODA budget, more than 90% of it being allocated to the EU budget. In line with the Multiannual Strategic Programme for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance (2020-2023), Romania’s bilateral assistance was directed mostly to countries from the extended Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, the Republic of Moldova remaining the top recipient.

In 2021, Romania continued to actively support the Team Europe approach and joined the process of regularly reporting to the EU on the activities implemented by the public institutions in the context of the Team Europe response to COVID-19.

In response to the effects of the pandemic, in 2021 Romania reconfigured its development assistance projects by strengthening the institutional capacities of health systems, ensuring food security, sustainable management of water resources and combating fake news. In addition, Romania responded to the call of the Global Humanitarian Response Plan, by adjusting the Romanian Agency for International Development (RoAid) Agency annual approach to allocating voluntary contributions to international organisations able to respond to the urgent situations caused by the pandemic (UNDP, Unicef, UN OCHA, World Food Programme). In addition, due to the travel restrictions imposed by the pandemic, a series of programmes included in the RoAid’s 2021 work plan were cancelled, the funds being reallocated to provide sanitary supplies and medical equipment to



CASE STUDY

RoAid, with the financial support of the EU, through the European Social Fund, and in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania and the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, started the implementation of the project “Building the capacity of Romania as Official Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid Donor State – RoAid integrated instrument: planning, development, implementation and evaluation.”

The project aims at consolidating the profile of Romania as a donor state, by enabling it to develop effective public policy for international development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, as well as the tools necessary for its implementation.

The instruments created as part of the project will help Romania optimise the allocation of development funds, through strategic and budgetary planning based on common methodologies and tools used by the central public authorities and institutions, as well as by setting out clear mandates, roles and competence for them.

COVID-19 patients, as well as for education campaigns aimed at people in the partner states.

In 2022, Romania joined two regional TEIs and is considering joining more. These are the Green Team Europe Initiative (ASEAN)/South East Asia corresponding to UN SDGs on Zero Hunger, Affordable and Clean Energy, Decent Work and Economic Growth, Sustainable Cities and Communities, Responsible Consumption and Production, Climate Action, Life Below Water, Life on Land; and Water-Energy-Climate Change in Central Asia, corresponding to UN SDGs on Clean Water and Sanitation and Affordable and Clean Energy.

The activities and financial contributions supported in 2021 by the Romanian public institutions in order to fight the effects of the pandemic were integrated in the Team Europe approach.

The costs of COVID-19 vaccine doses donated bilaterally by Romania to developing countries in 2021 amounted to EUR 4.34 million.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

One ongoing trend is Romania's difficulty in meeting the 0.33 % of GNI target by 2030. Although a notable increase in ODA volume was recorded in 2021 as compared to 2020, efforts to increase ODA spend need to be stepped up in the coming years, especially given the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its aggravating associated crises.


Another trend that has persisted is the extremely low level of NGO financing and involvement in policy and strategic planning. Although the national Multiannual Strategic Programme for International Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance (2020–2023) recognises the role of civil society to ensure peace, eradicate poverty and support sustainable development, and although several calls for proposals addressed to civil society were organised by the RoAid agency in 2020 and 2021, the role of civil society is still marginal and the funds are inconsistent.

One last trend refers to Romania's engagement in the TEIs. The Romanian MFA will continue to be engaged in developing TEIs, by mobilising resources for strengthening the health systems in partner countries and combating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT

- Continue efforts to increase ODA budgets from 2022 onwards (particularly bilateral ODA).
- Increase the measures aimed at developing the capacity of civil society by appropriate and constant funding, as well as by involving CSOs in all consultation mechanisms and at all institutional levels.
- Increase focus on development effectiveness and impact in partner countries and strengthen systematic monitoring and evaluation in line with the LNOB principle.

ROMANIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCs (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	41.3	0.0	18.9
2018	40.8	0.0	18.8
2019	45.7	0.0	19.4
2020	41.0	0.0	15.1

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	39	39	0	0
2018	52	52	0	0
2019	60	60	0	0
2020	66	66	0	0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0
2018	0.0	0.1	0.1	89.2	0.0
2019	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2020	0.1	0.0	0.2	15.2	0.1

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	37.9	37.9	0.0	6.6	31.3	0.0	82.5	0.0
2018	50.3	49.7	0.6	49.5	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.1
2019	58.3	58.3	0.0	58.2	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0
2020	64.5	64.3	0.2	63.6	0.6	0.1	1.0	0.2

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	38.8	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2018	51.7	0.031017	0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
2019	59.6	0.151519	0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0
2020	65.7	0.377135	0	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.0

SLOVAKIA



0.12% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.13% TOTAL AID/GNI



One often imagines humanitarian aid in a far foreign country, however this is not true for Slovakia anymore. We have to defend Ukrainian freedom and solidarity.”

The prime minister Eduard Heger,
Ambreila Development Forum, 24 May 2022

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021, total Slovak spending on ODA equaled EUR 131 million, or 0.14% of GNI, with bilateral aid of EUR 31 million. The increase from 2020 was mainly due to the increase in contributions to the EU in multilateral aid and non systematic aid related to the COVID-19 response.

Disregarding the inflated aid and COVID-19 related activities, bilateral aid is only 13% of total aid. This imbalance not only stands out against the percentages for the majority of DAC OECD members but leaves the Slovak Republic with very limited space to significantly boost its international programmes.

Major changes occurred in geographic priorities that might seem to solve the geographic fragmentation. Nevertheless, a number of countries were delisted without a proper reasoning, consultation with CSOs or a phasing out process. These changes seriously question the predictability and consistency of the SlovakAid strategy.

Evacuation of military and Western personnel from Kabul in August 2021 was a death knell for the SlovakAid endeavour in Afghanistan that had started in 2003, and that was fading out in recent years with no strategy. Slovakia's only LDC partner country in Africa, Ethiopia, was removed from the partner country list at the end of 2021. Ethiopia was not among the partner countries in the first programme cycle (2003–2008) but became one starting in 2009–2013, only to be delisted in 2014–2018 and then back in 2019–2023, before being delisted again in 2021.

Later on, the government confirmed it would abandon the regional approach to Sub-Saharan Africa. Given that scarce resources are being fragmented over a number of countries, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia,

Burundi, Rwanda and Eritrea are not expected to be seen on the list any any time soon.

The above not only means that Slovakia has no single LDC among its partners but also that in general its focus has shifted even more onto Europe. It also showed a lukewarm approach to poverty eradication and the leaving no one behind principle.

The COVID-19 pandemic was not a wake up call to reform the Slovak humanitarian aid system which is outdated, with limited strategic, financial, personnel and expertise capacities. The long term need for a humanitarian strategy started in autumn 2021 but in spite of the relatively intense meetings of the working group, the process affected by interministerial misunderstandings about the process and structure of the strategy, was stopped in December 2021.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOS

Civil society and NGOs a longstanding SlovakAid partners. However, in the 2013–2021 year-on-year comparison, there was no significant increase in the grant budget for NGOs, although total aid increased from EUR 64 million to EUR 127 million, and bilateral aid went from EUR 12 million to EUR 30 million. This is undoubtedly a painful point in the SlovakAid and NGO partnership. It is not clear how the Foreign Ministry reallocates funds from NGO grants to other tools not accessible for NGOs nor to what extent the Annual Bilateral Aid Programme budget can be relied on or how binding it is. Overall communication with government representatives is open but it is proving to be very difficult to make significant improvements in the space and conditions in which civil society operates.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND


The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing humanitarian crisis is a potential game changer for the Slovak ODA landscape. So far, the official humanitarian aid of Slovakia was rather low. However, the dynamics between CSOs might partly change given that the largest CSOs, thanks to public solidarity, now operate with a bigger budget than the annual budget of the SlovakAid agency.

It can be reasonably expected that ODA will be spoiled by in-donor refugee costs. Political instability and unpredictability must also be taken into consideration. The advocacy work might be harder in the context of the present energy crisis and austerity measures. It is difficult to expect a genuine increase in the volume of the Slovak ODA in order to reach 0.33% ODA by 2030. So far, even the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine did not cause any major increase in the budget. In autumn 2022 a consultation process with the CSOs on the new five year Slovak ODA strategy is supposed to start.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SLOVAK GOVERNMENT

- Focus on poverty eradication and leaving no one behind.
- Reform the humanitarian aid system, adopt a humanitarian strategy, improve the overall rapid response capacity and flexibility in project implementation.
- Create and approve a realistic plan for increasing the Slovak development cooperation bilateral aid budget.
- Introduce a strategic dialogue, based on data and evaluations and focused on results, with the main actors of development cooperation.
- Finalise the National Strategy for Global citizenship education (GCE) and the transfer of the GCE agenda from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of education with proper expertise and financial backing.

SLOVAKIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2019)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	17.34	0.02	15.16
2018	18.00	0.02	15.22
2019	19.34	0.02	17.95
2020	18.70	0.02	15.09

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	34.0	34.0	0.0	0.0
2018	27.8	27.8	0.0	0.0
2019	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0
2020	32.8	32.8	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.0	0.1	0.2	74.4	0.1
2018	0.0	0.0	0.1	55.2	0.1
2019	0.7	0.7	1.3	50.7	1.3
2020	0.3	0.2	0.5	34.2	0.4

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	29.8	28.5	1.3	16.6	11.8	0.2	41.3	0.6
2018	24.9	24.9	0.0	12.2	12.8	0.0	51.2	0.0
2019	17.1	17.1	0.0	10.9	5.9	0.2	34.7	1.3
2020	13.4	13.4	0.0	8.8	4.3	0.4	31.7	2.8

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	27.7	5.3	1.0	18.6	5.5	2.9	0.9
2018	24.5	3.1	0.1	11.6	2.7	0.5	0.1
2019	15.2	4.6	0.2	24.1	4.5	1.1	0.2
2020	29.0	3.6	0.1	11.4	3.0	0.4	0.1

0.14% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.19% TOTAL AID/GNI

SLOVENIA



In sub-Saharan Africa, around 400 million people are subject to bad conditions, and above all to increasingly serious terrorism threats. These people will look for a better life in Europe and Europe will have to decide whether to build a wall on the Mediterranean or go to those countries and help establish better conditions.”

Janez Janša,
former Slovenian prime minister, 5 July 2021¹

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

The preliminary numbers for 2021 show an increase of Slovenia's ODA to EUR 91 million in real terms from 2020, representing 0.19% of Slovenian GNI. In 2021 bilateral aid increased to almost 40 % of total ODA in 2021, in line with civil society's long standing recommendation to increase bilateral ODA to at least half of total ODA. However, as the Ministry of foreign affairs has acknowledged, the increase in both total and bilateral ODA is mainly due to the increase in bilateral grants, including vaccine donations and contributions to multilateral organisations.

In 2021, we witnessed an increase in humanitarian efforts of the Slovenian government. Planned new financial resources for supporting civil society development cooperation with their partner organisations have been redirected towards humanitarian donations, causing an important shift toward addressing basic needs with higher immediate effect but much weaker long term effect on poverty alleviation, which is the overall purpose of the ODA. CSOs caution that the government is lacking a long-term action plan for international development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

During the Slovenian presidency the government was theoretically promoting the interest of partner countries. Unfortunately, the Slovenian government has failed to respond to all the recommendations from last year's AidWatch report.



CASE STUDY

The Directorate for International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid was established in 2010-2011 and disbanded overnight in 2015. Although it is not a unique practice and having demonstrated its shortcomings such as weak interlinkages between the strategic and implementation levels, Slovenian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid has not received sufficient attention from the government. CSOs are therefore cautiously optimistic about the promised reestablishment of the Directorate.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOS

In 2021 the government continued to limit its engagement with the CSOs. Although a call for interest to join an expert council to the Minister of Foreign Affairs was sent to two NGOs, the council was never called to meet. In 2021 the Ministry also published its annual call for co-financing of international projects for NGOs. Instead of fully financing the NGOs own contribution, which is a proven method of supporting Slovenian NGOs to apply for European funds, the call was limited to financing a maximum of 90 % of the NGO's own contribution. The remaining 10 % was to be financed by private donations or market activities. Both sources are extremely limited or even nonexistent for most development NGOs or marked as dedicated funds by humanitarian NGOs. At the same time, officially announced calls for advocacy, capacity building and global education projects were never published, directly impacting the NGOs' capacities for national advocacy and awareness raising work in the sector.

¹ Source: <https://www.rtvsllo.si/slovenija/jansa-ce-do-konca-poletja-ne-bo-70-odstotne-precepljenosti-bo-jeseni-vse-zaprto/586605>

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

In May 2022 a new Government was elected. Projections made by the new foreign minister were positive for development cooperation, global education and humanitarian aid. The minister highlighted her openness to dialogue with civil society movements and initiatives, the need to address conditions and financing of NGOs, the need to reestablish the General Directorate for Development Assistance and the potential future establishment of an agency to address the commitment to gradually increase funds for development and humanitarian aid, as well as the need to pay more attention to strengthening global learning and active citizen awareness of interconnectedness and global interdependence.

The 2022 Eurobarometer on EU citizens and international partnership indicates that the fight against poverty in the partner countries should be one of the main priorities of the national government (52% in Slovenia compared to the EU average of 67%). Still, this represents an increase of five percentage points compared to 2020.


RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SLOVENIAN GOVERNMENT

- Ensure an adequate organisational structure of governmental bodies for quality ODA implementation, including by immediately strengthening the MFA's working structures to be better equipped with supporting and coordinating facilities among different global development stakeholders.
- Continue to scale up ODA to achieve the 0.33% target and the 0.2% target to LDCs, limiting the trend of increasing inflated aid, and extending bilateral ODA to at least half of total ODA, thus increasing the share of priority-targeted and monitored aid.
- Slovenia should strengthen financial support to NGOs, including by reestablishing its support for small NGDO programmes in advocacy, capacitybuilding, awareness-raising and Global Citizenship Education. The national NGDO platform should receive core support, in accordance with the 2018 Non-Governmental Organisations Act. These actions would significantly contribute to strengthened public support for development

and humanitarian policies, the latter needed for Slovenia to fulfil its ODA commitment.

- Adopt the Guidelines for Inclusion of Gender Equality and Environmental Protection into International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of the Republic of Slovenia. It should also develop guidelines for private sector engagement in international development cooperation and humanitarian aid to ensure full compliance with standards and principles. Both guidelines for institutional setup shall be supported by establishing a permanent, open, inclusive and participatory policy coherence for sustainable development assessment mechanisms, in line with the 2030 Agenda.

SLOVENIA – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2019)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	13.55	0.03	18.88
2018	9.06	0.02	12.82
2019	9.77	0.02	12.09
2020	10.60	0.02	13.31

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	23.6	23.6	0.0	0.0
2018	24.8	24.8	0.0	0.0
2019	28.6	28.6	0.0	0.0
2020	27.3	27.3	0.0	0.0

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	0.4	0.3	0.7	46.0	0.9
2018	1.6	1.5	3.1	48.4	4.3
2019	1.7	1.0	2.7	37.5	3.3
2020	0.5	0.0	0.5	3.6	0.6

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	10.7	4.5	6.2	2.9	1.3	0.3	29.7	6.3
2018	10.4	5.7	4.8	2.8	2.5	0.4	43.5	6.8
2019	11.6	7.2	4.4	4.0	2.6	0.6	35.9	8.6
2020	8.0	5.8	2.2	3.1	2.1	0.7	35.4	11.9

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	21.7	1.4	0.5	8.1	2.7	2.2	0.7
2018	23.0	1.5	0.4	7.4	2.6	1.4	0.5
2019	26.4	1.9	0.3	7.9	2.8	1.2	0.4
2020	24.3	1.6	0.5	8.2	2.7	2.0	0.7

SPAIN



0.19% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.23% TOTAL AID/GNI



The International Cooperation Law gives legal status to the commitment made in the UN and the EU to reach 0.7% of GNI in Official Development Assistance by 2030.”

Jose Manuel Albares, Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, 11 January 2022

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

In 2021, Spanish ODA grew by 12.5% in real terms, reaching EUR 2.6 billion (0.25% GNI/ODA). While this is definitely good news, almost half of this increase corresponds to the donation of in-excess vaccine doses, a practice that La Coordinadora, the national NGDO platform, has asked the government not to engage with, as it adversely affects the quality of ODA.

The General State Budget for 2022 has marked a change in trend with an increase in funding to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ODA channelled through the Ministry has increased by 15% in 2022, reaching EUR 909 million. EUR 378 million will be channelled through the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), representing a 55% increase. Good news, indeed, although insufficient to provide AECID with the necessary capacities or to ensure compliance with the 0.5% GNI/ODA commitment by the end of 2023.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

By the end 2022 the government should approve both the budget for 2023 and the new International Cooperation Law. The forecast for 2022 is to reach 0.27% ODA/GNI, which means that compliance with the 0.5% commitment by 2023 is unlikely. Despite the political will to increase ODA levels by 2023, it still falls short of what is needed to recover from the lost decade.

On the positive side, the new law is expected to be approved before the end of 2022, with consensus among the different political parties, except for the far right. The law will include the commitment to achieve 0.7% by 2030, and 10% of ODA for humanitarian action. It is also an opportunity to improve the quality, efficiency and coherence of



CASE STUDY

In March 2022, La Coordinadora and the Government of Spain signed a memorandum of understanding (GoS-CSOs MoU), which aims to promote and improve the quality of joint work between the parties, with the ultimate goal of increasing the impact and effectiveness through two main objectives: developing an enabling environment for NGDOs in Spain, and supporting CSOs work in partner countries. The MoU recognises the different roles played by NGDOs, and it also includes commitments towards more predictable and durable funding.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOs

There is generally good dialogue between the government and CSOs, both bilaterally and through the Development Cooperation Council. The government seems to be open to including CSOs in a future advisory committee for the reimbursable aid fund and referencing it in the new cooperation law.


The signature of the GoS-CSOs MoU should mark a turning point in the relationships with the government. On the one hand, to recover the NGDO budget, which has been significantly impacted over the last decade due to the effects of the financial crisis. On the other hand, to ensure an enabling environment for civil society both in Spain and in partner countries to support human rights, environmental protection and strengthen democracy.

Spanish ODA, as it explicitly includes the fight against poverty and inequalities, the feminist and ecological agenda, human rights, and the promotion of civic and democratic space as its central objectives.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

- Ensure that the parliamentary process of the law enhances the feminist and environmentalist approach, the promotion of civic and democratic space, the culture of peace and the promotion of citizenship committed to local neighbourhoods and the planet.
- Develop the regulations derived from the new cooperation law in close dialogue with all stakeholders.
- Include intermediate objectives in the law to ensure compliance with the 0.7% ODA/GNI target, prioritising effective instruments for sustainable development and the reinforcement of AECID capacities.
- Ensure that the fight against poverty and inequalities and the defence of human rights are the main focus of financial cooperation, that the principles of development effectiveness are taken into account and that CSOs have a specific role throughout the ODA cycle.
- Put in place an action plan for the implementation of the GoS-CSOs MoU, including increasing support to CSOs in partner countries and reducing excessive bureaucracy.
- Advance the PCSD mechanism within the framework of the Agenda 2030 and through the adoption of specific measures on global challenges. The new cooperation law should provide an effective forum to monitor this.

SPAIN – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	488	0.04	20.5
2018	597.3	0.05	27.5
2019	518.2	0.04	20.8
2020	522.6	0.05	21.7

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	1010.2	979.4	30.7	3.04
2018	917.8	890	17.8	1.9
2019	993.4	965.2	28.2	2.84
2020	909.2	883	26.3	2.9

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	27.3	39.6	66.9	59.2	2.8
2018	26.7	43	69.7	61.7	3.2
2019	32.6	50.4	83	60.7	3.3
2020	22.3	35.3	57.7	61.3	2.4

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	563.3	563.3	0	289.5	176.9	96.9	31.4	17.2
2018	553.8	552.5	1.3	258	165.6	128.9	30	23.3
2019	573.1	573.1	0	295.6	137.6	139.8	24	24.4
2020	598.2	598	0.2	280	182.9	135	30.6	22.6

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	173.7509	461.3198	0.716166	72.67172	19.40505	0.112643	0.030078
2018	94.7309	497.3021	0.651374	84.01687	22.94737	0.109903	0.030017
2019	186.521	550.1734	0.954421	74.71452	22.1297	0.129388	0.038323
2020	140.8515	504.5265	0.388445	78.18808	21.00566	0.060152	0.01616

0.87% GENUINE AID/GNI

0.92% TOTAL AID/GNI

SWEDEN



To alleviate the humanitarian consequences of war and to resolve conflicts in the long term, regional and international cooperation is required. Development assistance must to an increased extent prevent and manage the effects of climate change. Sweden's development cooperation continues to focus on democracy and our work to strengthen women's and girls' rights. The pandemic has plunged an additional 70 million people into extreme poverty. Swedish development assistance will correspond to one per cent of gross national income."

Magdalena Andersson, Prime Minister,
government declaration, November 2021.

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

Sweden was engaged in the EU's and other multilateral responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Another focus was to double Sweden's climate finance before 2025. Sweden's ODA was 0.92% of GNI, lower than parliament's 1% target. However, the national aid budget corresponded to 1%. Some of this was reported in 2020 (when Sweden hit 1.14%) due to rules requiring loan credits to be reported in full the first year (in this case a multi-year Green Climate Fund core support).

In November 2021, after a government split, the post of minister for development was filled by a Social Democrat for the first time in 16 years. Thematic priorities remained similar to the previous minister's: climate, democracy, gender equality plus sustainable economic development.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

In the new year, the Ministry of the Interior implied that aid conditionality was part of a new migration policy package to promote returns and readmissions. However, there was no substantial proposal behind the press release. Russia's war against Ukraine made more humanitarian aid a priority. In response to the arrival of refugees in Sweden, the government made Sweden's biggest ever aid budget cut of almost EUR 1 billion. Since then, the government has restored almost half of the budget cut, but Sweden is the EU Member State which made the largest cuts to its



CASE STUDY

A regional strategy for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) in Southern Africa. Building on Sweden's feminist foreign policy, the SRHR strategy was recently renewed with increased funding, in dialogue with relevant actors in the region including civil society. The strategy influenced a TEI on SRHR in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2022 annual aid budget. Even climate finance was severely affected, which led to criticism ahead of the Stockholm+50 environmental summit.

Before the national elections in September, the commitment to international development cooperation and 1% of GNI was shared by six of eight political parties. The government that was formed following the elections will determine the influence of the two parties (right and extreme-right) who want to cut ODA.

Sweden has well-established support for civil society, through a dedicated strategy as well as country and thematic strategies. In the 2022 budget cuts, the civil society budget line was among the hardest hit at first, but was mostly restored after advocacy by CSOs. Swedish CSOs report a loss of trust from local partners towards Sweden.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT

- The government should continue to meet the target of 1% ODA/GNI and plan to phase out the reporting of in-donor refugee costs entirely in the future.
- While the reporting of in-donor costs persists, the government should conduct a public inquiry into ways of applying them, which safeguards assigned funds and minimises the loss of development focus, effectiveness or trust in Sweden's international partnerships.

- Take the opportunity of Sweden's 2023 EU presidency to put more political focus on ODA commitments and targets, the importance of development cooperation and public financing of sustainable development, for example in the LDC5 Summit in Doha, the Financing for Development agenda, and the Paris agreement on climate change.


ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	1485.4	0.3	30.4
2018	1584.8	0.3	31.7
2019	1622.7	0.3	33.5
2020	1726.8	0.4	31.0

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	3423.5	3382.5	41.1	1.2
2018	3291.4	3233.9	57.5	1.7
2019	3299.2	3240.1	59.1	1.8
2020	3175.0	3098.8	76.2	2.4

SWEDEN – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	221.6	283.8	505.4	56.2	10.4
2018	251.9	340.6	592.6	57.5	11.9
2019	283.5	360.8	644.3	56.0	13.3
2020	220.8	273.4	494.2	55.3	8.9

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	2498.2	2438.9	59.3	336.0	1634.8	468.2	67.0	19.2
2018	2649.8	2585.9	63.9	376.4	1690.2	519.3	65.4	20.1
2019	2837.2	2837.2	0.0	428.9	1908.4	499.8	67.3	17.6
2020	2823.3	2678.5	144.8	469.2	1769.0	440.2	66.0	16.4

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	2529.5	664.5	164.8	24.7	17.0	4.9	3.4
2018	2333.5	707.6	153.5	27.0	17.2	4.8	3.1
2019	2260.1	815.4	155.4	30.0	20.0	4.8	3.2
2020	2168.9	805.9	160.1	30.8	17.3	5.1	2.9



In the world we face today our development work must form an increasingly key part of a coherent UK foreign policy”

Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, International Development Strategy, published May 2022.

MAIN CHANGES IN 2021

The main story for UK ODA in 2021 was one of cuts. The UK government’s move away from its commitment to 0.7% GNI and reduce it to 0.5% was implemented during this year, with ODA spending totalling GBP 11.5 billion. This was a reduction of GBP 3 billion compared to 2020, and GBP 4.6 billion less than it would have been had the 0.7% target been met. These cuts were implemented with no transparency or consultation. The government announced that they would return to 0.7% when two fiscal tests had been met: 1) the UK is no longer borrowing for day-to-day spending on a sustainable basis and 2) underlying debt is falling.

The budget reduction coincided with the implementation of many of the strategic shifts announced during 2020, including the merger of the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This has increased the influence of the UK’s geopolitical concerns on the allocation of ODA, most notably to the Indo-Pacific region. We can see this strategic shift in the geographic spread of ODA during 2021. The proportion of bilateral ODA going to Africa from the FCDO (the primary ODA spending department) fell from 55.4% of the total bilateral spend to 52.2%, a cut of GBP 864 million or 39% compared to 2020. In comparison, funding to Asia was cut by 32%, the Americas by 19% and Europe by 12%. The new Foreign Secretary, who took on the role in September 2021, continued this strategic shift and also introduced a new increased focus on trade and investment.

The UK government has continued to maximise its use of ODA rules, reporting all eligible costs. The UK counted GBP 194 million, equating to 0.9% of the total ODA budget, towards sharing excess vaccine doses purchased for UK citizens. In-donor refugee costs increased significantly in 2021. The amount going to the Home Office, which spends almost all

its ODA budget on in-donor refugee costs, increased by 53% while other government department budgets were cut. Because the UK treats the 0.7%/0.5% target as a hard ceiling, this increase in spend on these areas will have required even further reductions elsewhere.

THE GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CSOS DURING 2021

The cuts to the ODA budget, and the opaque process by which they were implemented, placed strain on the government’s relationship with CSOs during the first half of 2021. Civil society organisations were not consulted on the decisions surrounding the reallocation of the ODA budget, and were often informed of cuts to their programmes with no notice. There were reports of government officials being actively discouraged from communicating with CSOs during this period.

Engagement improved during the second half of the year, with the government going out for consultation on the International Development Strategy, hosting roundtables with civil society and holding regular meetings with relevant CSOs on Afghanistan. However, four months after the consultation ended, the strategy was substantially revised without any further engagement with civil society. Communication was ad hoc and one-way, with a lack of transparency around the changes happening internally or implications for civil society.

TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2022 AND BEYOND

In 2022 there will most likely be increased pressure on the ODA budget. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the increased cost of living, the global food crisis and a probable reduction in GNI all place additional demands on a shrinking ODA budget. If the UK continues its approach of treating the 0.5%/0.7% target as a hard ceiling and continues to use ODA to fund the increasing in-donor refugee costs then it is likely further reductions will be needed in other ODA expenditure.


The new incoming Prime Minister and Cabinet in September 2022 will inherit these challenges and opportunities. In the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there will be continued calls to appropriate ODA for the UK’s foreign policy aims, in line with the strategy from the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence,

Development and Foreign Policy. However, the new leadership should recognise ODA's unique role and re-focus UK development finance on poverty eradication and the LNOB principle.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UK GOVERNMENT

- The UK should return to the 0.7% GNI/ODA budget, in line with the International Development Act, as soon as possible. Prepare a plan for how the budget will be systematically scaled up to meet the 0.7% target, to ensure the increase in ODA is spent effectively.
- The UK must recommit to a focus on poverty reduction in all decision-making and implementation of all ODA, pursuing an inclusive approach that targets resources where they are most needed and that aligns with the SDGs, the aid effectiveness principles, the commitment to LNOB and other key international agreements.
- The UK government should be transparent in its approach to allocating ODA and consult with civil society throughout the process.

UNITED KINGDOM – GENUINE AND INFLATED ODA (€ million, constant 2020)



ODA TO LDCS (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	ODA to LDCs	%GNI	% ODA
2017	5798.8	0.2	32.9
2018	5644.4	0.2	33.0
2019	5496.0	0.2	29.9
2020	4968.5	0.2	29.4

AID MODALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

Year	Bilateral (gross)	Grants	Loans	Loans (% of gross bilateral)
2017	11155.3	11116.6	38.7	0.3
2018	10991.5	10968.7	22.8	0.2
2019	12651.8	12578.5	73.2	0.6
2020	10864.4	10743.9	120.5	1.1

ODA TO CLIMATE FINANCE (€ million, constant 2020)

	ODA for mitigation	ODA for adaptation	Total climate finance	Adaptation finance as % of climate finance	Climate finance as % of ODA
2017	840.2	812.7	1652.9	49.2	9.4
2018	1103.8	804.7	1908.5	42.2	11.1
2019	1166.1	1033.9	2200.0	47.0	12.0
2020	817.9	680.4	1498.4	45.4	8.9

ODA TO SUPPORT GENDER EQUALITY (€ million, constant 2020)

	Bilateral allocable	Total screened	Not screened	None	Significant	Principal	Significant (% of screened)	Principal (% of screened)
2017	9985.5	9985.5	0.0	4633.9	4851.3	500.2	48.6	5.0
2018	9755.1	9517.5	237.6	3794.2	5238.8	484.5	55.0	5.1
2019	11138.9	10591.4	547.5	3890.5	6069.9	631.0	57.3	6.0
2020	9046.6	8711.2	335.5	2930.1	5212.0	569.0	59.8	6.5

ODA TO SUPPORT CSOs (€ million, constant 2020)

	Non-CSO	CSO Earmarked	CSO Core funding	Total bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Total bilateral CSO support (% ODA)	Core bilateral CSO support (% bilateral)	Core bilateral CSO support (% ODA)
2017	8933.3	1650.1	449.2	19.0	11.9	4.1	2.6
2018	9173.2	1238.6	416.9	15.3	9.7	3.9	2.4
2019	10675.0	1308.3	436.8	13.9	9.5	3.5	2.4
2020	8943.0	1374.9	396.4	16.5	10.5	3.7	2.3

ANNEX 1 – METHODOLOGY

HOW THE COMPONENTS OF INFLATED AID ARE CALCULATED

Under the OECD DAC's official definition of aid, donors can report a number of financial flows that, in CONCORD's opinion, do not genuinely contribute to the objectives of development and international cooperation. To give a more accurate picture of donors' efforts to reduce poverty and inequalities, the AidWatch methodology discounts the following items from net ODA flows:

- the imputed cost of hosting international students in the donor country;
- first year costs of receiving refugees in the donor country;
- interest repayments on concessional loans, which should instead be considered a 'negative' budget item;
- debt relief and future interest on cancelled debts;
- the additional cost of tied aid, in this report estimated at 15% of partially tied aid and 30% of tied aid.

The rationale for discounting these items is based on two criteria: an assessment of whether or not they contribute to sustainable development, based on the aid effectiveness principles, and whether or not they represent a genuine transfer of resources to developing countries. Measuring aid inflation in relation to total aid budgets, however, tends to minimise the real extent of the problem. The level of inflation is best perceived as a share of the bilateral aid budget, because it is only possible to estimate it in relation to the expenses incurred directly by donors. Consequently, 'genuine aid' is the sum of all multilateral aid and 'genuine bilateral aid' (meaning bilateral ODA disbursements, in this report in constant 2019 prices, minus the already mentioned inflated aid items).

IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS

Imputed student costs include the costs of tuition less any fees paid by the students, and are calculated as a percentage of public expenditure on higher education, weighted by the number of foreign students. In theory, only the cases in which foreign affairs ministries or aid agencies are involved

should be counted towards student costs, but the methodology for estimating these costs is not well defined by the OECD. Reporting practices also seem to differ by country, especially around the level of involvement of aid authorities and the types of costs that are eligible. As data on imputed student costs in 2021 was not widely available at the time of writing, the figures used in this report are based on projections calculated with the official data available from 2016 to 2020. For more details on how the projections were calculated, see the 'Quantitative data' section of this Annex. However, some donor agencies responded to a questionnaire requesting this data, and the figures obtained are used where possible.

REFUGEE COSTS

According to OECD DAC rules, resources spent on supporting refugees arriving in the donor country are eligible as ODA for the first 12 months of their stay. Eligible expenditure includes payments for refugees' transport to the host country, temporary sustenance (food, shelter and training) and some of the costs of resettlement. In CONCORD's view, while it is vital for countries to support refugees arriving at their borders, labelling this kind of expenditure as ODA is misleading, given that it provides no resources for developing countries and is not linked to the core purpose of ODA, which is to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. In addition, donors show considerable differences in their reporting practices. To obtain the genuine aid figure, therefore, in-donor refugee costs must be removed from net ODA flows.

New reporting standards for in-donor refugee costs were clarified by the DAC at the High Level Meeting in October 2017. The reporting directives reinstate the eligibility rule of covering only the first 12 months of stay; they also clarify eligible categories of refugees and cost items. However, the outcome of this review process did not address CSOs' demand for donors to phase out entirely the reporting of in-donor refugee costs as ODA.

DEBT RELIEF AND FUTURE INTEREST ON CANCELLED DEBTS

When donors cancel or reschedule bilateral debts, the amount cancelled can be reported as aid in the year the debt is restructured. The cancellation of unpayable debts is important, but it should not be counted as aid. In the first place, in their cancellation donors can count both the principal and future interest; and since many of the debts are long term, counting future interest can inflate the figure significantly. Secondly, the relationship between the debt and sustainable development objectives is often unclear.

TIED AID

Making aid conditional on the purchase of goods and services from one donor country, or a restricted set of countries, reduces its sustainable development impact. Firstly, this is because it increases the cost of purchasing goods and services (by between 15% and 30%), undermining affordability for poor countries. It acts as an expensive subsidy for donor country industries. And secondly, because it may actually increase the net resource flow from developing to donor countries. By preventing developing countries from procuring local goods and services, it undermines local job generation and economic development. To reflect the financial impact of tying, the CONCORD AidWatch methodology discounts 30% of the flows that are recorded as fully tied and 15% of the flows that are partially tied. As data on tied aid in 2021 was not available at the time of writing, the figures used in this report are based on projections calculated with the official data available from 2016 to 2020. For more details on how the projections were calculated, see the 'Quantitative data' section of this Annex.

INTEREST PAYMENT ON CONCESSIONAL LOANS

When donors estimate their net ODA, they discount the repayment of the principal by recipient governments, but not interest payments, which are counted as aid. CONCORD AidWatch counts these interest payments as inflated aid. Since 2018, loans have been reported to the OECD DAC in a different way. These changes were made after it was noted that France, Germany and the European Investment Bank had extended over USD 2.5 billion (EUR 1.8 billion) in 'concessional' loans to developing countries at interest rates above their own borrowing costs. As data for 2021 on interest repayments was not

available at the time of writing, the figures used in this report are based on projections calculated with the official data available from 2016 to 2020. For more details on how the projections were calculated, see the 'Quantitative data' section of this Annex.

IN-EXCESS VACCINE DONATIONS

In 2021, many donors counted significant sums of ODA for donating "excess vaccinations." These were vaccinations against the COVID-19 virus that were not bought for the sake of developing countries, but for rich countries' own benefit, and were only given to developing countries after it became clear that they could not all be used. Many were given too near the expiry date to be used by the recipients. In addition, the fact that rich countries bought up many more vaccines than they could use contributed to the shortage in the Global South, and hence exacerbated the significant vaccine inequality. Given that the vaccines were not bought with a developmental purpose, and there was no donor effort at the point of donation, CONCORD AidWatch includes ODA counted on these donations as inflated aid. Figures are taken from the DAC press release on preliminary ODA figures and converted to constant 2020 euros.

RESEARCH SOURCES FOR QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

The main source for the qualitative findings in the report was a review of CONCORD's position papers, desk-based research drawing on both official and non-official analysis and interviews with the European Commission and CSO representatives from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Philippines. Other sources include the European Commission, OECD and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Additionally, focal discussion groups were led by consultants involving CONCORD's member organisations, including both national platforms and international networks. This was complemented by inputs from the CONCORD AidWatch team.

The main source for the country examples in the report was a standardised questionnaire survey, conducted by the authors among all of CONCORD's 28 national platforms at the start of the report drafting period. The national platforms themselves drafted the country pages. For the EU institutions, the country page was drafted by the author and the main sources used were official European Commission documents, the EU Aid Explorer website and the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

The main sources of information about the Team Europe approach were the EU's guidance document, *Working Better Together as Team Europe through joint programming and joint implementation*, and the Council of the European Union's "Strengthening Team Europe's commitment to Human Development - Council conclusions (14 June 2021)". Other sources included interviews with EU officials, civil society representatives and other relevant stakeholders, as well as the questionnaire responses provided by CONCORD's national platforms across Member States.

QUANTITATIVE DATA

The report relies on the OECD CRS dataset, including preliminary OECD DAC data for 2021. This data has been complemented by updated figures provided by CONCORD's national platforms. In some cases, data provided by the European Commission and Eurostat has been used (for example, as the DAC only publish the imputed multilateral share for DAC members, it is not possible to get the percentage of ODA/GNI to LDCs directly from DAC tables). Data for 2019 was also compiled using the OECD CRS dataset, now confirmed and which might slightly differ from preliminary data used in last year's edition.

In 2018, the OECD DAC changed its reporting practice, moving from calculating ODA spending on a cash basis to a grant equivalent basis. In this report, CONCORD analyses recorded ODA against the flow basis method, to facilitate our comparison of ODA figures with previous years and because of the controversies of the OECD DAC grant equivalent methodology. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures in Part One are given in euros and expressed in 2020 constant prices, as is the case for all the figures obtained from a primary source. The use of constant prices partially justifies the difference of official preliminary figures, in addition to some updated information already included in the report. All figures in Part Two are expressed in current prices unless noted otherwise. Since data for 2021 on imputed student costs, tied aid and interest repayments was not published by the OECD or in general not accessible to the national platforms at the time of writing, some projections are based on official data from 2014 to 2019. Several methods of projecting the 2020 values were attempted (including linear regression, Holt-Winters method, combinations) but when modelling past data, by far the most accurate method used was to simply assume that data was unchanged relative to the previous year. Therefore, when data was missing for 2021, we impute the data from 2020. However,

the published data inevitably will deviate slightly from the numbers assumed in this report. For imputed student costs, most countries that spend heavily on this category have provided data.

To project the estimated timescale for keeping the 0.7% promise, based on both total and genuine ODA, a simple linear trend was estimated. This is not intended as a forecast of likely future values of ODA, but an illustration of the path ODA will take if continuing along current trends. In addition, the quantitative analysis of ODA provided to LDCs relies on EU compiled data from 2008 to 2019, reported by Eurostat. Eurostat only reports ODA to LDCs as a percentage of GNI, and so these figures are converted to constant 2019 euro figures using current GNI data and deflators reported as part of OECD DAC table 1.

GENDER FOCUS

The gender markers were introduced by the DAC as a tool to track aid activities that target gender equality as a policy objective. Aid projects are given a score of 0, 1, or 2, indicating no gender objective, a significant gender objective or that gender equality is the principal objective.

The gender markers are only applicable to "bilateral allocable" ODA, which excludes categories such as donors' administrative costs or debt relief, which by their nature cannot be assigned a gender focus. The full list of aid types included in bilateral allocable ODA are (CRS aid type codes in brackets): sector budget support (A02), core support to NGOs (B01), support to specific funds managed by international organisations (B03), pooled funding (B04), projects (C01), donor country personnel (D01), other technical assistance (D02), and scholarships in donor country (E01). The reporting on the gender markers by projects is incomplete, and projects have been screened for a gender objective. To calculate the percentage of ODA that has a gender objective, we calculate ODA that has a principal or significant gender objective as a percentage of all ODA that has been screened. This might overstate the real gender focus if projects that have not been screened are less likely to have a gender focus.

SUPPORT TO CSOS

Support to CSOs is identified in the CRS dataset by the following parent channel codes: 21000 (international CSO), 22000 (donor country based CSO), and 23000 (developing country NGO). The CRS variable "Bi_Multi" is then used to identify whether this

support is core (if this variable takes a value of either 3 or 7) or earmarked (all other values). See the DAC-CRS code book for full details. To calculate ODA to CSOs as a percentage of total ODA, we calculate total aid to CSOs from both Member States and EU institutions as a percentage of total ODA from EU Member States.

CLIMATE FINANCE METHODOLOGY

Climate finance has been measured using the Rio markers contained in the CRS dataset. These markers were not originally intended to be quantitative. However, they nevertheless form the base of the Biennial Report Submissions to the UNFCCC, which are widely regarded to be the most “official” source of climate finance data. Unfortunately, the UNFCCC data is still only available up until 2018, and there are numerous inconsistencies in how different donors use the markers when reporting. Therefore, we use the Rio markers directly from the CRS.

Producing climate finance figures:

Projects can be marked as having either a “principal” or “significant” climate focus on either adaptation or mitigation objectives. We form an aggregate climate finance figure for each donor in the following way:

- When projects are marked as having either adaptation or mitigation as a principal objective, we count 100% of the project as climate finance.
- When projects are marked as having either a significant adaptation or mitigation objective (but not both) we count 40% of the value of the project as climate finance.
- When projects are marked as having both an adaptation and mitigation objective (whether significant or principal) we count 100% of the project as climate finance.

This methodology is common among DAC countries, although some countries use different coefficients on projects with one significant marker. To produce data as comparable as possible across donors, we use the same coefficients for each. This does not guarantee consistency: the way that the Rio markers are applied might differ among countries, and there is evidence that many are applied to projects that have limited real focus on climate.

Estimating the share of adaptation in climate finance:

We are particularly interested in the share of climate finance that goes towards adaptation. Donors have committed to provide a “balance” between climate finance to mitigation and adaptation objectives, and adaptation finance is a higher priority for many developing countries, especially since the rich world continues to be a much greater source of greenhouse gas emissions. When projects only have either an adaptation or mitigation marker applied, assessing the share which is adaptation is simple. When projects have both markers applied, we adopt the following method:

- We count 50% of the climate finance associated with the project as adaptation if the markers are at the same level (i.e. either significant or principal),
- We count 33% of the climate finance associated with the project as adaptation if the project has a significant adaptation marker but principal mitigation marker, and
- We count 67% of the climate finance associated with the project as adaptation if the project has a principal significant adaptation marker.

ANNEX 2 – TABLES

TABLE 1: EU-14 2020-2021 GENUINE AND TOTAL ODA AS PERCENTAGE OF GNI (IN 2020 CONSTANT PRICES)

	Total aid as % of GNI in 2021	Genuine aid as % of GNI in 2021	Total aid as % of GNI in 2020	Genuine aid as % of GNI in 2020
Luxembourg	0.99	0.95	1.03	1.03
Sweden	0.92	0.87	1.14	1.11
Germany	0.72	0.59	0.75	0.62
Denmark	0.70	0.68	0.72	0.70
France	0.56	0.45	0.60	0.48
Netherlands	0.52	0.48	0.59	0.53
Finland	0.49	0.47	0.47	0.45
Belgium	0.46	0.40	0.49	0.44
Ireland	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.29
Austria	0.31	0.26	0.31	0.26
Italy	0.29	0.22	0.23	0.22
Spain	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.19
Portugal	0.18	0.13	0.19	0.16
Greece	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.13

TABLE : EU-13 2020-2021 GENUINE AND TOTAL ODA AS PERCENTAGE OF GNI (IN 2020 CONSTANT PRICES)

	Total aid as % of GNI in 2020	Genuine aid as % of GNI in 2020	Total aid as % of GNI in 2019	Genuine aid as % of GNI in 2019
Malta	0.34	0.09	0.40	0.11
Hungary	0.29	0.26	0.27	0.27
Slovenia	0.19	0.14	0.17	0.14
Estonia	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.16
Poland	0.15	0.11	0.14	0.12
Croatia	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.13
Czech Republic	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12
Slovak Republic	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.12
Lithuania	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13
Latvia	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12
Bulgaria	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.12
Romania	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.13
Cyprus	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09

TABLE 3: EU 2020 INFLATED AND GENUINE AID (IN 2019 CONSTANT PRICES)

	TOTAL AID, FLOW BASIS		BILATERAL AID		INFLATED AID		GENUINE AID	
	€m	%GNI	€m	% total aid	€m	% total aid	€m	% total aid
Austria	1191	0.31	568	47.6	194	16	997	84
Belgium	2029	0.46	938	46.2	277	14	1752	86
Bulgaria	70	0.12	11	15.3	5	7	65	93
Croatia	74	0.15	17	22.9	8	11	66	89
Cyprus	0	na	0	#DIV/0!	0	na	0	na
Czech Republic	273	0.13	59	21.5	15	5	258	95
Denmark	2298	0.70	1518	66.0	87	4	2211	96
Estonia	50	0.17	21	42.1	0	0	50	100
Finland	1185	0.49	555	46.8	55	5	1130	95
France	13506	0.56	8386	62.1	2615	19	10891	81
Germany	24903	0.72	18152	72.9	4707	19	20196	81
Greece	209	0.12	5	2.4	1	0	208	100
Hungary	353	0.29	212	60.1	29	8	324	92
Ireland	958	0.31	515	53.8	45	5	913	95
Italy	4914	0.29	1907	38.8	1090	22	3824	78
Latvia	38	0.12	5	12.1	3	9	35	91
Lithuania	67	0.13	14	20.7	5	7	63	93
Luxembourg	420	0.99	300	71.4	15	4	404	96
Malta	44	0.34	38	86.5	32	73	12	27
Netherlands	4207	0.52	2990	71.1	327	8	3881	92
Poland	757	0.15	211	27.9	173	23	585	77
Portugal	354	0.18	121	34.3	92	26	261	74
Romania	257	0.12	73	28.3	9	4	248	96
Slovak Republic	120	0.13	28	23.6	12	10	108	90
Slovenia	91	0.19	36	39.7	25	28	66	72
Spain	2609	0.23	930	35.6	443	17	2166	83
Sweden	4528	0.92	3028	66.9	212	5	4316	95
Total EU27 Member States	65508	0.48	40636	62.0	10477	16	55031	84
Memo:								
United Kingdom	12811	0.52	7623	59.5	1074	8	11737	92

ANNEX 3

– LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMC	Advanced Markets Commitment
AU	African Union
COP	Climate Change Conference
COVAX	COVID-19 Vaccines Access
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSSI	Debt Service Suspension Initiative
EFSD	European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
GAPIII	Gender Action Plan III
GCE	Global Citizenship Education
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LICs	Low-income countries
LMICs	Lower middle-income countries
MIPs	Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NGDO	Non-Governmental Development Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCSD	Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TEIs	Team Europe Initiatives
UK	United Kingdom
UMICs	Upper middle-income countries
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States
VNR	Voluntary National Review
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation

OUR MEMBERS

<p>NATIONAL PLATFORMS</p>	 <p>Global Responsibility Austrian Platform for Development and Humanitarian Aid</p>	<p>BELGISCH PLATFORM PLATE-FORME BELGE</p>  <p>CONCORD CNCO-11.11.11 ACODEV ngo-federatie</p>	 <p>BPID Bulgarian Platform for International Development</p>	<p>Platforma za međunarodnu građansku solidarnost Hrvatske — Croatian Platform for International Citizens Solidarity</p>  <p>CROSOL</p>	 <p>FORS</p>	<p>GLOBAL FOCUS Danish NGOs for Development Cooperation</p>
 <p>AKÜ</p>	<p>fingo</p>	 <p>COORDINATION SUD</p>	 <p>VENRO ASSOCIATION OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID NGOS</p>	 <p>Hellenic Platform for Development</p>	 <p>HAND</p>	<p>dóchas The Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organisations</p>
<p>Network delle ONG in Europa per lo sviluppo e l'emergenza</p>  <p>CONCORD ITALIA</p>	<p>LAPAS</p>  <p>Luxembourg Platform for Development Cooperation</p>	 <p>Cercle de coopération des ONG DU LUXEMBOURG</p>	 <p>SKOP Solidarjetät u Koperazzjoni</p>	 <p>PARTOS</p>	 <p>ZAGRANICA</p>	<p>ONGD PLATAFORMA PORTUGUESA</p>
 <p>FOND Národní Organizace na pomoc dětem a rodinám</p>	 <p>Ambrella Platform for Development Organisations</p>	 <p>SLOGA Slovenian Global Action</p>	 <p>LA COORDINADORA DE ORGANIZACIONES PARA EL DESARROLLO</p>	 <p>C&NCORD SWEDEN</p>	 <p>bond</p>	<p>NETWORKS</p>
<p>actalliance eu formerly APCODEV</p>	<p>actonaid</p>	 <p>ADRA</p>	<p>Alliance 2015 towards the eradication of poverty</p>	 <p>care</p>	 <p>caritas europa</p>	<p>ChildFund Alliance</p>
<p>CIDSE together for global justice</p>	<p>eucord European Council of Organisations for Humanitarian and Development</p>	 <p>GNDR</p>	 <p>Habitat for Humanity</p>	<p>handicap international humanity & inclusion</p>	<p>IPPF International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network</p>	<p>LIGHT FOR THE WORLD</p>
 <p>OXFAM International</p>	 <p>PLAN INTERNATIONAL</p>	 <p>Save the Children</p>	 <p>Sightsavers</p>	<p>solidar</p>	<p>SOS CHILDREN'S VILLAGES INTERNATIONAL</p>	<p>Terre des Hommes International Federation</p>
 <p>wecf</p>	 <p>Wetlands INTERNATIONAL</p>	<p>World Vision EU REPRESENTATION</p>	 <p>WWF</p>	<p>ASSOCIATE MEMBERS</p>	<p>alda* European Association for Local Democracy</p>	 <p>CARDET</p>
 <p>EAEA EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE EDUCATION OF ADULTS</p>	<p>EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY</p>	<p>EUROPEAN DISABILITY FORUM</p>	 <p>INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE</p>	<p>NRC NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL</p>		



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